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dimension by the turn of the twentieth century. Drawing on archival sources, the thesis 
explores what motivated British social imperialism, how knowledge and political thought 
operated within it, and how it translated into local colonial policy in the Bombay Presidency, 
British India, between 1895-1925. The study uses Michel Foucault’s concept of bio-politics to 
engage the ways in which emerging social liberalism, and British sociology, enabled the 
conceptualisation and politicisation of a distinct social domain, and helped putting ‘the social’ 
into British imperialism. Sociology and social liberalism defined the social in vague terms. 
Yet, I will show, it was seen as key to stability and progress. It was perceived by 
contemporaries as contingent of, but not determined by, industrial capitalism and the 
emergence of modem industrial society. Liberalism, the thesis points out, had always been 
closely related to British imperialism in general, and the British administration of India in 
particular. The introduction of a social element in liberalism did not end that relationship; 
rather, it enabled a shift in preferred domain of intervention from the moral to the social. I 
outline what constituted social liberalism and how it influenced imperial thought. Sociology, 
in turn, delineated the social domain and made it known. I revisit turn of the twentieth-century 
debates within British sociology and trace how these debates informed the official 
introduction of sociological research into colonial India. The study examines various angles 
of how social imperialism translated into the Presidency. It shows how administrators began 
to frame interventions through social-political language, and how they utilised sociological 
methodology and research. It analyses actual social interventions of sanitation, education, and 
housing. I suggest that social interventions, evoked in the name of stability and progress, 
formed as measures to draw on and channel movements and tendencies within colonial 
society, while simultaneously promoting the state as vehicle for reform. Social interventions 
widened the scope of colonial state action, and so limited society- and market based 
approaches to conditions of life.
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Preface
Thomas Henry Holland was an energetic man. As a trained geologist, he went to 
Calcutta for the first time in 1890 in order to pursue studies of local geological 
questions. Holland soon settled into the daily routine of the Anglo-Indian community in 
that administrative centre of the British Raj: he joined the Calcutta Volunteer Rifles, he 
lectured in geology at the Presidency College, and he rose within the ranks of the 
Government Geological Survey. In 1903 he was appointed President of the Survey. The 
exclusivist character of the Raj helped Holland to sidestep Pramatha Nath Bose, who 
was ten years his senior in service and was considered next in line for promotion.
Holland travelled widely to study mining and industrial development. He travelled in 
India. He went to Europe, Australia, and to North America. Holland saw himself as an 
advocate for using practical scientific discoveries in processes of modern industry; he 
thought it would help advance the Indian economy. Holland happily accepted to lead the 
Indian Industrial Commission in 1916 when he was appointed to the chairmanship. 
Soon he was promoted to take charge of the newly formed Department of Munitions 
and Industries of the Government of India -  and in that capacity he joined the Viceroy’s 
Executive Council as its youngest member.1
But something was troubling Thomas Holland. On 19 February 1920 he was engaged in 
a debate in the Indian Legislative Council in Delhi concerning industrial progress in 
British India. In the course of debate Holland made the following remarks:
A question of more immediate importance is that of 
housing of workers, especially in those industrial 
areas that have recently developed at a rapid rate. The 
reduction of factory hours is of no use to the worker 
so long as his so-called home is even less comfortable 
than the [cotton textile] mill...In addition to the 
general question, the [Indian] Industrial Commission
1 MacLeod, R.M, Entry on ‘Holland, Sir Thomas Henry’. Oxford Dictionary o f  National 
Biography. Accessed online at http://www.oxforddnb.com 16 December 2008.
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devoted very special attention to the alarming 
conditions at Bombay, where the difficulties are 
greatest and the necessity for improvement is most 
urgent. Every time there is a strike at Bombay, one 
cannot help sympathising with the strikers, because 
of the degenerating conditions under which they 
live...I have had opportunities of studying the social 
welfare of workers in the principal industrial areas of 
India, in England, in America and Australia; but I 
have never seen anything quite so depressing as some 
of the labour quarters in Bombay. On the whole, I 
think it not unfair or even indiscreet.. .to say that I 
would rather see the mill industry of Bombay wiped 
out than accept an indefinite perpetuation of the 
conditions under which many of the workers are 
necessarily compelled to live...At Bombay, the 
question is urgent on economic as much as 
humanitarian grounds.2
Thomas Holland’s fellow members in council did not object to his social language and 
welfarist approach. Nor was he met by surprised comments from other British officials 
participating in the discussion. Some decades earlier, his statement would have been 
unusual, if  not controversial, coming from a colonial official. But on that day in 
February 1920 Thomas Holland’s topic -  housing in Bombay -  must have sounded 
familiar to council members; social welfare in relation to industrial development was 
debated frequently at this time throughout the industrialising world, and in Britain.
Holland’s statement reflects how during the first quarter of the twentieth century, 
socialised political language instilled itself into a section of influential administrators in 
India, who now formed part of a wider, initially metropolitan, movement of thinkers, 
bureaucrats and politicians. This movement expressed concerns over the conditions of 
life in modem industrial society. The movement had, since the concluding decades of
2 Maharashtra State Archive, Mumbai [M.S.A.] Proceedings o f the Indian Legislative Council 
1920. Holland, T. Proceedings o f 19 February 1920, 816.
the nineteenth century in Britain, helped to make political the domain of human 
existence called ‘the social’.
What defined ‘the social’ as a political space was not entirely clear. The social was an 
elusive and ambiguous concept. Perhaps it is best described with Mitchell Dean’s words 
as a set of ‘problems, agents, institutional sites, forms of knowledge, and types of 
action’. As such the social was conceptualised as a secularised and disenchanted 
domain. The idea of ‘the social’ framed modem society as a lived experience. It brought 
together the existence, effects and experiences of wage labour, of mechanisation of 
industry and agriculture, of rural-urban migration, and of new divisions of labour.
The social was conceptualised as a modern space that could be known rationally, and as 
we shall see, even scientifically. It had evolved from (but sometimes co-existed with) 
what were perceived to be customary and traditional ways of life. The social existed as a 
domain separated from, yet closely interrelated to, the domains of economy and polity. 
The notion of a distinct modem social domain was intimately linked to, yet not 
exclusively derived from, a growing awareness of the transformative force of capitalist 
market relations, and contingent new developments of modem industrialisation.
The politicisation of the social was also linked to a positive notion of political power. 
There existed at this time an optimism concerning the prospect of state machineries to 
tend to the side effects of industrial capitalism, and of ways of life in modern society. 
As will be further discussed below, the invention of a social domain now enabled this 
movement to connect a wide range of previously unconnected aspects of life in modem 
society -  health, education, poverty, sanitation, living conditions, and leisure -  and to 
question their effect on economy and polity. Such aspects of life had previously been 
understood as being governed by their own laws -  moved by history — and left without 
notice by bureaucracy and politicians. Now policy makers found that in order to tend to 
the side effects of modem industrialisation, which they thought gave rise to radicalism, 
while simultaneously turn society stable, as well as accommodating towards new modes 
of production, previously unregulated conditions of life needed management. The social 
domain fell under the aegis of bureaucracies and public agencies, as it was thought that 
political involvement could help preserve life, increase productivity and reduce 
discontent.
3 Dean, M. (1999) Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society. London: Sage, 66.
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The ideas of this movement, which had mobilised progressive circles in Britain, were 
initially for domestic consumption. Later however, and this is where this thesis makes 
its contribution, they came to influence imperial thought and layers of imperial 
operators. To use Michel Foucault, and I will explain this further in chapter one: to tend 
to the welfare of subjects, to work through society by moulding its capacities, to come 
to know what mobilised society and what need it had, now seemed a more effective 
form of government to influential sections of imperialists than to simply dominate and 
coerce subjected populations. In short, for them, bio-politics, that is, the shift towards a 
greater concern of governing institutions for conditions of life of populations, their 
health and welfare, became an acknowledged aspect of imperial power.4 To return to 
Foucault’s vocabulary, with this shift in imperialism, sovereignty did no longer only 
signify power over death, but also power over life.
As I will show, ideas forming within this movement came to inform colonial 
administrators in India as well, especially those so-called liberal governors of the 
Presidencies of Bombay, Bengal and Madras. Bio-politics emerged as a motivation for 
colonial administration. The assertion that colonial officials considered the conditions of 
life of Indians may seem strange given that the already high death rate in India in the 
1880s rose to disturbing 48.6 per 1000 during the period between 1911 and 1921.5 For 
sure, new ideas about how to study the social and to design social interventions, as I will 
show, would be applied selectively in India. But the notion of a socialised imperialism 
that took seriously social conditions of industrialising areas of the empire left imprints in 
India by the turn of the twentieth-century. Tentatively at first, more pronounced around 
the First World War, growing social concerns in industrial areas of India would begin to 
have a real impact on local colonial practice.
This thesis will investigate the birth of social imperialism, its motivations, and how 
political thought and knowledge operated within it. This study will also show how social 
imperialism translated into political language, new demands for social science, and 
newly designed interventions of sanitation, education and housing in colonial Bombay 
Presidency.
4 Foucault, M. (2000a) ‘The Birth o f Biopoliticsh In Rabinow, P. (Ed) Ethics: Essential Works 
o f  Foucault 1954-1984 volume 1. London: Penguin Books.
5 Arnold, D. (1993) Colonizing the Body: State Medicine and Epidemic Disease in Nineteenth- 
Century India. Berkeley, CA: University o f California Press, 200.
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The period revisited here was, as we shall see, a time of great upheaval, anxiety and 
crises within empire, but also one of great optimism. The twentieth-century brought with 
it reformulated visions of the state’s obligation to society and of how social science 
could contribute to disintersted statecraft. It earned ideas of participation and prospects 
of prosperity that would penetrate layers of both domestic and colonial society.
In Europe the practice of inventing, then regulating, the social domain contributed to the 
foundation of welfarism and the welfare state. The reinscription of such practices into a 
colonial context would, of course, leave out many positive contributions. Social 
imperialism did not ultimately change the focus of colonial administration in India. 
Undoubtedly, as Sudipta Kaviraj points out, the ‘thin’ colonial state remained structured 
around its main functions of extraction and the upholding of public order.6 Nonetheless, 
the records produced by British administrators and their Indian colleagues tell of a 
growing imperial concern over conditions of life.
My assertion is that the birth of social imperialism reflected an important change in how 
sections of British administrators in India, and politicians and thinkers in Britain, 
conceptualised how the imperial connection might best be maintained with 
industrialising areas of their empire. Operators within the imperial machinery felt a need 
to formulate ideas about imperial rule that would answer to questions over the 
legitimacy of empire in the twentieth-century, while still help ensuring what they 
believed to be stability and progress in British dependencies. Social imperialism, I find, 
formed out of such efforts of formulation.
Although the force with which the social argument helped transform state society 
relations in Britain was watered down in India, it helped -  as I will show -  to 
reconceptualise the ways in which imperialists ‘at home’ and administrators ‘on the 
spot’ perceived political power as a force to employ in their formative attempts to 
manage society.
I will argue that emerging social imperialism brought about certain shifts in how 
imperialists viewed the capacity and role of imperial power and colonial government in
6 Kaviraj, S. (1997) ‘The M odem State in India’. In Doornbos, M. and Kaviraj, S. (Eds.) 
Dynamics o f  State Formation: India and Europe Compared. Delhi: Sage, 225-250.
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colonial society. First, with the introduction of a social component in imperialism, 
nineteenth century imperial obsessions with moral reform were reduced, and more 
comprehensive interventions were promoted. Social imperialism departed from previous 
ideas about moral improvement or betterment of character of colonial subjects, in that it 
explicitly took the social and aggregated populations as its object of reference and 
intervention.
Secondly, social imperialism presented bio-political measures of reaching into the social 
domain as effective alternatives to the use of force in the management of colonial 
society. When translated into a colonial context, social imperialists would have political 
power working through society, rather than to simply dominate or discipline it. The new 
approach implied that local colonial administrators must better come to know colonial 
society; it was an approach that demanded new forms of action-oriented and applied 
social knowledge to become integrated into local policy.
Thirdly, social imperialism called forth a positive notion of state power in the 
management of colonial society, at the expense of market- and society based action. 
Translated into colonial practice, social imperialism would increase social concerns of 
local administrations, and chalk out an expanded scope of state action. The birth of 
social imperialism instilled into alien and unrepresentative forms of administration a 
sense of urgency to tend to social problems. The sense of urgency derived from a belief 
that would the state not act upon social problems, neither markets nor polity would 
continue undisrupted.
I will argue that the introduction of a social component into imperial thought was 
enabled by a social turn in liberalism, and the emergence and imperial reach of British 
sociology. Contemporary liberalism, of course, was a broad strand. By the turn of the 
twentieth-century, however, the arguments of radical social liberals came to exercise 
great influence over liberal thought, especially during the years of Liberal Party 
government in Britain, 1906-14. But the social liberal movement was broader than its 
party; it included prominent British thinkers and economists, as well as support of 
subaltern classes in Britain who rallied behind the idea of a politics beyond 
contemporary liberal individualism. The social liberal movement’s linkages to trade 
unions and the co-operative movements, and its broad middle-class base helped it to 
become a force, which, as Nikolas Rose writes, sought more than parliamentary power:
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it aspired to rework liberal tenants of minimal state intervention and to transform state 
society relations as to ‘mitigate what were now seen as the inevitable social 
consequences of capitalist economic arrangements’.7
I will show that ideas from within this movement in liberalism came to influence 
contemporary imperialism and its views on the reformist capacity of British imperial 
power. I will discuss liberalism’s history of being the most active reformist ideology 
under British rule on the Subcontinent. Now the issue of whether to project new social 
liberal views within the British Empire -  and if so, how to do it -  posed a range of 
intricate questions to British imperialists and colonial administrators. Yet, as I will 
suggest, socialised political language and strategies seemed convincing to them; it even 
made a reformist Tory with gusto for precedence and glory -  the then Governor of 
Bombay Presidency George Lloyd -  embrace a social interventionist language.
Simultaneously, the new discipline of sociology came to influence domestic social 
liberalism and emerging social imperialism. Politicians in Britain and administrators in 
India alike hoped that utilising sociology would help them to ‘scientifically’ probe those 
social conditions that caused them so much anxiety. Although the work of early 
sociologists like August Comte and Herbert Spencer was decisive for the development 
of the sociological discipline itself, it was the views of practically oriented sociologists 
like Charles Booth, Seebohm Rowntree, and the early Patrick Geddes, that first came to 
influence administrators within British India. During the latter part of the nineteenth 
century and the first quarter of the twentieth, wide surveys of the conditions in 
industrialising urban areas in India began to emerge.
In India, and in Bombay, administrators tried to institutionalise sociology within their 
reach. Traditional political economy, it seemed to some of them, could no longer 
provide the necessary knowledge about conditions of life in Bombay Presidency. In 
modem society, as Percy Anstey, principal of Sydenham College in Bombay, argued, 
‘progress’ could not only be measured through flows of commerce and trade. One must
7 Rose, N. (1999) Powers o f  freedom: reframing political thought. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 118.
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also rigorously study and compare ‘the general conditions of life, as regards housing, 
sanitation, education, intensity of work, and so on’.8
Colonial Bombay Presidency makes a compelling case for a study of how social 
imperialism actually translated into colonial administration. The Bombay Presidency 
covered a large section of the western flank of British India. It started in the lush palm 
groves just north of Goa in the south, ending in the harsher climate in Sind [Sindh] in 
current Pakistan. The port and industrial cities of the Presidency were all expanding 
rapidly, and many of the perceived characteristics of modern industrial society would 
make themselves known in these urban areas.
The city of Bombay, for a long time India’s largest city and second only in size to 
London in the British Empire, was of great importance to the Raj. Other urban centres 
of the Presidency, Karachi, Ahmedabad, Allahabad, Poona, and Surat were all of great 
political and economic importance to the British Raj. Some of these urban centres 
showed early segmentation along class lines, with indigenous as well as foreign 
industrialists and expanding labour forces. Housing, education and sanitation -  issues in 
any large industrial or commercial centre — became urgent problems. Congestion, ill 
health, illiteracy and high mortality rates began taxing local business as well as to 
translate into nationalist and radical political consciousness.
The cotton textile industry dominated Bombay City, as well as Ahmedabad. Trade 
around the port made up most of Karachi’s business. Both Bombay and Karachi 
attracted a regular, although cyclical, influx of migrants from rural areas. As will be 
further detailed in chapter two, urban Bombay Presidency grew enormously during the 
latter part of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
The city of Bombay had seen a remarkable growth since the 1850s, putting its social 
and economic infrastructure under intense pressure. As the British opium trade 
temporarily ceased during the 1860s, indigenous capital was re-directed into the cotton 
textile industry. By the turn of the twentieth-century the wider Bombay region was 
strongly integrated into the world economy, and was closely linked to neighbouring
8 University o f Strathclyde Archives, Glasgow [Univ.S.A.]. Sir Patrick Geddes Collection [T- 
GED] [item nr,] 12/2/123. Anstey, P. (22 July 1922) ‘Moral and M aterial Progress o f India’. 
Bombay Chronicle.
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cotton producing areas in British India. After the first textile mill was erected in the 
1850s, a textile industry soon burst with activity. The city of Bombay became, along 
with New York and Liverpool, one of the main market places for the global cotton 
trade.
The cotton textile industry formed the backbone of the city’s economic life for decades. 
From its outset, Bombay was a haven of indigenous Indian capital. Later, by 1914, 
Bombay City received more than 87 per cent of the total value of Indian capital 
investment; most of these investments were directed towards the cotton industry.9 In 
1912 the cotton textile mills employed around 110,000 workers. In 1922 the number of 
workers in the mills had increased to over 150,000, which, in turn, made up 73.5 per 
cent of the total number of workers in Bombay City.10
The social texture of the urban setting was very much a product of the migration 
patterns of workers and the lower middle-classes. Mostly, the manual workers of 
Bombay had arrived from the Konkan area of the Presidency, and many skilled artisans 
came from the Punjab. This varied social composition was, in fact, a continuation of the 
multi-ethnic history of Bombay. Beginning in the early 1670s, the British had invited 
prosperous merchants and traders from various ethnic groups to resettle in the area. 
These merchants and traders would, in turn, set up businesses and attract artisans from 
their respective regions.11 Yet the latter period of the influx of migrants was on a much 
larger scale. Especially during the years surrounding the First World War, Bombay -  as 
did Karachi -  witnessed a considerable increase in population.
Karachi was of great interest to British India’s northwestern regions. The city was vital 
for the province in Sind, which formed the northern part of the Bombay Presidency. 
Sind was made into a province of its own in the mid 1930s. The province differed in 
many ways from the rest of the Presidency. British rule was established almost 20 years 
later in Sind than in the southern parts of the Bombay Presidency. The population of the 
province was mainly Muslim, and large landowners dominated social and political life. 
Although the Governor of the Bombay Presidency was formally the highest authority of
9 Chandavarkar, R. (1994) The Origins o f  Industrial Capitalism in India: Business Strategies 
and the Working Classes in Bombay, 1900-1940. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 26.
10 Ibid., 78.
11 Conlon, F.F. (1985) ‘Ethnicity in a Colonial Port City, Bombay 1665-1830’. In Basu, D. (Ed.) 
The Rise and Growth o f  the Colonial Port Cities in Asia. Lanham: University Press o f America, 
49-53.
15
the province, it was the Commissioner in Sind who actually called the shots in the 
administration.
The port of Karachi began to grow significantly by the turn of the twentieth-century. 
Karachi lacked the great cotton industries of Bombay City; it built mainly 011 an 
entrepreneurial economy dominated by families or self-made merchant princes. To a 
large extent, Karachi was for a long time free from the kind of erupting tension Bombay 
showed. Various ethnic and sectarian groups were represented within the Municipality 
Commission, which was set up in the early 1860s. However, although Karachi had a 
Muslim majority, Hindu groups dominated its public life: charities and merchant 
associations were dominated by Hindu tradesmen.12
The trade in the port of Karachi grew as British military operations began in 
Mesopotamia, and as the Anglo-Persian oilfields expanded. This activity was intensified 
during the 1920s when cotton trade was diverted from the port in Bombay due to the 
cotton cess imposed there as a result of housing operations in Bombay. The East Indian 
Cotton Association in Bombay City suggested that between the years 1921-25 exports 
from Bombay port had remained stationary, while those from Karachi had increased 
between 400 and 500 per cent.13
Before turning to the actual study, I need to clarify my use of the terms ‘imperialism’ 
and ‘colonialism’. I follow David Armitage in spirit, as I treat imperialism and 
colonialism as intertwined but separate. I will use the term imperialism in its original 
meaning, that is, how most contemporaries used it: as an ideology of empire within 
which a collection of shifting cultural, economic, and political ideas co-existed for the 
legitimation, and justification, of foreign dominance over discrete peoples. This 
ideology, in turn, structured an array of practices that underpinned and made possible the 
existence and miming of an empire.14 Although this study concerns exactly the time 
when the concept of imperialism was partly reformulated and reduced to an ultimately
12 Metcalf, T.R. and Freitag, S.B. (1985) ‘Karachi’s Early Merchant Families: Entrepreneurship 
and Community’. In Basu, D. (Ed.) The Rise and Growth o f  the Colonial Port Cities in Asia. 
Lanham: University Press o f America, 55-60.
13 Oriental and India Office Collection, London [O.I.O.C.] Bombay M illow ners’ Association 
(1934) Annual Report o f  the Bombay M illowners’ Association. Letter no. 3456/G/324A. East 
India Cotton Association to Bombay M illowners’ Association 21 April 1933.
14 Armitage, D. (2000) The Ideological Origins o f  the British Empire. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 3-4.
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economic, and more precisely financial process, I will insist in using the term in its 
broader sense.15
I take colonialism to mean a set of ideas, and actual local practices, aiming to make 
dominant or actually imposing alien forms of government in order to diminish or replace 
indigenous or previous structures of government within an occupied territory. 
Colonialism will, in this study, exclusively relate to structures and forms of governance. 
In the era of formal empire, colonial structures were imperative for translating and 
projecting imperialism within the realm of their occupied territories.
The British governing apparatus in India was of course a complex, and multilayered, 
construction. The British Viceroy in Calcutta (Delhi after 1911) answered to the Cabinet 
in London, while formally representing the British monarch. The India Office, integrated 
into the day-to-day running of British India, was led by the Secretary of State for India, 
who formed part of Cabinet and answered to Parliament in Indian affairs.
The Viceroy in India presided over executive and legislative councils, and later over the 
legislative assembly. The Viceroy also led the Government of India, with its various 
members. Between London and Calcutta/Delhi existed a strange connection: the 
Government of India was vested with vast powers, yet still, petty details like official 
allowances or hiring of individual administrators had to be run by the India Office.
Local governments, in this case the Government of Bombay, formed part of the fiscal 
and military structure of British India, but exercised independence in certain matters. 
The Governor of Bombay presided over the Bombay Presidency’s executive and 
legislative councils, its Government, and later, formally, over its assembly. The 
Governor was in regular contact with the Viceroy, as well as with the Secretary of State 
for India in London. Further down in the organisational chart of the Raj existed local 
Municipalities and local boards.
Much of the daily work of the Raj was, of course, done by the administrative body of the 
public services, especially the Indian Civil Service (ICS). The ICS provided the various 
governments in British India with influential secretaries. It also made up the bulk of the
15 See: Hobson, J.A. (1902) Imperialism: a study. London: J. Pott & Co; Lenin, V.I. ([1917] 
2000) Imperialism: The Highest Stage o f  Capitalism. Delhi: LeftW ord Classics.
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Raj’s lower rungs of collectors, deputy-collectors, instructors, superintendents and so 
forth that, taken together, made up local bureaucracy. Indians were restricted, and 
subsequently given a slow introduction, to the various levels of this multilayered 
machinery. When not further specified, it is to this complex I will refer when using the 
terms ‘colonial state’ or ‘colonial administration’.
How this study combines ‘social’ and ‘imperialism’ begs a comment. Social imperialism 
has occasionally been used to describe the policies of radical early twentieth-century 
British politicians like Joseph Chamberlain, who would argue for territorial expansion 
and more intense exploitation within British colonies as a way of financing domestic 
social policy. The term has also been used to describe the ideology of Soviet Union 
expansionism. Rather, I take it to mean the ways in which imperial power was perceived 
as a force for tending to social conditions within overseas dependencies, often, but not 
always, through colonial governance.
Finally, as Thomas R. Metcalf points out, it is important to note how the British were 
less interested in jotting down a structured theory of their imperial venture, than in 
articulating their underlying ideals in response to particular crises or events.16 This 
approach will inevitably influence my use of sources. Much like Metcalf — and I discuss 
this further in chapter one - 1 will draw on a variety of debates within British intellectual 
and governing milieus, as well as on discussions surfacing at the instance of 
implementation of particluar interventions in colonial Bombay.
16 Metcalf, T.R. (1995) Ideologies o f  the Raj. The New Cambridge History o f India 4 (4). 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, x-xi.
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1. Introduction: the birth of British ‘social’ 
imperialism
The birth of social imperialism was influenced by a long British imperial engagement in 
South Asia. Ideas about the need to intervene into life and its natural surrounding had 
accompanied the British throughout their presence on the Subcontinent. In chapter two I 
will discuss how social imperialism built on, though departed from, ideologies and 
practices formed through that British engagement. In this chapter I will elaborate a 
conceptual framework through which the shift in imperial thought and practice that I 
identify can be analysed and understood.
I will discuss this in depth in chapter two, but what was distinctively new with the birth 
of social imperialism were the ways in which the social domain gained colonial 
attention as a space of intervention. Where previous interventions of the Raj had taken 
either the individual or the natural environment as its primary referents, social 
imperialism relocated those concerns to ‘the social’ or the ‘population’. Instead of 
primarily focusing on the barbarian character of colonised subjects, or seed or cattle 
breeding, irrigation or land reclamation, ‘the social’ now emerged as a location for 
colonial intervention.17
Imperialism at this point attached to the colonial administration an obligation to manage 
colonial society and its conceived concoction of local pressures in order to -  or so it was 
claimed — realise the potentials of that society, as well as to check its possible sources of 
unrest. The anxiety among those who governed India in general, and the Bombay 
Presidency in particular, during the first quarter of the twentieth-century was 
increasingly ill-concealed. Facing assertive nationalism and deteriorating conditions in 
industrial towns and impoverished villages, administrators worried about discontent 
turning more political, or even militant. But, as I will point out, among influential 
colonial officials there was also a growing belief in a managed society as a condition for
11 See for example: Arnold, D. (2005) ‘Agriculture and “Improvement” in Early Colonial India: 
A Pre- Histoiy o f Development.’ Journal o f  Agrarian Change, 5 (4), 505-525; Prakash, G. 
(1990) Bonded Histories: Genealogies o f  Labor Servitude in Colonial India. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
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future progress, and that life might be externally managed to support colonial society’s 
internal yet unrealised capacity.18
In Britain, as I pointed out earlier, the idea of the existence of a distinct social domain 
was intimately bound up with the perceived emergence of modem industrial society. 
However, the notion of industrialising or modernising India was, as Bernhard S. Cohn 
has aptly described, a complicated one to handle for British officials. The Raj 
encompassed both an intention to enforce and sometimes invent a feudal social order 
based on a loyal landed feudatory, and a modernising impulse.19
David Cannadine finds British colonial officials influenced by a perceived affinity 
between the ruling classes within the realm of empire. Cannadine argues that British 
officials and administrators attempted to find ways to replicate the British domestic 
social order elsewhere. As industrial society developed, Cannadine suggests, nostalgia 
over a lost world at home drove administrators to resurrect an ordered and hierarchical 
society abroad. The dual mandate promoted by Frederick Lugard in Africa, and the 
protection of the native princes in India, aspired to keep in place a model of governance 
within the empire, with which the ruling British elites felt most at home.20
This ambivalence towards both past and coming ages, Michael Adas points out, ran 
through British society as well during the Victorian and Edwardian periods. During 
these periods a paternalistic conservative like Thomas Carlyle was joined in sentiment 
by a champion of the British working classes like Robert Owen in celebrating the 
prospect of improved factory and living conditions through technological advance. 
Scientific and technological progress marked a sign of British cultural or civilisation 
superiority for them both. Yet they would, although for different reasons, dull their 
celebratory mood by reminding themselves of the human cost of that advance.21
18 Escobar, A. (1992) ‘Planning’. In Sachs, W. (Ed.) The Development Dictionaiy: A Guide to 
Knowledge as Power. London: Zed Books, 132-145.
19 Cohn, B.S. (1983) ‘Representing Authority in Victorian India’. In Hobsbawm, E.J. and 
Ranger, T.O. (Eds.) The Invention o f  Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 165- 
210 .
20 Cannadine, David (2001). Ornamentalism: How the British Saw Their Empire. London: 
Allien Lane.
21 Adas, M. (1989) Machines as the Measure o f  Men: Science, Technology, and Ideologies o f  
Western Dominance. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 138.
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We will see bow the ambivalence towards modernisation, conservation, and reinvention 
was reflected also among those involved in the actual running of the empire, or those 
engaged in debating it during the time here under review. The ambivalence described 
above was dramatised by the emergence of social imperialism. It made obvious the 
ways in which colonial officials both nourished the romantic idea of how their rule 
would shield India from the onslaught of modern industrialism, while claiming to 
promote exactly the opposite: the rapid making of modem industrial society.
Yet veiy little has been said about the ways in which those ideas that underpinned 
greater social concerns in Britain during the latter part of the nineteenth and the first 
quarter of the twentieth century transplanted into imperial thought and practice. An 
answer to the lack of attention given to the birth and application of social imperialism 
could be found in the division of labour within academia itself, where rigid geographical 
focus sometimes tends to obscure-cross border movement of ideas.
However, what was going on in the metropolitan state and society is of great interest 
when trying to understand the history of South Asia, suggests historian of South Asia 
C.A. Bayly. I agree. In a discussion on early forms of nationalism on the Subcontinent, 
Bayly mentions in passing how a new ‘ideology of empire’ emerged during the mid 
1880s in India, simultaneously as ideas about ‘national efficiency’ formed in Britain. 
Bayly points out how an expansion of scope of the British Indian administration and its 
wider bureaucracy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries coincided with the 
growth of the British domestic state.22 The idea that the state ought to have a wider 
scope of action in order to more effectively manage society than was previously 
conceived, as we shall see in following chapters, found resonance within contemporary 
administrations in India.
Curiously, in his well-informed and wide-ranging study into how the British attempted 
to legitimise and justify their rule over India, Thomas R. Metcalf does not explicitly 
mention this innovation in imperial ideology that Bayly suggests was taking place 
during the concluding years of the nineteenth century. Metcalf organises his work on the 
ideologies of the Raj around the most glaring contradiction internal to British rule: 
whether to approach Indians as different from British people, or as similar to them. In
22 Bayly, C.A. (1998) Origins o f  Nationality in South Asia: Patriotism and Ethical Government 
in the Making o f  Modern India. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 288.
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other words, were there unbridgeable differences between rulers and ruled, where the 
British right to govern lay in exactly that difference. Or were Indians and the British 
essentially the same, meaning that Indians could, under British tutelage, reach levels of 
European civilisation and eventually govern themselves? This was, of course, a central 
question miring the British Raj throughout its entire existence. Liberals, suggest 
Metcalf, believed in the essential similarity between discrete peoples. Contingent to 
whether the liberal influence over policy in India waxed or waned, Metcalf suggests, the 
notion of Indians and Britons as similar or different flowed and ebbed. However, 
M etcalfs focus never leaves the Raj and internal developments on the Subcontinent, 
except for a brief moment in the epilogue. Therefore, ultimately, Metcalf is unable to 
detect how shifting liberal ideals in turn of the twentieth-century Britain inspired new 
approaches to government in the colony, and his discussion 011 the first decades of the 
twentieth-century remains unnuanced.
Bayly, however, insists on the significance of the shift occuring within imperial thought 
around the early 1900s, and he names the Indian application of this new ideology 
‘Curzonism’, after the British viceroy between 1899 and 1905, Lord Curzon. Curzon’s 
viceroyalty implied a feverishly active phase in the history of the British Raj. This new 
‘ideology of empire’ when applied in India, Bayly notes, ‘projected the Indian criminal 
tribe, the outcast of London, and the disease-ridden slums of both colonial and 
metropolitan cities as sources of disorder. The state had begun to expand again to pre­
empt disease and social conflict’.23
Bayly is right to note the globality of this approach. I will, throughout this thesis, 
describe how the intellectual movements at work transcend boundaries of metropole and 
colony, stitching them together into a single analytical field.24 Indeed, returning to 
Thomas H. Holland’s speech in Council in Delhi, mentioned earlier, we find that by 
referencing his studies of welfare in India, as well as in Australia, England and 
America, he indicates that the nature of the problems he draws attention to, and the 
causes he sees behind them, were similar across the industrialising world, while the 
extent of the problems, and the policies to deal with them, might differ according to 
context.
23 Bayly, 1998,290-91.
24 Stoler, A.L. and Cooper, F. (1997) ‘Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research 
Agenda’. In Stoler, A.L. and Cooper, F. (Eds.) Tensions o f  Empire: Colonial Cultures in a 
Bourgeoisie World. Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1-56.
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C.A. Bayly recognises the overseas reach of those ideas and practises he outlines. Yet, 
unfortunately, he does not show exactly how this new ideology of empire asserted itself, 
what were its influences and constituent parts, or how it was articulated and actually 
embedded in India through British policy.
Moreover, I disagree with Bayly on specifics. Clearly, fear of disorder and disease was 
most certainly a constitutive dimension of this new approach, as Bayly writes. However, 
there was more to it. I will show how the new approach was firmly linked to a wider 
reformulation of liberal tenets about the necessity of political power to address social 
issues, about the possibility of continued development in the face of transforming social 
order, and about the contemporary reconsideration of the conceived imperial obligation 
to lead colonised subjects on the alleged path of progress.
Bayly notes how new ideas and practices of interventionist state action evolved during a 
time of great material change in larger urban areas in India. Such changes were clearly 
felt in the Bombay Presidency, the setting in which I investigate the application of 
social imperialism. These transformations in social experiences have been detailed by 
Indian historians. Rajnarajan Chandavarkar makes ever-pressing everyday issues of 
housing and sanitation central to his discussion of the formation of capitalism, as well as 
working-class mobilisation, in India. He particularly teases out how changing social 
contexts in the city of Bombay became a driving force in the very formation of an urban 
working class.25
Prashant KidambTs recent study of the Bombay City successfully draws out the ways in 
which the imperial connection framed urban culture and forms of governance in the face 
of industrial expansion and global markets.26 By revisiting certain actual practices of 
government, such as housing, as well as looking into the ways in which local elites not 
only mediated but hybridized impulses of philanthropy, he gives an interesting case 
study of the ways in which a limited public sphere emerged in relation to the activities 
o f ‘the state of colonial modernity’.27
25 Chandavarkar, 1994; (1998) Imperial Power and Popular Politics: Class, Resistance and the 
State in India, c. 1850-1950. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
26 Kidambi, P. (2007) The Making o f  an Indian Metropolis: Colonial Governance and Public 
Culture in Bombay, 1890-1920. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing.
27 Kaviraj, 1997, 232.
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Sandeep Hazareesingh’s study of Bombay City takes a similar departing point to that of 
Kidambi. Hazareesingh, however, more clearly focuses on how modernising discourse 
was also appropriated by influential sections of Indian society, and as it consolidated,
7 8turned into a space of contestation.
The lineage of the ways in which native elites appropriated and hybridized the various 
languages of modernity is, of course, important for post-colonial experiences. In two 
recent anthologies, authors connect Bombay City’s history of growth, governance and 
public culture with Mumbai’s current affairs.29 These broad-ranging approaches 
described above have been complemented by specific historic investigations into 
singular topics, such as Darryl D ’Monte’s in-depth study of the rise and fall of 
Bombay’s mill industry.30 Taken together these various studies of the local setting of 
the Bombay Presidency provide a rich background for my discussion on the rise of 
social imperialism and its application in western India.
1.1. Analytical framework
In this section I will suggest an analytical framework through which the emergence and 
application of social imperialism, with its new concern for conditions of life of 
colonised populations, can be analysed. Naturally, there is no single cause driving the 
kind of shift in ideas with which I will be concerned here.
As I will discuss in chapter two, previously dominant imperial ideologies of reformist 
intervention under empire provided a conceptual scaffolding upon which new ideas 
formed and cut themselves loose. Material changes in local and global economic 
conditions, technological and scientific innovations, and demographical and
28 Hazeeresingh, S. (2007) The Colonial City and the Challenge o f  Modernity: Urban 
Hegemonies and Civic Contestation in Bombay City (1900-25). Delhi: Orient Longman.
29 Patel, S. and Thorner, A. (1995) Bombay: mosaic o f  modern culture. Bombay: Oxford 
University Press; Patel, S. and Masselos, J. (2005) Bombay and Mumbai: The City in 
Transition. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
30 D ’Monte, D. (2002) Ripping the Fabric: The Decline o f  Mumbai and its Mills. Delhi: Oxford 
University Press.
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sociological factors all had a real influence on new ideas about imperial intervention, 
and actual practices thereof.
There is of course an intimate and dialectical relation between material change and 
shifting ideas, sensibilities and mentalities. Clearly, changing material circumstances are 
often coupled with shifts in the ways policy-makers think about the utility of political 
power in the management of society, why they think governance is at all necessary in 
particular situations, and how they imagine modalities of government be designed. At a 
certain point, these shifts in conceptualisation will reflect back from positions of power 
on a reality they were once moulded from. And so, they too contribute to historical and 
material changes.
In my attempt to keep focus on the rise of social concerns in imperialism and in local 
colonial government, I will go beyond presenting a stoiy of how successive 
administrations responded to social conditions in the Bombay Presidency. I will analyse 
what influenced local administrations to respond the way they did, and what formed 
their motivations. When administrators in Bombay institutionalised social science in the 
Presidency in order to gain from new forms of social knowledge, or when they 
concerned themselves with mundane issues of sanitation, education, and housing, they 
did so informed by specific ideas about the necessity of turning the social domain into a 
political enity, and paying close attention to its effect on their future possibility to 
govern. As such it is not the rise of the social per se that interest me here, but the 
politicisation of the social within the confines of empire, and the formation of local 
colonial strategies for intervening into that social space. That is, I will study the social 
less as an object of cognition, but as a domain of state-led intervention.
Analysis of the ways in which the colonial state has shown interest in improving and 
reforming society and human conditions through state action has been a topic for 
historians and social and political theorists alike. In his study of why schemes for the 
improvement of human life and conditions often fail historically, James C. Scott finds 
explanations in what he perceives to be central to social engineering under a modem 
state: administrative ordering of nature and society, a high modernist ideology, an 
authoritarian state, and —finally -  a civil society that cannot resist state interventions.31
35 Scott, J. (1998) Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition 
Have Failed . New Haven: Yale University Press.
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Scott asserts social control as a main motivation behind social action of the state. The 
main object for the modem state to embark on such a project is to create order and 
intelligibility among objects under its rule, Scott argues. He suggests that the opposite, 
that is ‘[a]n illegible society’, would be a ‘hindrance to any effective intervention by the 
state, whether the puipose of that intervention is plunder or public welfare’.32 In this 
apparently self-perpetuating process, the modem state attempts to reconfigure what 
Scott calls local knowledge in order to impose transparency, commonality and simple 
standardised planning and knowledge. This process of abstraction Scott calls ‘state 
simplification’. For Scott, improvement of the human condition has provided an 
argument for penetrating every sphere of human life by the modern state.
I agree with Frederick Cooper when he suggests that this is a poor analysis of social 
governance. Social interventions in, for example, the Bombay Presidency were never to 
obtain the totalising character that Scott outlines. Clearly, the colonial administration 
was never in a financial position to design projects to that end; it is even highly doubtful 
that it was inclined to order colonial society in such ways Scott suggests. In fact, as 
Cooper writes, the only case of actual high modernist simplification to note in Scott’s 
study is his own form of analysis.33
Of course, the coercive branches of the administration in Bombay -were capable of 
mobilising brute force and much violence, but these were outbursts of violence rather 
than constant repression. In fact, it is curious how, according to Chandavarkar, India in 
general was far less densely policed than England. The ratio during 1900-10 in England 
and Wales was one policeman to every 772 people. In the Bombay Presidency the ratio 
was one to 1,360 people. In Bombay from 1865 onwards, local police forces were 
constantly under funded. Due to its insufficient funding and staffing, the police force 
was dependent on the neighbourhood to carry out its policing. The police force itself 
refrained from intervening in local issues that could be handled by local power 
structures.
A more sophisticated approach comes from historian Ranajit Guha. Guha, who 
elaborates on the notion of hegemony -  or rule by consent -  developed by the Italian
32 Ibid., 78.
33 Cooper, F. (2005) Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History. Berkeley, CA: 
University o f California Press, 140-42.
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social theorist Antonio Gramsci, characterises the general British idiom of 
‘improvement’ as a rather weak colonial strategy of persuasion,, aiming at winning over 
the attachment of indigenous elites; a strategy with liberal inclination, he argues, yet a 
shadow of the forceful liberalism that was refonning metropolitan society.34 Yet Guha 
rejects the claim made by liberal historians of the 1960s who argued that the British Raj 
ruled India by consent.
Guha’s is a compelling analysis of colonialism as the limit of universalist aspirations of 
reformist metropolitan bourgeoisie, and the reluctance -  or incapability -  of indigenous 
elites acting within the strict confines of metropolitan power to establish hegemony. For 
Guha, the colonial state would ultimately rely on force -  that is, dominance -  to secure 
its rule.
But, I will argue, during the first quarter of the twentieth-century, the colonial state 
struggled to do more than simply dominate -  if by domination we mean to ignore or 
attempt to crush the capacity for action of the dominated. In fact, during the time here 
under review, strategies of colonial social intervention did not win over indigenous 
elites; rather, administrators often faced vocal opposition from local urban business 
elites and influential landlords. Rent Acts or education initiatives were actively opposed 
by influential sections of society. Still, these interventions were not forcefully imposed 
upon colonial society.
It is more accurate to say that these interventions attempted to counter growing 
discontent among local working and middle-classes in order to win over subaltern 
groups. Anxious at the prospects of mobilisation or even sporadic discontent among 
urban subaltern groups, as we shall see in chapters three, four and five, views of how to 
govern colonised populations were turning towards recognition of a real capacity for 
action of the governed, radical or otherwise. With the colonial administrators 
acknowledging this potential, followed the question of how they could better draw on, 
channel, and also discipline this energy under the new circumstances of modem 
industrial society. So to argue, as Guha does by way of extending his discussion based 
mostly on work on the nineteenth-century Raj, that the relationship between ruler and
34 Guha, R. (1992) ‘Dominance Without Hegemony And Its Historiography’. In Guha, R. (Ed.) 
Subaltern Studies VI. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 243.
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ruled during the first quarter of the twentieth-century was one of ‘dominance without 
hegemony’ is disputable.
Guha fails to acknowledge the distinct shift in how influential imperial operators -  from 
imperialists in Britain to sections of local colonial administrations in India -  began to 
question the effectiveness of rule by force. I will outline this in depth in chapters three 
and five, but during the period here under review, imperialists and local administrators 
began to view active management of the social realm as a more efficient way of 
ensuring stability and progress. To work through society and the capacity of its social 
domain, rather than to repress it; to improve sanitation, education and housing, might in 
according to the views of social imperialists, turn out a more sustainable way to reduce 
discontent, violence and anti-colonial sentiments. To govern successfully, thus, implied 
trying to understand what mobilised sections of the colonised population -  and then 
relating to those issues. Ideas of how to cany out effective governance, in India as well 
as in Britain, began to link progress and stability in modern society to the further 
regulation of the social domain. In effect, colonial governance was at this point neither 
explicitly dominating nor explicitly hegemonic. Rather, it was simultaneously both.
A better understanding of the motivations of social imperialism can only be arrived at 
when one concentrates on exactly this aspect of modem power: its simultaneous 
manifestation in positive and negative forms.
1.1.1. O rganising concept: bio-politics
The analytical framework of this thesis is inspired by the work of Michel Foucault. I use 
Foucault’s conceptual apparatus selectively to point out a direction to explore, rather 
than being overly prescriptive. As I will discuss below, I find his conceptualisation of 
the new forms of government emerging at the time of the birth of liberalism highly 
suggestive when studying imperial relations. Liberalism and liberal forms of 
government were, as we shall see, constitutive in the emergence and continuation of 
British Empire.
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A selective use of Foucault allows me to frame the various ways in which the colonial 
state actively began turning colonial society into an arena for social interventions, and it 
enables me to place within a longer intellectual history that conceptual shift, within 
which imperialism turned to the social. I will use Foucault to chart several 
reformulations in the practices of the colonial state, as well as in the ideas underpinning 
those practices, occurring at a time when social costs of modem industrial society in 
India began to have an effect on the working of government and market. In connection 
to this, Foucault’s notions of ‘bio-politics’ and ‘govemmentality’ become central to my 
analysis of social interventions enacted by the colonial administration.
1 will hold bio-politics to be a particular form of govemmentality, in which the social 
interventions described here formed as state-led techniques, designed to reach into 
society in order to manage it.35 However, Foucault’s work on bio-politics is not only 
useful to me as an analytical lens -  I also find his historiographical account of its 
development helpful. Working along side Foucault’s historical narrative is, as we shall 
see, unusual in studies of empire. It is true that bio-politics, as described by Foucault, 
emerged during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, that is, before the 
period here under review. Yet Foucualt acknowledges that the late nineteenth and the 
early twentieth centuries, that is -  the period of concern here, implied an intensification 
of state centred interventions into the social domain.36
Foucault outlined his concepts of govemmentality and bio-politics in different series of 
lectures at the College de France during the 1970s and early 1980s. Although he 
reformulated his positions several times, Foucault’s main problematic throughout that 
period remained the genealogy of the modem state. During the latter part of the period, 
he came to concentrate on a shift he located to the late eighteenth century, when 
disciplining regimes of power centred on the individual body, turned into regimes of 
power concerned with the management of life through various forms of government.
In his treatment of the concept of govemmentality, or the art of government, Foucault 
takes his readers back to the the late sixteenth century, when a new kind of literature 
and a subsequent debate emerged concerning the relation between rulers and ruled.
35 See: Proccaci, G. (1991) ‘Social Economy and the Government o f Poverty’. In Burchell, G. 
(Ed.) The Foucualt Effect: Studies in Govemmentality. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
36 See: Hindess, B. (1993) ‘Liberalism, socialism and democracy: variations on a governmental 
them e’. Economy and Society, 22 (3), 357-72.
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What this literature did, argues Foucault, was to query the qualities of good governance. 
One of the more defining features of this debate, Foucault argues, was the emergence of 
an idea of economy as a quality within governance. Economy as a quality in governance 
had less to do with public revenue and public expenditure; rather, what was indicated 
was a measure of how to effectively exercise power while ensuring the creation of 
prosperity, happiness and wealth of those ruled.37
Philosophers of the late sixteenth century developed this idea of economy, suggests 
Foucault, around a certain model of governance: the family. The main responsibility of 
a head of the family, it was argued, was to ensure present and future welfare and 
prosperity for family members. Hence, in analogy, this was how the essence of 
statecraft was conceived during the early modem period.
However, the model of the family was not robust enough to meet the needs of 
territorially and demograpliically expanding states of the late eighteenth-century. It was 
too thin and too restrictive, argues Foucault as ever more phenomena were documented 
that were irreducible to the family. Instead, he suggests, the model of governance based 
on the family shifted, and re-centred the need of economy on a higher aggregate: that of
7 Q‘population’. This shift implies nothing less than a new technology of power, argues 
Foucault. Because, while previous technologies of power had been disciplinary towards 
the individual, and especially the body of the individual, the new population based form 
of government sets itself out to address human beings as a mass, or ‘man-as-species’.39
The notion of the population was an invention without precedence. New forms of 
scientific knowledge helped to define populations as being entities, which were moved 
by certain dynamics, and inhabited and expressed certain patterns -  of epidemics, of 
rates of birth and death. Moreover, Foucault suggests, these new dynamics internal to 
populations, proved to have effect on economy and polity. Epidemics, for example, 
caused migration that in turn caused falling productivity in cities and in the countryside. 
Hence these dynamics that were internal to the population had to be managed in order to
37 Foucault, M. (2000b) ‘Govemm entality’. In Faubion, J.D. (Ed.) Power: Essential Works o f  
Foucault 1954-1984 volume 3. London: Penguin Books, 207.
38 Ibid., 215.
39 Foucault, M. (2003) “Society Must Be D efended”: Lectures at the College de France, 1975- 
1976”. New York: Picador, 242-243.
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reduce disruptions. The dynamic of populations, in short, had ‘economic effects’.40 The 
integration of statistics and modem medicine into governmental policy was imperative 
in the process of forming the population as an integrated entity, as was ethnography, and 
later during the latter part of the nineteenth century, sociology.
Subsequently, populations become in Foucualt’s words a ‘great technological core 
around which the political procedures of the West transformed themselves’ during the 
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.41 That is, at this point in time, particular 
forms of interventions were designed to address issues at the level of the population, 
and so housing, urban conditions of life and public hygiene thus became concerns of 
government.
However, Foucualt points out, it was not necessarily the state that took the lead in social 
interventions; ‘sub-state’ institutions like welfare funds, and medical institutions were 
as important. Still, the invention of the population as an object of rule implied its 
emergence as a political problem. As such the state would, on one level, deal with the 
population through processes of regulation 42
But as bio-politics emerges, and ‘power. ..takes life under its care’ during the nineteenth 
century, racism asserts itself in government in new ways 43 Racism provides, as it were, 
the eugenic impulse into statecraft at this point in time. It becomes an intrinsic aspect of 
the modem state as the denominator over life that may live and life that may die, argues 
Foucault. In fact, he asserts, to the notion of life as subject for improvement and 
development, comes attached a waiver of what life that is not 44
The shift towards a population-based model of governance was associated with wider 
changes in the context of ‘political rationality’, argues Foucault. Late eighteenth- and 
early nineteenth-century liberal thought highly influenced that emerging intellectual 
context, he suggests. But, Foucault explains, this was not liberalism as a normative 
theory, or as a coherent political ideology per se, but liberalism as practice -  ‘as a
40 Foucault, 2000b, 216.
41 Foucault, M. (2007) ‘The Meshes o f Power’. In Cramp ton, J.W. and Elden, S. (Eds.) Space, 
Knowledge and Power: Foucualt and Geography. Aldershot: Ashgate, 161.
42 Foucault, 2003, 250.
43 Ibid., 253, 254.
44 Foucault, M. (2000) ‘Security, Territory, and Population’. In Rabinow, P. (Ed.) Ethics: 
Essential Works o f  Foucault 1954-1984 volume 7. London: Penguin Books, 70.
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principle and a method of rationalizing the exercise of government’ or as a ‘form of 
critical reflection on governmental practice’.45 In short: a framework, or a form, for 
negotiating economy in governance.
Foucault argues that liberalism of the nineteenth century broke with the idea that 
government had a reason in itself; that there was such a thing as a reason of state. 
Instead, it was asked within liberal thought ‘why, in fact, must one govern?’46 A healthy 
and functioning society, contemporary liberals argued, did not need governmental 
intervention 47 For contemporary liberals, the most economic model of government, 
Foucault points out, the model with least governmental interference, proved to be 
people governing themselves. Subsequently, Foucault formulates his understanding of 
liberalism around a notion where ‘the advent of liberalism coincides with the discovery 
that political government could be its own undoing’.48
Yet if people were to be entrusted with governing themselves, they must be fit to do so, 
morally and materially, liberals argued. Still there existed in liberalism of that time an 
underlying question as to the collective capacity of a population to manage its own 
affairs.49 This questioning of the self-governing capacity of populations played itself out 
in contemporary narratives of evolution.
However, as Foucault points out, with the intensification of bio-politics during the 
nineteenth century emerged a productive tension in liberal thought of the time: 
management of society seemed necessary, but increased management would inevitably 
increase the scope of the state. So from the mid nineteenth-century problems of 
collective welfare -  public health and sanitation, for example -  became problems of 
government, and were given wider political considerations.50 Foucault discusses the 
example of early British social legislation. At first, he suggests, occasional campaigns 
pushed for sanitation and public health. Later, and I will discuss this more thoroughly in
45Foucault, (2000a), 74, 77.
46 Ibid., 75.
47 Osborne, T. (1996) ‘Security and vitality: drains, liberalism and power in the nineteenth 
century’. In Barry et. al. (Eds.) Foucault and political reason: liberalism, neo-liberalism and  
rationalities o f  government. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 99-121.
48 Barry, A., Osborne, T. and Rose, N. (1996) ‘Introduction’. In Barry et. al (Eds.) Foucault and 
political reason: liberalism, neo-liberalism and rationalities o f  government. Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 8.
49 Duffield, M. (2005) ‘Getting savages to fight barbarians: development, security and the 
colonial present’. Conflict, Security & Development, 5 (2), 146.
50 Foucault, 2000a, 73.
32
chapter three, more elaborate legislation concerning conditions in factories and 
dwellings was enacted. Foucault later argued that as the prospect of social upheaval 
became acute around the time of the First World War, these interventions shifted into 
forms of social security systems.51
I will discuss this in depth in chapter three, but during the concluding decades of the 
nineteenth century, sensitive to changing social realities of the time, philosophers and 
politicians began to view markets as conditioned by the interlinked set of issues of ‘the 
social’. This realisation caused much tension within liberalism; if markets proved 
unable to regulate themselves, to what extent could laissez-faire be practised in all 
aspects of life? If markets were linked to, even conditioned by, social realities, was the 
undoing of government really the best alternative, when facing growing social costs?
For contemporary liberals the state needed to effectively manage the social in order to 
uphold effective government.52 Whereas the old Poor Laws and other forms of 
legislation in Britain had tended to patch up scratches in the social fabric, new 
interventions attempted to rise above the occasional campaign and to act upon the social 
through concerted interventions.
With the realisation that state action was necessary to tend to social costs, Foucault 
argues that liberalism of the interwar and post-Second World War periods broke with 
classical liberal bio-politics and its faltering attempts to ameliorate social conditions.53 
Foucault uses the work of the German so-called Freiburg-liberals to date the beginnings 
of this new liberal bio-political doctrine, which was then further elaborated by members 
of the same group, but after the Second World War. Economists previously associated 
with the Freiburg-school were highly influential in the founding phase of West German 
social-political policy.54
The Freiburg economists, according to Foucault, found state-led social interventions 
necessary. To their understanding, markets were never naturally given, they were 
always socially constructed. For them, capitalism in the Marxist sense -  that is, as a
51 Foucault, M. (2000c) ‘The Risks o f Security3. In Faubion, J.D. (Ed) Power: Essential Works 
o f  Foucault 1954-1984 volume 3. London: Penguin Books, 366.
52 Foucault, 2000a, 79.
53 Lemke, T. (2001 May) “T h e  Birth o f  Biopolitics” : Michel Foucault's Lecture at the College 
de France on neo-liberal govem m entality3. Economy and Society, 30 (2), 193.
54 Ibid., 192.
33
naturally given force with an inner logic -  did not exist. Rather, what existed was a 
capitalist system that functioned only through political will and politically established 
institutions. Social realities, the Freiburg-economists argued, must be actively engaged 
in order for markets to function. In this sense, social interventions would create the 
'historical and social conditions for the market’.55 In other words, the workings of 
markets were conditioned by both conditions of life and by active state intervention. 
The acknowledgment of a centrality of social experience to the function of market- 
mechanisms marked the birth of new liberal bio-politics, Foucault argues.
However, Foucault’s historiography over the increased willingness in liberalism to rely 
on social interventions could be complemented by a look at the rise of new liberalism in 
Britain, I would argue. Because in many ways, the rise of British social liberalism in the 
latter part of the nineteenth century actually anticipated aspects of the new liberalism of 
the Freiburg economists and later early West German social policy. Although British 
social legislation during the early twentieth century never turned out so systematic as 
the German new liberal program, the two strands were influenced by similar impulses. 
New social liberal interventionism in Britain, influences of which I will trace in the rise 
of social imperialism, thus constitute a specific kind of liberal bio-politics that in turn 
gave rise to certain techniques of intervention in the shape of social policy that were 
then selectively applied in the empire. However, when doing this one needs to account 
for a process occuring during this period, in which the category population, becomes 
folded in to the more abstract conceptualisation of 'the social’.
Foucault would move further, however, as he attempted to give an account for the 
radicalisation of liberalism under the influence of the Chicago School. Bio-politics runs 
as a thread through new liberal thought, according to Foucault. With the Chicago- 
school, he asserts, economic rationality was moved into the social domain. Within this 
market society political power was marginalised and even made redundant. This form of 
liberalism Foucault characterised as a reformulation of —although an intellectual kin to — 
the new liberalism of the Freiburg economists. With the experience of totalitarian 
ideologies in Europe fresh in mind, neo-liberals tended to mistrust political power and 
state-apparatuses as managers of social domains. Regulatory impulses were now to 
come not from the state, but from within this merged socio-economic domain. Self-help
55 Lemke, 2001, 195.
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and self-care, rather than political power, must tend to social problems, Chicago liberals 
argued.56
1.1.2. Reception of Foucault in studies of empire
Foucault occupies a special place in contemporary social sciences and the humanities; 
his work has been highly influential, but also criticised from a wide range of academic 
perspectives. Historians, like Frederick Cooper, have been troubled by his sweeping use 
of sources and lack of historic specificity, and important questions have frequently been 
raised in this connection about the use of his terminology when analysing historical 
processes.57 Cooper has also argued that when analytical concepts furnished by Foucault 
are put to work in historical situations, they come to sanitise the meaningful messiness 
of history, and repackage events into neat but flawed contrasting positions of power and 
counter-power.58 It is a relevant critique, and in his lectures at the College de France, 
Foucualt often acknowledged the sketchy character of his ideas on liberal 
govemmentality and bio-politics. Unfortunately, his premature death implied that no 
major works of his were to published 011 these issues. Yet, that does not discredit his 
whole suggestive approach. In fact, it leaves Foucauldian frameworks open for 
innovative contributions and further elaboration.
Historical sociologists have found his early work on disciplinary regimes of power in 
the histories of sexuality and psychiatry unconvincing, as they tend to overvalue, or so it 
is claimed, the ability of those regimes to actually exercise totalising social control.59 
Foucault has also been criticised for his insistence not to study practices of government 
in nonnative ways. Also, his ideas about the structuring effect of discourse have been 
described as unclear in terms of who could actually exercise power and agency in
56 Lemke, 2001, 201.
37 Cooper, F. (1996) Decolonization and African Society: The Labour Question in French and  
British A frica . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
58 Cooper, 2005, 48-49.
59 Haskell, T.L. (1985 April) 'Capitalism and the Origins o f the Humanitarian Sensibility, Part 
1’. The American Historical Review, 90 (2), 339-361; Haskell, T.L. (1985 June) 'Capitalism and 
the Origins o f the Humanitarian Sensibility, Part 2 ’. The American Historical Review , 90 (3), 
547-568.
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political terms.60 Moreover, Foucault has been accused of not paying attention to the 
constitutive role of colonial experiences in the formation of modem Europe.61
Yet a most heterogeneous literature has sought inspiration from Foucault, and has 
engaged his work critically when analysing colonial situations. Theorists of British rule 
in South Asia have studied the ways in which relationships between ruler and ruled 
constituted themselves at the level of discourse. Partha Chatterjee, for example, has 
consistently applied a Foucauldian framework to his studies of the construction of 
colonial society as an object of rule. Chatterjee explores the productiveness of discourse 
through a close reading of the sites where colonial power and knowledge combine: the 
map, the census, and the planning proceedures of the state.62 Other scholars of 
colonialism, like Achille Mbembe have inverted Foucauldian terminology in their 
studies of liberal forms of government in order to describe colonial practises. Mbembe 
speaks of necro-politics, as a way to describe racialised and genocidal colonial 
government.63 Timothy Mitchell also applies a Foucauldian vocabulary to colonial 
contexts, yet persist in a critique of what he find Foucault’s euro-centrism.64 For 
Mitchell the aim has been to show whether actually many of the various elements that 
constituted the rise of European modernity — the subject matter of Foucault’s studies -  
in fact formed throughout European empires, not only in Europe.
A common critique of the wide use of a Foucauldian terminology, is that it works better 
when historicising liberal governmental practices in the ‘West’, than when discussing 
actual colonial experiences. Aran Agrawal, for one, stresses the portability of 
Foucauldian concepts between contexts; it is as an ‘analytical optic’ rather than as 
historical experience that makes Foucauldian concepts ‘obviously relevant to other 
places and historical periods’.65
60 Vanaik, A. (1997) The Furies o f  Indian Communalism: Religion, Modernity, and  
Secularization . London: Verso.
61 Spivak, G.C. (1988) In Other Worlds. New York: Routledge.
62 See: Chatterjee, P. (1993) The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial 
Histories. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; (2004) The Politics o f  the Governed: 
Reflections on Popular Politics in Most o f  the World. New York: Columbia University Press.
63 Mbembe, A. (2003) ‘N ecropolises’. Public Culture, 15 (1), 11-40.
64 See: Mitchell, T. (2000) ‘The Stage o f M odernity’. In Mitchell, T. (Ed.) Questions o f  
Modernity. Minneapolis: University o f Minnesota Press, 1-34.
65 Agrawal, A. (2005) Environmentality: Technologies o f  Government and the Making o f  
Subjects. Durham: Duke University Press, 219.
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Historian Gyan Prakash shares this understanding. As was the case with governance in 
Europe, writes Prakash, views on how to govern British India developed in relation to 
shifting conditions of life on the Subcontinent. Yet for unspecified -  but for Prakash 
apparently obvious reasons -  colonial ways to govern were to be ‘radically 
discontinuous with the Western norm’.66 Indeed, for Prakash, colonial rule was 
‘fundamental dislocation’ of liberal forms of governance.67
I will argue that this is a misleading analysis, as it makes ‘the West’ and ‘the colony’ 
into oppositional extremes, the experience of which seems to be historically 
unbridgeable. Unfortunately, while assuming this, we lose out on an analysis of the 
ways in which the bio-political impulse internal to social imperialism adapted to 
changing historical circumstances, and, in fact, came to integrate metropolitan and 
colonial forms of governance during the period here under review. Therefore, I suggest, 
a more productive approach to Foucault would be to engage not only his analytical 
framework, but also his historiography, and apply them both onto the multifaceted 
experiences of empire.68
Because when looking closely into speeches, tracts and records produced during this 
period, it becomes clear that how social interventions were legitimised through political 
language and discursively framed, they differ less within empire than one might first 
assume. Considerations and inclinations that influenced ideas about how to effectively 
govern modem industrial society in Britain were earned into imperial thought. They 
even translated into local interventions in India thus furthering the integration between 
colony and metropole. Socially oriented projects in India during the first quarter of the 
twentieth century came about under the same influence that formed programmes in 
Britain.
Of course, the similarities I discuss are not structured around contemporary liberal 
political doctrine of freedom of speech or citizenship; India would be granted very little 
or none of that. Rather, similarities become clear when looking into the social
66 Prakash, G. (1999) Another Reason: Science and the Imagination o f  Modern India. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 125.
67 Ibid., 126.
68 See: Stoler, A.L. (1995) Race and the Education o f  Desire: Foucault’s History o f  Sexuality 
and the Colonial Order o f  Things. Durham: Duke University Press; (2002) Carnal Knowledge 
and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule . Berkeley: University o f California 
Press.
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component in liberal thought and the ways in which the social side of liberalism was 
ideologically framed and technically operated in British and Indian society. That is, how 
the ideas of social intervention as necessary for the continued stability and progress of 
market and polity, found its way into administrative language and actual projects in 
India and Bombay.
1.2. The study: structure, method, sources
I have chosen to narrate the conceptual shift in imperialism -  its social turn -  by staying 
close to a range of unpublished primary and original published sources. The study relies 
predominantly on discourse and content analysis of English language texts: official 
records, departmental and committee reports, newspaper and review articles, speeches, 
pamphlets, and private letters.
During the course of this project I have been fortunate to become familiar with four 
different but veiy rich archives: The Maharashtra State Archives, Mumbai; The Oriental 
and Indian Office Collection, London; The Sindh Archives, Karachi; and the University 
of Strathclyde Archives, Glasgow. These archives organise the material they keep in 
different ways. While the collection of the private papers of Sir Patrick Geddes held in 
Glasgow is indexed at the level of discrete documents, the Maharashtra State Archives 
and the Sindh Archives lists volumes, compilations or files that, in turn, includes several 
discrete items. In order to be consistent I have imposed the following system. When 
citing archival material, I start with a reference to the archive within which the 
particular document could be located. I then refer to the broader series to which the 
cited document relates. This information is followed by a reference to the volume, 
compilation or file of the document. Finally I refer to the specific document, that is, for 
example, the letter, departmental note or government order. Information about citations 
is given through footnotes at the bottom of each page, along with references to the 
secondary literature that I have used for this study.
I have looked for and found different things in these rich archives, but while working in 
them I have learnt how to stick to detailed reading plans, while keeping eyes and mind 
open. It is the beauty as well as the strain of writing about changes in mentalities, rather
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than particular historical events, that it is often not obvious which records might be 
more helpful.
In fact, this project started out as a much narrower enterprise. Initially fascinated by 
responses to spatial interventions, I ventured to study housing- and town-planning 
records, looking for resistance to colonial infrastructure projects, in order to connect 
those instances to protests in today’s Mumbai. However, my interest shifted as I spent 
more time in the archives.
I was struck by how often I found the prefix ‘social-’ attached to early twentieth-century 
official conversations. In records produced earlier, say during the late 1870s and early 
1880s, that prefix was nowhere to be found. The ways in which the term ‘the social’ 
was grafted onto these conversations seemed to escape narrow definitions of partisan or 
bureaucratic organisation; it presented itself in debates between members of colonial 
administration in Bombay, despite whether the department itself was primarily 
concerned with housing, finance, education or sanitation. It became the topic of new 
schemes of state-sponsored research in India, as well as of newly formed scientific 
associations in London. The social prefix emerged as a central component especially in 
liberal political texts about why state intervention was needed in Britain, as well as in 
speeches on Indian affairs and why a continuation of imperial presence was necessary in 
India. I realised that the ways in which that prefix of the social had found its way into 
imperial thought and practice was an issue rarely studied. I decided to pursue the 
question of why and how ‘the social’ came to appear in imperial thought and practice.
My study of social imperialism contains three main components. Research into each 
component builds on varying degrees on original and primary sources. The first 
component of the study — presented in chapters two and three — is a close reading of the 
emergence of social liberalism as a reformist ideology with imperial reach. In chapter 
two I look into the connection between nineteenth-century British reformist ideology 
and British rule in India. Historicising the application of reformist ideology under the 
British Raj enables me to highlight the specifics of the shift towards the social in the 
imperial approach in India that I detect happening by the turn of the twentieth-century.
I discuss the ways in which a broad tradition of early liberalism initially, when projected 
in India, formed around moral interventions aiming at reforming the character of
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Indians. After the Indian Mutiny of 1857, and the subsequent consolidation of the 
colonial state, I suggest that moral reforms gave way for what I call revenue-enhancing 
reforms. These reforms were mainly environmental and spatial. They targeted specific 
sections of the economy, and aimed at increasing the income of the state. By the 1880s, 
however, a new form of intervention began to emerge, which, when described by the 
British themselves, was designed to preserve life. This, I argue in chapter two, makes up 
the preamble to the social turn in imperialism and colonial governance. Material for this 
chapter is, for the most part, secondary.
This overview is followed by a more detailed chapter three, where I will discuss the 
ways in which liberal thought and practises during the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries began to place social issues at the core of its doctrine, in a much 
more systematic way than before. I will describe how, with the rise of social liberalism 
in Britain, the social domain was turned into a significant arena for governmental 
policy, not only in the metropole, but in India, and more specifically the Bombay 
Presidency. I suggest in chapter three that social issues became a concern for state 
action partly through the sheer force of surfacing social problems in industrial society, 
and partly through a new liberal philosophical emphasis on a managed social domain as 
a condition for economic and political progress. Social liberalism significantly 
expanded the bio-political assumptions of nineteenth-century liberalism: it placed 
political power in an active role centre stage. This shift was not simply ephemeral, it 
was rooted in attempts to continue yet reformulate a liberal intellectual tradition in the 
face of changing social realities.69
The invention of the social in liberalism, I will argue, influenced imperial thought. It did 
not constitute a full break with previous liberal ideas about empire as a civilisational 
force; yet it downplayed imperialism’s obsession with moral reform. Instead, I will 
suggest, the invention of the social in liberal thought introduced into imperialism a 
social concern. Imperial power, it was now argued in liberal circles, could be a force for 
tending to the side effects of modern industrialism. And when translated into existing 
colonial administration, liberals now argued, socially oriented imperial power would 
prove much more effective in the management of society than would force.
69 Lemke, 2001, n. 7, 193.
40
Chapter three builds on original published articles from monthly or quarterly British 
reviews, in which radical debates about culture and politics were ongoing. Not all 
writers publishing in those periodicals considered themselves to be social liberals or 
socialist; yet they all published in those reviews to reflect standpoints of radical debate, 
either in the positive or negative.
The publications used in this chapter are The Contemporary Review, Nineteenth Century.> 
(and after), The Westminster Review, The Westminster Gazette, and occasionally The 
Sociological Review. Many of these reviews had for a long time been pillars in 
Victorian intellectual life, and were at the time discussed here, still vital and frequently 
progressive.70 I read closely a selection of contemporary published liberal tracts on 
imperial issues — speeches and monographs. I also looked into correspondence between 
high officials in Britain and India. These are all of course biased sources, written to 
convey a certain point of view. One needs to engage with them critically and with 
caution.
The second component of the study, presented in chapter four, concerns how sociology, 
as a new discipline for social scientific knowledge at this time, contributed to the 
invention of the social in political thought, as well as how it influenced emerging social 
concerns of empire. This chapter uses unpublished and published primary sources. 
Initially, I use a specific publication: the Sociological Society’s annual collection of 
Sociological Papers, which later, in 1908, became the Sociological Review. This 
publication was a vital forum for debates during the formation of modem British 
sociology.
More importantly, however, the Sociological Society, which stood behind the Review, 
helped create an institutional platform upon which contemporary British sociology was 
then constructed. Some researchers who frequented the sessions of the Society were, or 
would soon become, active within empire. I follow two of them -  Harold Hart Mann 
and Patrick Geddes -  to the Bombay Presidency. I use the papers of the Society to stress 
two main debates of the time: whether to restrict the influence of biology in sociology, 
and whether sociology was primarily an abstract, theoretical science or an applied,
70 Collini, S. (1991) Public Moralists: Political Thought and Intellectual Life in Britain 1850- 
1930. Oxford: Clarendon.
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practical one. That is, crudely put, whether sociology ought to lend its hand to practical 
social work of the state. I also use the debates to introduce Mann and Geddes.
I then turn to a use of detailed archival sources -  most of them unpublished — in order to 
chart the early career of sociology in India, and in particular in Bombay. This material 
shows the inception of sociology as a research subject in Bombay and how it, in a 
colonial context, became applied and was taken up by the colonial administration in 
Bombay, and included into its actual practises of governance. Just as it did in Britain 
during the time here under review, sociology as a ‘science of society’ in India, I will 
argue, worked as a methodology for coming to know the new circumstances under 
which the population lived in modem industrial society. And just as sociology in Britain 
helped promote stronger state and political involvement in social issues, it provided an 
argument in India for new forms of colonial social intervention. Sociology, as it were, 
helped promote a wider bio-political scope of colonial administration. The close 
connection to colonial power circumscribed the production of social knowledge. The 
quality of knowledge operating within social imperialism was measured by its utility for 
administrative action -  that is, how it contributed to doing rather than to knowing.71
Finally, the third component of this study is presented in chapter five. Here I use 
detailed archival sources in order to show how social imperialism translated into actual 
colonial governance in the Bombay Presidency. The two South Asian archives that I 
have frequented, Sindh Archives in Karachi and Maharashtra State Archive in Mumbai, 
are very rich on detailed material. These archives mostly contain unpublished volumes, 
files and compilations. Printed annual reports of governmental departments, committees 
or other government agencies I found in London. Chapter five presents detailed 
accounts of the nitty gritty of colonial administration in Bombay; reflections of its 
internal tension, and peculiar mix of self-righteousness and constant anxiety over 
occupation are, of course, invaluable for this thesis. Detailed archival material shows 
with clarity those ‘mundane governmental questions of how to rule the population of a 
state or an occupied territory’.72 It elucidates how the bio-political impulse internal to 
social imperialism worked within quotidian life.
71 Adas, 1989, 142.
72 Hindess, B. (2004) ‘Liberalism -  w hat’s in a nam e?’. In Larner, W. and W alters, W. (Eds.) 
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I discuss three cases. The cases are organised chronologically; this will bring out their 
internal connections. These three cases show, in different ways, how the colonial 
administration expanded its social concern by the turn of the twentieth century. I show 
how the administration reworked borders between state, society and markets by 
chalking out an enlarged bio-political scope of action on the level of everyday 
government.
The first case discusses the colonial administrations policy for handling an outbreak of 
plague in the city of Karachi, 1895-1900. This case describes how coercive social 
interventions were enacted by the administration, and how the colonial state marked the 
limit to societal self-care in the face of major social crises. The case also shows how 
local administrators realised that their lack of knowledge about local conditions of life, 
reduced the administrative ability to carry out effective governance when facing social 
breakdown.
The second case concerns how free and compulsory primary education was introduced 
to the Bombay Presidency. I pay particular attention to how debates around education 
were becoming increasingly interlinked with questions about productivity and stability 
of the work force; previously, education had a moral or civilisational slant towards 
reforming the character of Indians. For example, the introduction of compulsory 
education for children employed in factories was discussed partly on humanitarian 
grounds, partly as a measure to keep children from migrating from factories. With the 
introduction of productivist arguments for compulsory education, I argue that the state 
began to reach into society in innovative ways in order to define the limit to voluntary 
action in education.
The third case deals with urban housing and town planning in the city of Bombay. Here 
I discuss how the colonial administration embarked on projects to provide housing for 
the working and middle classes of the city. I also discuss how rent regulations were 
enacted in order to fix rent levels relatively lower than what local landlords claimed 
were market value. The issue of poor urban housing conditions formed a microcosm of 
official anxiety of modem society. Housing was related to a series of ‘problems’ of 
modem society: instability, alcoholism, and political radicalism. When engaging the 
question of urban housing, the colonial administration blended political tactics for 
addressing unrest with more wide ranging ideas about the making of modem society.
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Urban housing policy, however, revealed the ways in which colonial officials saw a 
limit to what markets could accomplish in these terms, and how officials began to 
consider markets failing to tend to the social costs they gave rise to. That is, officials 
here saw the limit of laissez-faire.
The archival method 1 have chosen agrees with Katznelson’s suggestion that broader 
theoretical questions of a political kind must be guided by ‘historically-grounded
* • 73inquiry’. However, to study a colonial situation through archival research presents 
some intricate methodological questions. In general, as Michel-Rolph Trouillot points 
out, people get involved in history and produce historical ‘evidence’ in different 
capacities: as agents, but also as subjects.74 Consequently, when using archival material 
produced by colonial authorities one has to be aware of how the constitution of archives 
themselves reflects power relations within a given social context. Official records give 
voice to perspectives that speak from positions of power. But while doing so, records 
not only gather biased information about past events. They also, in themselves, 
constitute a narrative of those events. An historical account for Trouillot may perhaps 
not even be an approximation of what happened, but an approximation of a story told by 
selected voices represented in the archive.
It is an important point. Having said that, however, it is easy to fall into a discussion 
about why certain political vocabularies were used by officials and administrators in the 
first place, and particularly in relation to their political behaviour. One may think that 
the use of certain ideas in policymaking is a mere faqade, brought in to serve as 
rationale for an underlying political motivation. Yet, to study closely how a new set of 
concepts, or how a new tone, becomes introduced in political language at a certain 
juncture in time is important. Quentin Skinner points out why. For him the formation of 
ideas and ideologies is closely related to grounded historical realities, and, ultimately, 
agency. His is an eloquent defence of a kind of investigation between intellectual 
history and historical sociology attempted here. Skinner suggests that:
what it is possible to do in politics is generally 
limited by what it is possible to legitimise. What you
73 Katznelson, I. (1997) 'Reflections on Histoiy, Method and Political Science.' The Political 
Methodolgistt 8, 11-14.
74 Trouillot, M. (1995) Silencing the Past: Power and the Production o f  H istoiy. Boston, MA: 
Beacon Press.
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can hope to legitimise, however, depends on what 
courses of action you can plausibly range under 
existing normative principles. But this implies that 
even if your professed principles never operate as 
your motives, but only as rationalisation of your 
behaviour, they will nevertheless help to shape and 
limit what lines of action you can successfully 
pursue.
The bottom line for Skinner is that discourse is productive beyond the conceptual realm, 
it shapes ways of seeing and thinking, which, in turn, form ways of doing. So, even 
though it is difficult to wholly assess the role of political principles in political 
behaviour, it is none the less vital to discuss the intellectual conversations in which 
statements were made. These conversations, Skinner asserts, form a part of the 
expanding and changing ‘political languages in which societies talk to themselves’.75 
Yet, says Skinner, studies of political language must not stand alone, they need to be 
combined with an historical sociological effort to contextualise the language, and to 
point out how it came to influence policy at a given time.
75 Skinner, Q.R.D. (1998) Liberty before liberalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
104-106.
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2. Early reformist ideology under the British Raj: a 
history
This chapter will situate my argument of the birth of social imperialism further by way 
of providing an historic background to the introduction of social concerns in 
imperialism. Social imperialism in India formed part of a long history of reformist 
ideology activated through British presence. In this chapter I will suggest that the rise of 
social imperialism marked a departure from previous reformist ideas and subsequent 
interventions. In what follows I will categorise older forms of reformist ideology into 
two main parts: those aiming at moral reform, and those aiming at enhancing revenue. 
Whereas the former ideology held as its main objective to civilise Indians by reforming 
their character, the latter sought to increase state income. As I will point out below, 
there is a chronology here to be accounted for: early British reforms, that is, those 
occurring before the Indian Mutiny of 1857, were morally toned. Post-mutiny, and after 
Queen Victoria’s declaration of non-interference into indigenous ways of life, revenue- 
enhancing reforms increased.
2.1. Liberalism and early reformist ideology under the Raj
Early nineteenth-century British reformist ideology owed much to emerging liberal 
thought in Britain; recent scholarship has begun to connect the history of empire with 
the histoiy of liberalism and its views on betterment and improvement.76 This literature 
has successfully traced how nineteenth-century liberalism evolved in close relation to 
the expansion and consolidation of the Second British Empire. Clearly, nineteenth- 
century liberal commentators did oppose particular colonial administrations, and were 
critical to the effects of an imperial economy. Yet often enough liberals came out 
supportive of empire on social as well as political grounds. And although the existence 
of empire and British rule in India posed a serious concern for the internal coherence of 
nineteenth-century liberal thought, it was to a high degree able to find justifications for 
it. Not only did nineteenth-century liberal philosophers like James and John Stuart Mill,
76 Sartori, A. (2006 September) ‘The British Empire and Its Liberal M ission’. Journal o f  
Modern H isto iy , 78, 623-642.
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Thomas Macaulay and Edward Strachey write extensively 011 the subject of empire and 
British Indian affairs, they worked for a living within the machinery that governed 
British India.
The welfare of Britain and its citizens was the main focus of late eighteenth- and early 
nineteenth-century liberals’ writing on the British Empire. Utilitarians like Jeremy 
Bentham and James Mill mainly focused on whether a British economy would benefit 
from British imperialism and British rule in India. Bentham disagreed with the idea that 
British colonies would be beneficial locations for surplus capital and surplus population. 
He found that money-capital invested in colonial trade withdrew investments from 
England. Further James Mill argued that investments in the colonies meant a real loss at 
home. He asserted that colonisation was actually driven by a few powerful investors, 
which drained the metropole of both labour and capital.77
However, Mill asserted, the British were in India for reasons beyond the economy. 
Rather, Mill suggested, British rule on the Subcontinent was beneficial as it brought 
civilisational advancement to Indians. James Mill incorporated in his theory of empire a 
belief in a singular hierarchy of human society and morals. Societies, argued Mill, could 
be placed on a ladder of development that was crowned by European culture. If Britain 
committed itself to improvement and to disperse modem civilisation on the 
Subcontinent, India would advance within that hierarchy of cultures.78
His son, John Stuart Mill, embraced the British Empire and British rule in India in 
general terms. His views 011 the scope and design of actual interventions and reforms in 
India shifted during his long career within the East India Company. Working alongside 
his father in the India House, Mill predominantly busied himself with issues regarding 
Indian education and Indian princes, but he took interest in various other issues 
concerning the administration of India. Although he initially inherited his father’s views 
on most Indian affairs, he soon revised these into a perspective of his own. In fact, his 
whole intellectual career was strongly influenced by his work with Indian affairs. His 
years inside the India House left clear marks in his overall political philosophy.79
”7 Sullivan, E. P. (1983 October) ‘Liberalism and imperialism: J.S M ill’s Defence of the British 
empire’. Journal o f  the H isto iy o f  Ideas, 44 (4), 599-617.
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John Stuart Mill never doubted the ability of British administrative power to cany out 
social change on the Subcontinent, or elsewhere in empire. Clearly, Mill had his 
reservations about colonial rule. As proved by his vocal and public criticism of the 
policies of Governor Eyre in Jamaica, Mill was critical to obvious abuses of power by 
particular colonial governments. Yet as we shall see below, his general attitude towards 
existing empire was positive.
The younger Mill played down economic factors in his justification of the British 
imperial connection with India. He argued that Indians would benefit socially and 
culturally under British rule. British governance would bring peace and civilisational 
advance, he thought, and it is in his philosophy of progress one finds his strongest
o n
justification for imperialism. Mill often used India and China as illustrative examples 
of civilisational progress gone awry; these civilisations had, he argued, first flourished, 
then they became stagnant or even backward. Yet although India lacked Europe’s 
contemporary dynamism, he suggests, it was not inherently backward. Neither was its 
backwardness biologically determined. Rather, just as Europe had passed through 
periods of stagnation, so did India. What India needed now, Mill argued, was British 
imperialism to stimulate its progress. This ought to be the main concern of empire, 
argued Mill: to uplift and improve backward Indian traditions and ways of life. Only 
then could India move up in the hierarchy of civilisations.81
On one level, suggests Bhikliu Parekh, the use of India as an example of a stationary 
civilisation was a pedagogical manoeuvre designed by Mill to warn his audiences in 
Europe what would happen to European civilisation were it not to advance. More 
importantly though, argues Parekh it indicates Mill’s view on history. Mill’s 
understanding of history as a teleological movement is particularly important since it so 
clearly shaped his view of governance.
80 Jahn, B. (2007) ‘Barbarian Thought: Imperialism in the Philosophy o f John Stuart M ill’. 
Review o f  International Studies, 31, 599-618.
81 Parekh, B. (1994) ‘Decolonizing Liberalism ’. In Shtromas, A (Ed.) The E nd o f  “ism s”? 
Refections on the Fate o f  Ideological Politics after Communism’s Collapse. Oxford: Blackwell, 
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48
According to John Stuart Mill the capacity of national self-government could only be 
achieved by societies at a certain level of development.82 National self-government was 
not there for all societies to exercise; nonetheless, it was there for all societies to aspire 
to. Accordingly, Mill suggests that the government of ‘backward’ societies such as India 
has to be exercised in a way which would cater for the progress of those societies, and 
for their moral and material development. Indeed, ‘[c]onduciveness to 
progress...includes the whole excellence of a government’, he wrote in his 
Consideration on Representative Government.83
In a less developed society like India, Mill asserts, progressive governments face 
traditional obstacles that hold progress back. In order to effectively reduce such 
obstacles, backward societies may be ruled, and benefit from, ‘despotic and civilizing 
rule’.84 Moreover, Mill argued, this form of civilising despotism was not only justified 
in India by its capacity to undermine existing oppressive structures, but because Indians 
had underdeveloped capacities for reason, which made them incapable of improving 
when guided by their own conviction. So, Uday Singh Mehta notes, the nineteenth- 
century liberal justification of British rale in India came to rely on the:
dual props of progress for India and a history that 
makes evident the need for such progress, along with 
the accompanying claim that such progress can be 
brought about only through the political interdictions 
of the empire.85
This acceptance and even promotion of imperial power as a progressive force by 
nineteenth-century liberals, Jennifer Pitts suggests, does not simply represent a gap 
between liberal theory and liberal practice. Nor does it mean that liberalism under the 
political pressure of empire was unable to live up to its theory. Rather, there exists an 
internal tension in nineteenth-century liberalism that forms around how it perceived and 
related to the different ways of life liberals actually encountered within the British 
Empire on one hand, and their understanding of history as an ongoing forward
82 Mehta, U.S. (1999) Liberalism and Empire. A Study in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal 
Thought. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 30.
83 Quoted in Mehta, 1999, 103.
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movement crowned by European civilisation on the other.86 Touching India’s stagnation 
with the industrial spirit of European (read British) civilisation, became a nineteenth- 
century liberal prerogative. Reforms to cater for that revival of India would only be 
effective under actual British rule.
2.2. Application of early reformist ideology in British India
Whether early reformist language and ideology had any real effect is, as I will show, a 
matter of controversy. There are at least two main scholarly approaches to the history of 
the Second British Empire’s early interventions on the Subcontinent. While C.A. Bayly 
argues that India saw few actual reforms being undertaken during the years between the 
Battle of Plassey in 1757 and the immediate aftermath of the Indian Mutiny in 1857 -  
that is, the years it took for British India to geographically complete its form -  Uday 
Singh Mehta, Richard Stokes and Thomas L. Metcalf suggest a much more active 
interventionist agenda.87
Stokes argues that early nineteenth-century reformist ideology found its practical 
application on the Subcontinent. He suggests that the British openly proclaimed its 
application of contemporary political philosophy through what they conceived an 
action-oriented form of governance. The preamble to this view on actual reform under 
empire was an Evangelical impulse, which made headway already during the last 
decades of the eighteenth century. Evangelicals created an intellectual framework, set 
on moral reform, and centred on the mission to evangelise India. This, they argued, was 
the main purpose of British rule in India,88 The notion infused administrators ‘on the 
spot’ with a sense of mission to British rule on the Subcontinent, and they actively set 
themselves to reshape social relations as they encountered them.
Evangelicals thought that missionary work would revitalise Indian society. India had, in 
their view, made veiy early civilisational advances of ‘progress of improvement’, but 
had then been rendered ‘stationary’, even ‘retrograde’.89 Were India to be revived, and
86 Mehta, 1999, 46.
87 Bayly, C.A. (1988) Indian Society and the Making o f  the British Empire. The New Cambridge 
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toned in European sensibilities, these Evangelicals argued, not only would Christianity 
prevail, but new market opportunities would eventually open up for British 
manufacturers.90
The subsequent period, ending in 1856, has been referred to as ‘the Age of Reform’ in 
imperial relations. During this period, argues T.R. Metcalf, India was to become a 
laboratory for reforms under empire. British intellectuals argued that the ‘spirit’ of 
British law would frame a civilising project, underpinning British rule in India. At this 
time, he says, ‘[a]way from the contentious political environment of England, 
Liberalism, as a programme of reform, developed a coherence it rarely possessed at 
home’.91
With this Bayly again disagrees. He challenges the view that an ‘Age of Reform’ had 
any effect within empire. ‘As for reform in Britain’s greatest colony, India’, Bayly 
writes, ‘this also promised more than it delivered’.92 Yet M etcalfs reading is shared by 
Mehta who writes ‘[f]rom the writings on India and the empire more generally, one gets 
the vivid sense of thought that has found a project’.93
In fact, moral reforms were riddled with tension. Administrators continually showed a 
deep reluctance for backing up their reformist language with actual use of political 
power. They were wary of what they found to be the corruptive character of power. 
Even so, argues Mehta, the ways in which ideas were projected within empire in 
general, and on the Subcontinent in particular, during the 1830s was both ‘reformist and 
activist’. In the exercise of imperial power, Mehta suggests:
one sees with stark clarity the sense in which the 
liberal imperialist project was paradigmatically 
political in the capacious sense, and not as an
90 Bayly, C.A. (1989) Imperial Meridian. The British Empire and the World, 1780-1830. 
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instance of the various ways that liberals have sought 
to limit the domain of the political.94
The Indian Mutiny of 1857 put moral reforms on a back foot. Conservative critics 
argued that reformist policies were partly to blame for the uprising. Queen Victoria’s 
proclamation of an end to interferences with Indian ways of life made reformers re­
think elements of British rule in India. Instead of emphasising universalism and 
essential human similarity, British officials now emphatically pronounced differences 
between Indians and Europeans as being imperative for the British self-proclaimed right 
to rule.
The aim to reform Indians in order to stimulate their civilisational advance was 
discredited; character formation was out of fashion. Instead, ideas about racial 
superiority took a much stronger hold on colonial imaginations at this time. British 
officials now found it unnecessary to intervene into Indian society; their right to rule 
was given them simply through their racial capacity. Right to self-government and 
democratic influence became related to colour in the eyes of British imperialists.
Furthering this process of segregation, somewhat paradoxically, were domestic political 
reforms in Britain aimed at increased enfranchisement of urban workers in England and 
the granting of responsible government to white settler communities in the empire. 
Arguments had to be found why certain communities under empire might be extended 
political rights, while others clearly were not -  race became the answer.95
Ideas promoting moral reform receded, and with the 1870s began an era of intensified 
revenue-enhancing interventions by the British administration.96 This intensification 
was related to the consolidation of the colonial state in India, as well as to the global 
transformations under what Eric Hobsbawm has labelled ‘the Age of Empire’. The 
colonial state in India formed its methods of revenue-enhancing interventions at a time 
in world history characterised by the systematic conquest and spread of metropolitan 
state power by advanced capitalist countries. During the period 1880-1914, most of the
94 Ibid., 80.
95 Metcalf, 1995, 55.
96 Bose, S. (1997) ‘Instruments and Idioms o f Colonial and National Development: India’s 
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world was being formally or informally annexed and ruled by a half-dozen metropolitan 
states.
These developments are of course complex, but Hobsbawm stresses the increasing 
global economic integration of that time as the main underlying force. Technological 
innovations called for new types of raw material for emerging industrial sectors, and 
new webs of transport facilitated the connection between natural resources and 
production. New tastes developed in metropolitan societies, and with that changed 
consumer patterns. Colonial possessions were important distributors of raw material and 
havens of cheap labour, but they were also potential markets. For Hobsbawm, the main 
driver of the formation of colonial empire was the shifting and transformative structure 
of the capitalist world economy; the main consequences, an asymmetric relation 
between a capitalist metropolitan core, and a dependent periphery.97
2.2.1. Areas of application o f early reforms
The primacy Hobsbawm assigns to economic forces in this new imperialism might be 
questioned. C.A. Bayly, for example, insists 011 the important role of political 
nationalism in the expansion of empire. The incorporation of new territories, Bayly 
suggests, formed part of an agenda of national interests on behalf of metropolitan 
countries.98 What is beyond doubt, however, is a growing intensity in British revenue- 
enhancing interventions in India, at the cost of moral reform intervention.
New revenue-enhancing interventions targeted specific domains of economic activity in 
India. The agricultural economy was the preferred domain of intervention at the time. 
Beginning in the 1850s the British began to survey agricultural land in India. By 1920 
almost all land was integrated into official documentation. During this period, the 
colonial state in India began to prioritise state works. Many of these projects centred on 
the wider Bombay region and demanded large labour forces. Initially, the British
97 Hobsbawm, E.J. (1987) The Age o f  Empire 1875-1914. London: W eidenfeld and Nicolson.
98 Bayly, C.A. (2004) The Birth o f  the M odem  World 1780-1914: Global Connections and  
Comparisons. Oxford: Blackwell, 230.
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administration restricted its own role in the works by guaranteeing private capital 
investment into infrastructure projects. In the 1870s, however, it took over much of the 
state works itself.
The vast spatial grid of irrigation and railway networks connected areas of agricultural 
interest to the colonial state. With irrigation systems and canal colonies in Punjab, or 
railways into Deccan, the British hoped to serve the double purpose of creating loyal 
merchant and agricultural elites, and increasing revenue from tilled lands. Ludden 
describes how the agricultural interest of the colonial state left imprints on political 
institutions: landed elites with much yield-producing land found their way into district 
and local boards."
David Washbrook is right when he suggests that these interventions should be thought 
of as productivist -  in other words, carried out in order to increase the profit of the state, 
rather than developmental.100 But it is also important to keep in mind a point elaborated 
by Manu Goswami: the mobilisation, and intensified use, of labour for state works 
coincided with increased global economic competition. Although strategies differed 
between states, the view of state as the manager and developer of resources of a national 
economy was a similar feature in Japan and USA, as well as in Europe.101
2.3. The preamble to social imperialism: returning to an 
interventionist ideal
Revenue-enhancing interventions continued into the 1870s and 1880s. However, facing 
criticism in India as well as in Britain over policies of economic exploitation, new 
notions of British imperialism as a life-preserving force would be introduced into 
imperial discourse by the British themselves. With tentative ideas of imperialism as a 
‘humanitarian’ impulse, views on imperialism as reformist and activist returned. These
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new prerogatives of imperial power on the Subcontinent did not leave substantial 
overall imprints on the everyday life of Indians. For much of the time the idea of 
imperialism as life-sustaining remained a rhetorical construction. Soon however, new 
campaigns to address particular crises of famine, cholera, and later plague, intervened 
into Indian everyday life in more comprehensive ways than moral or revenue-enhancing 
reforms had done before. Imperial interventions into life on the Subcontinent would still 
not be framed as ‘social’ interventions, yet the build up towards such a conceptual shift 
was becoming evident. As such, interventions during this period anticipated and paved 
the way for the coming bio-politics of social imperialism.
The new inclination of the latter part of the nineteenth century to preserve life has partly 
been investigated in terms of its economic developmental quality.102 Yet such accounts, 
however valuable, treat colonial interventions of this time as an intensified form of 
revenue enhancing, instead of viewing them as part of a build-up towards a new social 
emphasis in imperialism and colonial government.
New ideas about the capacity of imperial power to tend to conditions of life emerged at 
a time when the British started to feel real pressure from modem nationalist 
mobilisation in India. Nationalism rose as a force in India around the 1870s, as patriotic 
and nationalist sentiments were being recast into modem forms of association. This, 
argues Sumit Sarkar, manifested an ‘extremely important shift’ taking place within 
Indian intellectual milieus.103 The Indian National Congress was the most prominent 
organisation to embody a nationalist position around the mid 1880s. It first met in 
Bombay in 1885. At this time, however, it lacked the popular base that it was later to 
attain.
Nationalist critique began to focus on the exploitative character of British rule, and 
colonial officials recognised the heat of Indian discontent. This critique found rhetorical 
form in the ‘drain of wealth’ theory, expanding into a fully-fledged nationalist economic 
theory. It has even been argued that the economic dimension, rather than the political, of
102 Sinha, S. (2008) ‘Lineages o f the Developmentalist State: Transnationality and Village India, 
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the British occupation became the main focus of Indian nationalism between the early 
1890s and the partition of Bengal in 1905.104
Nationalists like Dadabhai Naroji, R.C Dutt and Subramania Iyer now argued that the 
poverty of India was the result of a deliberate British economic policy, with bias 
towards export surplus, excessive land revenue, and destruction of indigenous 
handicrafts. Most British officials dismissed that claim. Very few would, like William 
Wedderburn -  who served as president of the Indian National Congress in 1889 and 
again in 1910 — argue that the question whether the Government of India ‘had, or had 
not, promoted the general prosperity of the people in its charge’ ought to be addressed 
properly.105
The Congress consisted mostly of a recently formed social strata of ‘professionals’: 
lawyers, journalists, teachers and so forth who had moved towards political 
consciousness and middle class sensibilities through education attained within the 
colonial system. Landed elites were initially almost absent within the ranks of Congress, 
as were representation from the aristocracies of the Princely States. Even industrialists 
and urban merchants in Bombay and Calcutta, Sumit Sarkar points out, were wary of 
lending financial support to Congress’s then modest ambitions. At this early point 
nationalist ambitions were not political in any comprehensive sense, and at the time of 
its formation Congress was mainly concerned with fiscal policy and taxation.106
The 1870s and 80s also saw a lot of localised communal, civil and religious 
mobilisation and unrest. A wide range of indigenous reform movements formed with 
religious or sectarian base. Both Muslim and upper-caste Hindu movements emerged, as 
well as anti-Brahmin movements.107 There was also a rise in localised uncoordinated 
militant conflicts articulated through small-scale movements, addressing questions of 
local inequalities.108 The energy of these latter movements was often immediately 
directed towards landlord oppression, yet in their extension, they resisted the
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representatives of an often far away colonial state that did little to address local 
subaltern demands.109
Fears over external threats to the borders of empire had been deeply engrained within 
the British imperial imagination for a long time. Suspicion of any signs of large-scale 
military rebellions followed in the wake of the mutiny in India in 1857. During the 
concluding decades of the nineteenth century, however, officials were becoming 
anxious over the eruptions of internal conflicts of the kind mentioned above. British 
officials began to view these eruptions of unrest as un-connected to ideology and 
political consciousness, but related to mundane problems and everyday issues in various 
forms.
So, during the 1880s and 1890s, the colonial administration began to take an interest in 
mounting ecological and economic problems, and human suffering, in India. Both the 
Government of India’s own fact-finding missions and public opinion brought attention 
to growing local pressures, particularly within the agricultural sector.110 Questions were 
raised over how links between British failures to handle everyday issues of nutrition, 
sanitation, housing and health, could conflate with wider anti-colonial sentiments.
It was the occurrence of crippling famine in Bengal, and elsewhere in British India 
during the 1870s and again in the 1880s, that would most decisively push the British 
towards returning to a more interventionist agenda in India. For Evelyn Baring, later 
Lord Cromer, famine in India proved to be a formative experience. Cromer formed part 
of a radical wing of the Liberal party, and he was at times much associated with 
Gladstone. His experiences in India made Gladstone suggest him as Viceroy in 1894- 
95; a proposal never realised. Today he is perhaps most remembered for his work 
Egypt, where he served as High Commissioner. I take Cromer’s views as representative 
of an emerging focus in imperialism forming around the 1880s. Imperialism at this 
point, as translated into colonial policy in India, now called forth the return to a 
reformist and interventionist agenda. However, it was still not distinctly framed and
109 Guha, R. (1999) Elementary Aspects o f  Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India. Durham: 
Duke University Press.
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perceived as social imperialism that acted upon an integrated social domain; rather, it 
looked for ad hoc occasions to intervene and work through society.
Cromer first went to India in 1872-76 as private secretary under the Viceroyalty of 
Northbrook. Most of the time there he spent dealing with famine measures. He was in 
charge of the secret imports of rice from Burma. Many of his views on how to address 
social crises found resonance with Northbrook: famine committees, food handouts, and 
food for public work employment programmes. He also designed the controversial 
decision to keep exports of rice from Bengal open during famine there. As a result, 
secretly imported shipments of rice for famine-struck Bengal passed ships loaded with 
rice for export from the same area.
After a first stint in Egypt, Cromer returned to India in 1880-85 as finance member 
under the former Christian Socialist -  now Liberal -  Lord Ripon. Cromer was, 
according to one of his biographers Roger Owen, ‘completely devoted to the idea of 
using Ripon’s viceroyalty as an instrument of bringing Gladstonian liberalism to 
India’.111 Many aspects of Cromer’s thought on the British Empire and its future related 
to British rule in India. This is evident in his book Ancient and Modem Imperialism, 
where he compares the British Empire with the empire of the Romans. Indeed many 
examples of modern imperialism that he uses in his book were derived from his 
experiences of the British Raj during the 1870s and 1880s.112
In his book Cromer suggests that by the mid 1870s the Government of India had 
departed from previous practises of the Raj, as it became more and more concerned with 
the sustenance of life of its subjects, as well as their conditions of life. For him, this 
marked a new take, an outstanding new dimension of a modern empire. He discusses 
this new concern with life as the empire’s ‘humanitarian symptoms’. Even if the 
Romans might have had the will to mitigate the cruelties of nature, they did not possess 
the scientific knowledge that the British possessed, Cromer argues.
It is only now that imperial power has had the capacity to mitigate famine or disease, he 
suggests. Therefore, it was only very recently, Cromer writes, ‘beneficent imperialism
111 Owen, R. (2004) Lord Cromer: Victorian Imperialist, Edwardian P roconsul New York: 
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has been brought to bear on the subject of preserving life’. This has brought out new 
contradictions to empire, the consequences of which imperialists will have to work out. 
‘The policy of preserving and prolonging human life -  even useless human life -  is 
noble’, Cromer writes, ‘[b]ut its execution inevitably increases the difficulty of 
government’.113
Cromer did not explicitly formulate the work of the colonial administration he had 
joined as ‘social’; in the early 1880s he would not have thought about it as such. Yet he 
would conceptualise the ‘humanitarian impulse’ to ‘prolong human life’ as a novelty in 
imperial history. The new scope of imperial power and state action would have imprints 
on how governing in itself was conducted. Obviously, new forms of interventions 
needed elaboration, because, in order to prolong life, a colonial administration would 
have to reach a lot further into society. Moreover, it would need better information 
concerning conditions of life in both rural and urban India.
For Cromer, modern science makes an imperative component for the realisation of 
successful imperial interventions, and it ought to become intrinsic to imperial practises. 
For him science could be made to serve the state in its attempts to prolong life; 
knowledge could operate within modern imperialism in new ways, compared to before. 
Science, Cromer argues, must underpin a reformist and interventionist colonial agenda.
Lord Dufferin, Viceroy in India from 1884-88, would partly bear Cromer’s standpoint 
out. His Report on the Conditions o f the Lower Classes o f  Population in Bengal pointed 
in the same direction as Cromer did: a new scope of imperial involvement in everyday 
issues seemed necessary for the Raj to prosper, Dufferin argued. Dufferin’s report was 
published in 1888, after Cromer had departed. The publication of the Dufferin report 
was a direct consequence of public, as well as official, demands of a more engaged 
imperial policy after those massive famines in Bengal 1876-78. The report was an 
empirical study of 100 villages in Bengal, discussing whether there was an insufficiency 
of foodstuff in India. Its findings proved controversial to London: it promoted an 
argument of wider inclusion of Indians into the political structure of British India, for 
real improvement of conditions of the lives of Indians to come about.
113 Ibid., 113.
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For David Ludden, the period in which the Dufferin report was published marked a 
starting point for a new form of discourse in British India. It meant the early beginnings 
of a conceptual shift where the colonial state felt bound to partly reformulate its relation 
to Indian life and society. Thomas R. Metcalf makes a similar suggestion, but with 
reference to the field of state medicine. For him, the new form of interventionism was 
brought out by the British sense of India as a space apart, ravaged by disease and dirty 
environments that would ultimately make life miserable for the British.114 According to 
Ludden, however, this discourse was formed within the shifting parameters of an 
already existing ‘development regime’, which had emerged simultaneously in Europe, 
India and the United States in the 1770s.115
In the late 1880s, more than 100 years after the formation of that ‘development regime’, 
Ludden goes on to argue, public opinion in India began to make demands for a broader 
scope in colonial interventions. A modem state in any form, it was now argued, needed 
to expand its efforts in looking after the well-being of its subjects, compared to before. 
The idea that the state had a role to play in catering for the welfare of the Indian 
population found resonance within urban elites, as well as within sections of the 
imperial administration. For the latter category, it was becoming apparent that the 
occurrence of ‘[ejveryday starvation’ might threaten ‘the legitimacy of a modem state’, 
as Ludden points out.116
2.3.1. Late nineteenth-century interventions in Bom bay
The impact of the conceptual shift Ludden describes above could be seen in colonial 
thoughts about how to design effective government within urban areas in India as well. 
However, epidemic disease and congestion formed the backdrop to which the colonial 
return to a reformist and interventionist agenda was set in urban India. Clearly, by the 
first quarter of the twentieth century, pressures on life in the urban areas were 
indisputable. Average life expectancy was low, levels of child mortality high, and
114 Metcalf, 1995, 176.
115 Ludden, D. (1992) ‘India’s Development Regime’. In Dirks, N. (Ed.) Colonialism and  
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overcrowding rampant. Official statistics from the city of Bombay showed how death 
rates rose from 27 per thousand on average during the period 1881-85, to 40.9 per 
thousand on average during the period 1906-10.117 Although death rates always varied 
strongly when related to class, figures tell of appalling general living conditions in
1 1 Rlarger cities of the Presidency.
Yet successive colonial administrations did almost nothing to avert the situation. The 
Government of Bombay blamed its own inefficiency in providing amenities to urban 
populations on the effect of the fiscal settlement it had with the Government of India in 
Calcutta. This settlement, it argued, made it constantly balance on the verge of 
bankruptcy and left with no money to look after its own subjects. However, the 
Government of Bomb ay s’s poor track record and previous inaction is better explained 
by its own former priorities; as long as the major industrial heartland and production 
was unaffected by the deteriorating social conditions, governing bodies paid scant 
attention to the situation.
Inaction did not mean that improvements were not debated. Ideas about proper drainage 
and better health facilities were on the table, although plans were rarely implemented. 
Mariam Dossal described how people like Henry Conybeare and Dr. A.H. Leith pushed 
for sanitary reforms in Bombay. They studied drainage systems in Britain and tried to 
apply the ideas to Bombay during the decades of the mid nineteenth century. For 
example, Conybeare argued that diseases and high mortality rates in Bombay slowed 
down productivity.119 Nonetheless, little was actually done. In 1895, the Municipal 
Health Commissioner in Bombay City exclaimed after finding his proposal to create 
open drainage in parts of Bombay again rejected: c[w]e, in trying to do too much, do too 
little. Whenever I hear of any matter in sanitation being dependent on a big scheme, I 
know that such a matter will be neglected or put off for years. Big schemes are a sort of 
sanitary fetish for doing nothing’.120
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In early 1897, following the outbreak of plague in the Bombay Presidency -  something 
I will return to in chapter five, with reference to plague measures in Karachi -  the 
Government of Bombay began to consider a comprehensive scheme for the 
improvement of the city of Bombay, and this marked the return to a reformist agenda in 
Bombay. The initiative focused its effort on ‘better ventilation of the densely inhabited 
parts, the removal of insanitary dwellings, and the prevention of overcrowding’.
A proposal of how to organise and finance this scheme was put before the Municipal 
Corporation in September 1897. The proposal included the formation of a ‘City 
Improvement Trust’. The Trust would be the first of its kind in India, and it would have 
as its objectives to initiate the making of new streets, the opening up of crowded 
localities, and reclaiming lands from the sea to provide room for the expansion of the 
city of Bombay. The Trust would also construct ‘sanitary dwellings for the poor’.
A year after the proposal was made public, the Governor-General of India published his 
assent to the scheme, and in November 1898 the Bombay Improvement Trust began to 
work. The Trust began to survey Bombay City in order to get a sense of current 
conditions. The Improvement Trust found how ‘providing better housing for the 
working classes...being a matter of great urgency, second only in importance to the 
measure to be taken to develop the revenue resources’.121
In its work the Trust was much helped by the Indian Census of March 1901. It had 
previously encountered a shortage of information during its first year of work, but now, 
census statistics included:
[t]he numeration of the population by blocks of small 
area...the number of people living in tenements, and the 
number of rooms occupied by each family...
So, the Trust found:
‘[wjhen the results have been classified Bombay will possess, 
for the first time, data showing exactly what areas are most
121 O.I.O.C. Government o f Bombay Administration Reports. Annual Report o f  the City o f  
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densely populated, the classes which cause such crowding, the 
nature of accommodation which finds most favour with the 
people, and the scope of schemes intended to move bodies of 
persons united together by common occupation, village ties,
&c.122
Although it had first-hand and, for the first time ever, detailed knowledge about 
conditions of life in Bombay, the Improvement Trust found its work difficult. The main 
problem was that the low wages of the working classes made it difficult for prospective 
tenants to pay rents according to market value. Therefore, the Trust suggested, 
‘exceedingly low rents* were to be fixed for the new tenants of the houses it would
17 3construct.
Prashant Kidambi has detailed the failure of the Improvement Trust, and this will be 
further discussed in chapter five.124 To put the real effects of those early interventions 
into perspective: nearly 25 years later conditions had not improved. Governor George 
Lloyd found in 1920:
sufficient proof of the horror of the conditions that 
two-thirds of the people in this city live in insanitary 
and airless one room tenements, and that more than 
50 per cent. [SIC] of the children in this city die 
before they reached the age of eighteen months. For 
all that makes home life pleasant — light, air space 
and cleanliness, it is indeed a city of dearth -  for the 
children it is a city of death.125
In fact, conditions were steadily deteriorating, and after Lloyd had moved on to a High 
Commissionership in Egypt, they still -  to use the words of Stanley Reed, the long-time
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Bombay Improvement Trust. Administration Report fo r  the year ending 31st March 190 f  4.
123 O.I.O.C. Government o f Bombay Administration Reports. Annual Report o f  the City o f  
Bombay Bombay Improvement Trust. Administration Report fo r the year ending 31st March 
1902, 13-14.
124 Kidambi, 2007, 71-114.
125 O.I.O.C. Bombay Legislative Council Proceedings 1920. Lloyd, G. Proceedings o f 3 August 
1920, 562.
63
editor of The Times of India -  ‘sadly perplex[ed] the industrialist, the humanitarian and 
the sociologist’.126
2.4. Conclusion
111 this chapter I have described different phases of imperial thought with reference to 
reformist ideology, and how it was applied on the Subcontinent. The discussion shows 
how liberalism enjoyed a privileged place in the history of reformist ideology in empire, 
and especially under the British Raj.
Whether reformist ideology left any real material inprints in India has been debated. 
However, certain interventions under the Raj clearly earned the mark of reformist 
ideology. The character of actual interventions, I argued, shifted over time. I made a 
categorisation of three phases of interventions on the Subcontinent. I introduced this 
categorisation in order to better elucidate the shift towards the phase of reforms I argue 
occurred with the rise of social imperialism.
I suggested that the first phase of interventions was characterised by moral reforms, 
aiming at transforming the moral character of Indians. This phase, I argued, receded 
after the Indian Mutiny of 1857, when stability and non-intervention became 
watchwords in British policy. The second categoiy I suggested, revenue-enahancing 
interventions, soared as the colonial state consolidated in India around the 1860s. This 
phase was carried into the age of inter-imperial competition during the latter part of the 
century. Interventions of this kind helped to increase the income of the colonial state in 
India.
However, I suggested that during the latter part of this phase -  as human suffering and 
ecological consequences of earlier phases of reforms became all too obvious and as a 
nationalist critique of British policy asserted itself - a third phase of reformist ideology 
began to surface. I discussed how famine and epidemics enabled the introduction of a 
new type of rhetoric within imperialism. Interventions emanating from this rhetoric
126 Reed, S. (1925) ‘Introduction’. In Burnett-Hurst A. R. Labour and Housing in Bombay: A 
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were highly tentative at first, but allegedly aimed to preserve the lives of colonised 
subjects. These interventions had yet to be framed as social. Nonetheless, I suggest them 
in order to mark the preamble to a phase of social interventions. In my next chapter I 
will show how a returning reformist agenda in India would increasingly be framed in 
terms of intervening into a newly conceptualised dimension of human existence: ‘the 
social’. To this process we must now turn.
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3. Social imperialism and liberal thought, with 
reference to colonial Bombay
I have discussed how liberalism remained the most pronounced reformist ideology 
within empire throughout the nineteenth century. To early nineteenth-century liberals, 
colonial forms of governance were tolerable, given they improved what was perceived 
to be a savage or backward way of life. The liberals’ concern was a moral one at this 
point and did not concern conditions of life but the character and customs of various 
peoples. Later, after the Indian Mutiny in 1857, and at the time of the consolidation of 
the colonial state, the reformist agenda turned more explicitly towards revenue- 
enhancing reforms. At this time, occasional interventions by the colonial state into 
colonial society were not really sustained by a coherent programme. That is not to say 
that those interventions did not have real social consequences, which of course they had. 
But colonial administrations in India had yet to make a conscious distinction between 
interventions with social consequences on the one hand, and a coherent body of ideas 
and strategies utilised to actually work through society, on the other. For this to happen 
we have to wait until the birth of social imperialism.
Mark Duffield brings to attention how it has been discussed whether liberalism at this 
early point really embraced empire per se, or whether liberalism only came to be 
exercised through an imperial structure.127 For C.A. Bayly the question is not whether 
imperialism forms an important part of liberal throught, but how empire as an historical 
entity came to express and embody aspects of nineteenth-century liberalism. To that, 
Bayly suggests liberal ideals were not taken up in their entirety when diffused within 
empire. Rather, they found new shape as they were articulated locally.128
Both views are important to reflect upon. In this chapter I will show how a section of 
influential liberal thinkers and politicians of the late nineteenth century and first quarter 
of the twentieth continued to embrace the ideological underpinnings of empire as partly 
a product of liberalism. But I will also show how the application locally of new liberal
127 Duffield, M. (2007) ’Development, Territories, and People: Consolidating the External 
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reformist ideas was always conditioned by their operation within a specific -  read 
colonial -  historic context.
In this chapter I will show how liberalism would continue to inform imperialism during 
the early twentieth century, yet that it would do so from a new position. Liberal 
imperialism, I will point out, was influenced by a shift in liberal thought that implied the 
formation of ‘the social’ as a political entity.
During the time under review in this thesis, liberalism developed and included an 
explicit social dimension. Following on from this process liberal ideas and political 
language came to express a positive view of state-guided interventions into conditions 
of life. My argument in this chapter is that this positive view exercised a strong 
influence over liberal views on the use of imperial power, and in extension, the role of 
the colonial state vis a vis colonial society. This view, in fact, partly altered the idea of 
how successful and effective colonial governance must be designed: bio-political 
consideration became an alternative to force.
As we shall see below, the new outlook of liberalism was historically anchored in a 
wider rethinking of industrial society, assessing its potentials and pitfalls. Subsequently, 
this chapter takes the story forward into the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. It does so by describing the ways in which radical liberal thought began to 
intensify its bio-political considerations by constituting the social as a distinct domain, 
with similar qualities, wherever geographically industrial society would emerge, and to 
assign to political power an evident role in the managing of this domain.
Faced with experiences of industrialising areas in India such as Bombay, liberals partly 
refrained their ideas of existing colonialism around a sense of similarity rather than 
difference. For them, it was the conceived resemblance of social life in places like 
Bombay and Birmingham that made a continuation of colonialism justified; through 
experience, they argued, Europeans knew how to effectively govern emerging industrial 
societies. Moreover, believing that Bombay now faced similar social problems that 
industrial Europe had once faced -  and to a certain extent still faced -  proved, 
paradoxically, how the liberal idea of progress had universal applicability.
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Liberals were now less inclined to think of laissez-faire as the solution to societal 
problems. Indeed, they outlined radical approaches to increased interventions into 
society. Returning to my argument in this chapter: as the liberal case for new forms of 
social governance found form in Britain, it influenced ideas on imperialism in a specific 
way. While colonial administrators of the 1880s, as we saw at the end of my last 
chapter, began to believe again in a more interventionist agenda, they did not 
conceptualise such interventions holistically, or as social. During the first quarter of the 
twentieth century, however, liberals as well as colonial administrators increasingly 
began to portray social questions as questions of governance. Effective colonial 
government, they argued, needed to pay attention to the conditions of the newly 
conceptualised social domain; to manage modern industrial society turned into an aspect 
of imperial power. In order to begin managing society, however, those liberals engaged 
in the running of India found they needed to rely less 011 force, and more on working 
through the capacities of society.
3.1. The invention of ‘the social5 in liberalism
In this section I will revisit a period starting in the latter part of the nineteenth century, 
continuing in the first quarter or so of the twentieth, within which British liberal thought 
and action were partly reformulated around the notion of a social domain in need of 
formalised regulation.129 I will discuss how the surfacing pressures of late nineteenth- 
and early twentieth-century Britain produced a British liberal criticism of both the basic 
assumptions of previous forms of liberal thought, and the kind of society liberals of that 
time saw emerging. I will demonstrate how early twentieth-century liberal thought 
developed new dimensions by acknowledging the fabric of society put under stress by 
the entrenchment of the modem industrial system, while retaining some old 
presumptions; early twentieth-century liberals were still hostile to the landed 
aristocracy.130 In a later section 1 will tease out the ways in which the emergence of 
social imperialism was influenced by the invention and politicisation of the social 
domain within liberalism.
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As will be pointed out later in this section, liberal politicians, activists and 
commentators like J.A. Hobson, L.T. Hobhouse, Herbert L. Samuel, and E.S. Montagu 
-  to mention only a few — found the destitution of modem industrial towns harmful to 
both individuals and society. Governments and authorities, liberals now argued, had an 
obligation to act on these issues. Early twentieth-century liberals picked up 011 John 
Stuart Mill’s assertion that recent periods of material progress had done little to create a 
more advanced, sustainable and socially orientated society. In fact, large sections of 
society had gained veiy little from the coming of industrial society, they argued. 
Instead, they found that years of recent rapid development of modem industry had not 
really improved, but rather worsened the conditions under which society evolved.131
The radical liberal movement of this period pushed for a conceptual shift, pronouncing 
social rather than moral reformist action. This conceptual shift, as we shall see, had an 
impact on imperialism: imperial thought projected in India, which had recently retrieved 
its interventionist energy, began to reframe its agenda in a social language. The 
invention of the social helped articulate a liberal critique of capitalism, and helped to 
promote a new ideal of governance. This was an ideal that came with expanded bio­
political assumptions firmly at its core: in order for industrial society to peacefully 
evolve, to avoid friction and allow for progress, the welfare of populations must be an 
active concern of governments.
Very soon, as I will show, this line of liberal thought turned into a distinct view of 
progress, freedom, civics and ethics, stressing the need for an active utilisation of 
political power within society.132 This notion, as I will point out, applied domestically 
as well as within empire. Subsequently, as I will discuss in this section, by the late 
nineteenth century, contrary to the tradition of liberalism, liberal politicians and thinkers 
found much more extensive social interventions justified. As we shall see below, they 
found in comprehensive programmes of state-led reform in areas of sanitation, housing 
and education one of social liberalism’s more defining expressions.
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As will be discussed in depth in chapter four with reference to both Britain and India, 
this movement was closely related to the emergence of the new discipline of 
‘sociology’.133 Sociological surveys of urban settings provided telling evidence of the 
extent of poor housing conditions, meagre household budgets, and low levels of 
education in industrialising areas of turn of the twentieth-century British Empire.
3.1.1. The constitution o f social liberalism: m ovem ent and milieu
Of course, this form of social liberalism did not evolve out of touch with experiences in 
contemporary society: it was anchored in an intellectual, social and political milieu. The 
way liberalism constituted the social domain as an area of political concern was much 
indebted to popular nineteenth-century movements in Britain. Obviously, British social 
liberalism was closely related to the politics and ideas of the period of Gladstonian 
liberalism and Disraelian reformist Toryism. Indeed, during the period 1867-1894, 
several socially informed Acts were piloted through Parliament. Yet although both 
Gladstone and Disraeli led governments that emphasised political and social reform, 
they still primarily focused on single issues rather than proposing systematic reform.134
Gladstonian reforms were indebted to the constitution and mobilisation of the liberal 
political constituency during a period connecting the first and second half of the 
nineteenth century. This constituency had a broad social base; in fact, it was a popular 
liberal movement with strong subaltern influence. Historian Eugenio Biagini even 
points out the resemblance between the social composition of this early popular liberal 
movement and that of the sans-culotterie in revolutionary France. Already around the 
1830s, Biagini suggests, the British liberal movement built on the support of workers, 
artisans and petty traders.135 What bound the movement together, Gertrude Himmelfarb 
as well as Biagini argues, was a sense of shared values and virtues, rather than class
133 Collini, S. (1980) ‘Political Theory and the “Science o f Society” in Victorian Britain’. The 
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consciousness. These groups saw themselves in combination as ‘the people’, in 
opposition to the ‘old corruption’ and ‘privilege’ of landed aristocracy.136
By the mid nineteenth century, with the subsequent rise of Gladstone as the liberal 
politician per excellence, radical reformers in Britain found a home in the liberal 
movement, rather than turning to revolutionary socialism as their counterparts in 
continental Europe did. The ability of the liberal movement to mobilise radical elements 
was not restricted to urban areas, Biagini argues; it extended into the countryside as 
well. Moreover, by the mid nineteenth century the liberal movement had developed a 
close attachment to organised labour. Consequently, as P.J. Cain points out, the Liberal 
Party itself was a grand coalition of various forces.137 This broad popular liberal 
movement showed support for certain protective social legislation such as the Factory 
Acts of the 1860s and 1870s.
Yet with reference to such acts as the Contagious Diseases Acts of 1864-69, and 
Disraeli’s Artizans’ Dwellings Act of 1875, Biagini points out how hostility towards 
excessive state intervention prevailed.138 Workers often saw social interventions as 
reactionary in that they hit at alternative forms of welfare provision by cooperatives and 
Friendly Societies. When workers failed to sustain themselves, Biagini argues, they 
would rather turn to trade unions or co-operatives for relief, than place their demands at 
the level of the state.
The co-operative movement rendered strong public support among prominent liberals 
such as John Stuart Mill. Communal production and distribution of resources without 
state-interference signified independence, co-operativists argued. When it came to 
combating ever-more accentuated social problems though, trade unionists and co- 
operativists turned to the state. They ascribed to the state a responsibility to remove 
intemperance, poverty and crime.139 Workers and artisans argued for a liberal 
minimalist state. However, as we shall see, with the rise of social liberalism in Britain, 
these views were changing.
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Clearly, the mobilisation of a broad popular base helped metropolitan liberalism to 
develop more nuanced social thought. It made it possible to conceptualise, and then to 
enter, the social domain through a concern for everyday issues. At one level it was 
important to act on issues that in a direct way affected a significant part of the liberal 
constituency. Previous claims, made by historians, that support from subaltern groups 
for liberal politics in Britain was irrational, or was instilled into their political 
consciousness by a detached workers’ aristocracy, seem contestable, Biagini argues. In 
fact, he suggests the opposite. For him, ‘the programme of reforms proposed by the 
party leaders offered convincing solutions to some of the problems perceived to be real 
and urgent at the time’.140
The liberal concern for everyday social issues became even more pronounced during the 
end of the 1880s and the beginning of the 1890s, that is, during the formative years of 
British social liberalism. At this time Britain had seen significant slumps and recessions, 
a situation liberals believed Gladstonian politics was unable to correct. Productivity in 
manufacturing and agricultural sectors fell sharply in the 1870s, causing high 
unemployment as well as migration into industrial towns. During the late 1880s, rural 
recession again forced country people on the move. London was the foremost magnet 
for both domestic and international migration. However, London had already lost out on 
some of its major employers — the shipbuilding industries -  and increasing pressures 
and competition for resources, such as housing and employment, began to surface. The 
eastern parts of London saw rioting during the 1880s as a consequence thereof.141
The influential liberal philosopher T.H. Green argued that politics had to respond to the 
problems facing industrial society, not merely because individuals suffered, but because 
these problems threatened social harmony and moral community. Green feared 
emerging tensions might result in widespread class conflict. T.H. Green strongly 
influenced a generation of young British radical liberals, who would later become 
instrumental in the development of social liberalism. Two of them, Herbert Luis Samuel 
and L.T. Hobhouse, will be discussed below.
140 Ibid., 6.
141 Marriott, J. (2003) The Other Empire: Metropolis, India and Progress in the Colonial 
Imagination. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
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The liberal social philosopher and sociologist Leonard T. Hobhouse was to become one 
of the leading lights of the early twentieth-century radical intellectual milieu in Britain. 
Being one of the foremost theoreticians of social liberalism, his reworking of liberal 
principles expressed, and also influenced, the wider social turn in liberalism. Hobhouse 
wrote frequently for the press, and lectured and published through his affiliation with 
the London School of Economics.
It is perhaps unfair to include an ardent anti-imperialist like Hobhouse in an 
introduction to radical liberalism and its influence on colonial governance. Hobhouse 
was a member of a ‘Foreign Policy Committee’, which was created to inform Members 
of Parliament and journalists about world politics. Through this platform Hobhouse 
voiced his critique of the contemporary Fabian endorsement of expansive imperialism. 
And he clearly distanced himself from an emerging group of liberal imperialists 
including Rosebery, Asquith and Haldane, who viewed territorial expansion as 
important for financing domestic social policy.
However, being an anti-imperialist in the economic field, and having a nuanced view on 
the need for self-government within empire, did not prevent Hobhouse from keeping 
John Morley’s modest pragmatism during the 1900s towards political reform as a 
Secretary of State for India in high esteem. Also, describing himself as influenced by a 
“Gladstonian principle of interventionism” in foreign affairs, Hobhouse had a complex 
view on empire as a historic reality.142 He saw himself as an internationalist but was not 
anti-empire.
Hobhouse entered Oxford in 1883, when liberal disenchantment with Gladstonian 
politics began to emerge. He elaborated his view on social reform through work in 
several disciplines, predominantly philosophy. In his study of organised labour, which 
was published as his first major work The Labour Movement, Hobhouse engaged the 
question of how to integrate forces of trade unionism with radical liberalism. Aiding the 
labour movement, as well as educating co-operatives in economics, were his principle
142 Collini, S. (1979) Liberalism and Sociology: L. T. Hobhouse and Political Argument in 
England 1880-1914. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 81-84.
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activities outside his academic work. During the late 1890s Hobhouse began to write for 
the Manchester Guardian, and he moved to Manchester in order to devote his time to the 
newspaper. Yet he stayed loyal to his political activities in London, and kept in close 
touch with developments in the capital.
In the early 1900s Hobhouse began to produce ideas about a reformed liberalism. He 
was convinced that the principle of laissez-faire could not fully apply to contemporary 
state society relations, as the liberal tradition would have it. So when Hobhouse moved 
to London in the beginning of the 1900s, he became involved in practical politics 
concerning labour issues. Through this involvement he began to outline what he called 
‘liberal socialism’. His idea of liberal socialism led him to reconcile forms of 
collectivism and individual freedom: he called for liberals and collectivists to stay close, 
although not merge organisationally.
As mentioned above in the introductory chapter, at this time Hobhouse shifted attention 
to sociology as a scientific approach to resolve problems of progress, freedom and 
politics in modem industrial society. Hobhouse was instrumental in the founding of the 
Sociological Society. He found sociology could work for advancing his political 
thinking. We shall see below, and again in chapter four, how Hobhouse’s sociological 
studies became strongly linked to his political ideas, not least his ideas about state- 
society relations. The work of the Sociological Society will be further detailed in 
chapter four, but it was initiated by amateur sociologist Victor Branford, and he was, in 
turn, closely aided by Professor Patrick Geddes. We will come to know Geddes better in 
chapter four.
Hobhouse and Geddes shared many assumptions concerning sociology, although they 
differed in ideas about methodology and the scope of the sociological discipline, and 
often collided on administrative issues of the Sociological Society. Moreover, Geddes 
was less politically active than Hobhouse. In 1907 Hobhouse became the first professor 
of sociology at the University of London. The post was initially designed for Geddes, 
but the position went to Hobhouse after Geddes performed awkwardly in the interview.
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Hobhouse was contemporary to, and were also to influence, Herbert Luis Samuel. The 
two of them worked together on several occasions. They belonged to a broad radical 
milieu that included Fabians like Beatrice (Potter) Webb and Sidney Webb, and George 
Bernhard Shaw, and Christian Socialists like Sidney Ball. Both Samuel and Hobhouse 
took part in debates with the liberal coterie The Rainbow Circle, that was founded in 
1894. Its members initially met in the Rainbow Tavern on Fleet Street in London, and at 
the National Liberal Club. Here contemporary political issues would be hammered out 
among influential figures like the Fabian and later Colonial Secretary Sidney Olivier, 
economists J.A. Hobson and William Clarke, and future Prime Minister Ramsay 
MacDonald, They frequented Beatrice Webb’s social gatherings and debates held at her 
home, although none of them were members of the Fabian Society. As I mentioned 
earlier, Hobhouse would soon become highly critical of the Fabian Society, and he 
officially denounced their tract of 1894 Fabianism and The Empire.
Herbert Luis Samuel was a liberal party man, two-time Home Secretary and also High 
Commissioner for Palestine 1920-25. The main political turning point for Samuel had 
been the London Great Dock Strike in 1889. He describes the years around the strike as 
decisive for a growing political consciousness among a whole group of young radical 
liberals. The strike in the docks, and the mood developing in London at the time of the 
strike, especially in poorer working-class areas, proved most important also for 
Samuel’s cousin, the future Secretary of State for India E.S. Montagu. Both Samuel and 
Montagu were attached to the poor East London neighbourhoods of Whitechapel, where 
E.S. Montagu’s father served as a Liberal MP for Tower Hamlets between 1885-1900.
H.L. Samuel was first introduced to the poverty of urban England as he campaigned for 
his brother Stuart Samuel in Whitechapel for the London county council elections in 
18 8 8.143 Knocking on doors in Whitechapel was an eye-opener for Samuel. These 
events were formative for his later political career, which was devoted to social reform, 
and as we shall see, imperial issues.144 For the first time he went into workers’ houses, 
and to the docks, and he saw sweatshops and home industries. While his brother 
believed in charity as a way of countering poverty, Samuel now found state action vital:
143 Samuel, H. L. (1945) Memoirs. London: The Cresset Press.
144 W asserstein, B. Entry on ‘Samuel, Herbert Louis’. Oxford Dictionary o f  National Biography. 
Accessed online http://www.oxforddnb.com 9 April 2008.
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‘[ijndispensable as the charities were it was obvious that the task was beyond their
?  145scope .
Soon after the election Samuel went to Oxford, where he met Hobhouse. Together with 
Hobhouse, Samuel and a group of friends -  including H.E.A. Cotton who would later be 
posted in Bengal, and sit in the legislature there, and who would also preside over the 
Indian National Congress -  regularly went out to the countryside with a William Hines, 
the college chimney sweep and a vigorous organiser of radical political meetings.
However, it was to London, not the small university town, this group of young radical 
liberals longed for and belonged to, as London was at the centre of the reformulation of 
liberal ideas by the turn of the twentieth century. Social liberalism related closely to 
social realities and experiences of industrial society. It was at the docks, in the working- 
class areas, and in the newspaper rooms of Fleet Street, where the sense of urgency to 
reconceptualise political responsibility to act 011 conditions of life in the face of the 
pressures of modem society was most closely felt.
That urge to solve recurring crises and their effect on society caused much activity 
within liberal circles, and new legislation had made the emerging liberal concern for 
social issues even more important. Samuel identified that the 1870 Reform Act — and 
the expansion of franchise in 1868 and 1884, had begun to have a real impact on 
political thought. Politicians, Samuel writes, had to take into account an electorate that 
included large sections of the working classes. ‘The voters were concerned more and 
more to better the conditions of their own lives’, he writes, and so promoting social 
reform became increasingly important in order to win votes. Still, however, in the early 
1890s, the understanding of urban poverty among liberals could be highly un-nuanced. 
Following sociologist Charles Booth’s conclusions in his surveys of London, liberals 
such as J.A. Hobson found the urban poor an unemployable ‘residuum’ whose living 
environment would ultimately cause their degeneration. Life in the city was ugly and 
full of strife, liberals argued, and for that reason it needed active management.146
Samuel, 1945, 7.
146 Cain, 2002, 28.
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3.1.2. Early social liberal views
The problem emerging for liberals during the first quarter of the twentieth century was 
chiefly that wellbeing and liberty did not seem to come about in society when removing 
those obvious restrictions that had been imposed on individuals. Although people were 
freed from the old traditional bonds of a feudal society, or were left alone from state 
interference, the realities of industrial urban Britain seemed far from prosperous. This 
acknowledgment was bound to have a clear effect on how one may think about the 
realisation of progress, liberal political observers of the time suggested. In the face of 
the new kind of inequalities produced by industrial society, liberals were forced to think 
in new ways about how to successfully strike a balance between coercion and liberty, 
individualism and collective action, and how to govern according to new times.
On a discursive level, the question was analysed, as we shall see below, by liberal 
commentators like L.T. Hobhouse and Robert G. Davis. For them, and for their fellow 
liberal activists, the kind of individualism promoted by nineteenth-century liberalism 
had come to the road’s end; it had to be replaced by a ‘social’ liberalism that saw the 
freedom and prosperity of the individual linked to the freedom and prosperity of others. 
To what extent debates within the liberal press influenced actual politics is always 
difficult to measure. Anyhow, discourse helped to conceptualise growing social 
concerns, and reframe and update previous bio-political ideas.
Late nineteenth-century liberals stayed true to their liberal heritage by delivering an 
economic critique of how landed elites monopolised the rural economy, thus keeping it 
unproductive, and thereby causing large inflows of labour into industrial towns. They 
would, however, develop original ideas about life in modem industrial society, 
originating from what they saw and experienced in industrial areas. Many of these 
liberals were greatly influenced by John Ruskin’s views on the destructive dimensions 
of modem industrial capitalism, which, they thought, made humans into slaves of 
machines.
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For example, the radical liberal economist J.A. Hobson, Cain suggests, was able to 
combine a liberal evolutionist outlook with these dimensions of Ruskin’s paternalistic 
Toryism.147 Interestingly, in the Indian context, Gandhi argued similarly. In his Hind 
Swaraj from 1909, Gandhi explicitly criticises modem industrial society and its 
foremost expression, the machine. Gandhi points out how workers in the mills of the 
cotton textile industry in Bombay had become slaves under the machine -  a view, as we 
shall see, he shared with sections of the colonial administration. A greater aim of 
independence, he argued through his vision of a fully independent India, was to free 
those held captive by modem civilisation.148
The writer Robert G. Davis actively contributed to the influential liberal journal the 
Westminster Review. There he discussed the future of industrial society in a similar vein 
as Ruskin and J.A. Hobson. For Davis, it was modem commerce and industrialisation 
that had entrenched inequalities, and had created ‘impediments to moral and intellectual 
awakening, and so the development of widespread social freedom and happiness’.149 Ill 
health and ignorance had, as it turned out, Davis asserted, developed into a full-blown 
obstacle to progress. And this obstacle lay not in the political organisation of 
contemporary industrial society.
In fact, like others influenced by Ruskin, Davis was not overly enthusiastic about 
democratic reforms. He found that popular political mobilisation was given far too 
much importance, while it was actually only a means to enhance social freedom.150 For 
Davis, it was not even an economic problem that hindered development at this time; it 
was a ‘social problem’ of ignorance, poverty, and general destitution. This ‘social 
problem’ had to be resolved at its root causes: better housing, improved education, and 
an end to aristocratic privilege.
Subsequently, on this discursive level, beginning in the late nineteenth century, liberal 
concepts of ‘freedom’ and ‘progress’ came to operate within a new political landscape
147 Ibid., 35.
148 Gandhi, M. K. (1946) H ind Swaraj, or Indian Home Rule. [Revised ed]. Ahmedabad: 
Navajivan Publishing House.
149 Davis Gunn, R. (1909 June) ‘Some Obstacles to Progress’. Westminster Review  [W.R.], 171, 
639-645.
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where various liberals, reformist Tories, Fabians and socialists moved. They were 
bound together by a concern that the conditions of modem industrial society might 
produce obstacles to progress, and create instability. For this heterogeneous group of 
activists, politicians and thinkers, the social now became the lens, the optic through 
which anxieties and critiques were articulated.
‘Progress’, of course, was a wide term, embraced by many. As Stephan Collini has 
pointed out, it functioned more as a ‘pattern into which the educated late-Victorian 
Englishman naturally fitted both his perception of the past and his expectations of the 
future’.151 Economic and technological growth were obvious manifestations of progress, 
it was argued -  as were moral and intellectual advance. But the paradox to many a 
radical mind of the time was that the modem world being, as Collini points out, ‘the 
product of Progress to some extent’, simultaneously brought with it social ills, squalor 
and sceneries of despair.152
Hence, this liberal progressive discourse emerged self-conscious and sensitive to the 
socio-historical context in which it took shape. The shift concerned the central 
conceptualisation of how societal progress would actually come about. With the 
emergence of a more socially informed liberalism and its practical action-oriented 
reform agenda, focus was expanding from individual self-development, to the collective 
development of populations and the conditions of life of those populations.153 It was 
becoming a shared notion among liberal commentators in the early twentieth century 
that social progress was not only dependent on the reduction of constraints 011 the 
individual, but on the actual possibilities for all to actively engage social life.154
R.G. Davis found that ‘[o]ur social civilization is restricted because the physical 
environment of the majority is still savage’. And the only thing coming out of such 
savage conditions was menace to society: intemperance, crime and ignorance. In fact, 
for Davis it was primarily want which slowed the progress he had in mind, and he found 
that all ‘objectionable things in life exist and flourish amidst poverty’. Davis makes few
151 Collini, 1979, 160.
152 Ibid., 170.
153 Alden, P. (1919 April) ‘A new liberal programme: liberalism and labour’. C.R., 115, 396- 
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explicit references to contemporary research, but it is clear that he and others within the 
liberal press had been highly influenced by contemporary studies of British industrial 
towns. I will discuss this in detail later, but the genre of urban reporting emanating from 
Charles Booth’s study of London and Seebohm Rowntree’s study of York had a 
tremendous effect on domestic social and political thought of the time. It is not 
surprising that Davis concludes that the deteriorating conditions of modern industrial 
society, and their foremost expression -  the congested city -  had to be ‘operated’ on 
thoroughly. Only then, he asserted, could the twentieth century carry a ‘wider 
realisation of civilisation’ than did the nineteenth century.
Davis found a beginning of a new outlook in the movement of ‘improvement of the 
social environment’ taking place within various sections of society. This movement, he 
argued, ‘is one of the most encouraging signs of the humanist tendencies of modern 
times’.155 It was an ‘optimistic’ outlook, Davis argued, believing in the plasticity of 
individuals and populations, and the possibilities for change.156
3.1.3. Social liberalism expands the bio-political concern o f state
While new social liberal ideas formed within the milieu described above, they 
crystallised specifically around the question of how to reformulate the relationship 
between political power and society. These ideas called forth an expansion of previous 
bio-political considerations in liberalism; laissez-faire, voluntarism, charity and self- 
help seemed to have met their limit in the age of modem industrialism. To many liberals 
collective mobilisation and state action seemed necessary for the realisation of better 
conditions of life for all. In order to avoid social tension, even class conflict, but also in 
order to increase productivity and human capacity, official agency must be designed to 
reach into previously untouched domains of life, and act there, liberals now suggested.
155 Davis Gunn, R. (1908 January) ‘Some Tendencies in Social Evolution’. W.R., 169, 25-28.
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For social liberals like Hobhouse or Davis the pressures of industrial society had to be 
addressed in a much more comprehensive and holistic manner than ever before. Policy 
could not afford to take the individual as its primary unit of action, R.G. Davis asserted, 
and therfore charity must only play a background role in social action.157 Davis was not 
alone in liberal circles to make such a claim. For Davis, individualism and charity based 
approaches had two main flaws. First, reforms and interventions must build on exact 
studies of the problems identified. Secondly, after thorough investigation, the problems 
themselves must then be addressed by those with adequate power to produce a 
difference.
Here, Davis argued, nineteenth-century charity oriented approaches towards social 
amelioration had gone wrong. These approaches did not systematically and 
scientifically attack the social evils preying on social relations under modern industrial 
society. And they did not have authority to back up their projects properly in order to 
create sustainable change in people’s lives. Davis found that ‘the self-sacrificing labour 
of many of these good people have been in vain, and have seriously hindered reform’. 
Subsequently, Davis suggested, social problems could not be solved at the level of the 
individual, by doling out food or clothing to the poor. These issues, he asserted, must be 
addressed on a collective level.158
Davis saw liberals and socialists share common ground in this analysis. Indeed, some 
liberals elaborated these views at some length, arguing for the ‘socialisation’ of 
industries, and ‘right to work’ policies as security for the unemployed.159 Collini 
describes this aptly when he points out how ‘much which was condemned as 
“socialism” in the 1890s was in the vanguard of Liberalism in 1910’.160 The ideological 
integration between socialist and liberal positions had come about due to an emerging 
liberal emphasis on the strength of collective solutions and action of state. For early 
twentieth-century liberals, individual-centred tenets of mid nineteenth-century 
liberalism were inadequate to face the tests of modern industrial society.
157 Quoted in ibid.
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Previously, argued Davis, ‘individualists’ had ‘insisted on unrestricted economic liberty 
as the one thing necessary to ensure progress, forgetting that its operation would 
ultimately render liberty for the majority impossible’. For Davis and other 
commentators like him, this form of economic liberty within the emerging industrial 
society had had an overwhelming effect on social structures.161 They argued that in 
order to deal with the social consequences of nineteenth-century economic laissez-faire, 
one must now begin to elaborate new intellectual and conceptual frameworks, where the 
state was made central. And they blamed Gladstonian liberalism for being incapable of 
carrying out the proper measures to alter developments in industrial society.
H.L. Samuel describes how, between the end of the 1880s and the mid 1890s, 
Gladstonian liberalism was thus being ‘transformed’. True liberty, he asserts, could not 
exist amid ignorance, poverty, excessive working hours and a generally poor 
environment. He writes in his memoirs:
The theory that State action must be kept to a minimum, if 
liberty was to flourish, was being discredited by facts that 
were obvious on eveiy hand. Laissez-faire had never been a 
dogma to be accepted by Liberals without qualification.162
A majority of social liberals now viewed positively state action as a means to enable 
individual and societal progress through, for example, enabling the distribution and 
provision of better social security. Nonetheless, liberals were divided among themselves 
to which extent the state could function as a vehicle for social change.163 Still, many 
liberals viewed state interference with some scepticism, and would rather restrict state 
involvement to financial assistance to programmes actually earned out by non-state 
actors.
161 Davis Gunn, R. (1912 August) ‘Individualism and Socialism, and Liberty’. W.R., 178, 144- 
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L.T. Hobhouse worked along these assumptions. In his later work, Hobhouse identified 
the increasing social responsibility on the part of the state. The state had a role in 
organising the industrial energy of a society, but also to smoothen the social upheavals 
caused by rapid social change. Contemporary social economic features of industrial 
society were coercive and, as such, they restricted the realisation of freedom for classes 
of individuals, Hobhouse found. Only the state, wrote Hobhouse, could remove these 
negative features.164 The state, he suggested, was now responsible ‘for the provision of 
the fundamental conditions of healthy development for all its citizens’.
However, he argued, how much the state should do ‘outright5 in these matters, and how 
much it could depend on the contribution of individuals, had ‘not yet been settled on 
any clear principle’. Hobhouse was not a friend of an omnipotent state, yet he assigned 
it a role beyond its contemporary confines. He stressed its managerial role in welfare 
efforts. Hobhouse suggested that the expansion of state action that he called for had 
actually already commenced: old age pensions and regulations concerning child labour 
in factories were obvious examples, he suggested. Also, the Elizabethan Poor Laws had 
recognised a level of common responsibility for the welfare of individuals. However, in 
the case of the Poor Laws, the principle of communal responsibility had been 
unproductively applied, Hobhouse asserted.
He found that ‘the once beautiful name of Charity’ was losing its allure. Perhaps, 
Hobhouse suggested, ‘ [s]uch an ideal might have been applicable to a different 
structure of society’. But in ‘our industrial society’, he continued, there was clearly a 
great need for another social ideal. This ideal had begun to take shape through studies of 
societies forming under industrial competition, and under the stimulus of a ‘socialistic 
critique’. The ideal crystallised around the notion that ‘elementary human needs are a 
matter of common concern...and public service better than personal profit’. And, 
Hobhouse continued, it built on the assertion that ‘if the community cannot make its 
members happy or morally wise, it can provide the conditions under which they may 
cultivate their own faculties and sweeten the lives of their own circle’.165
Ibid., 123.
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For Hobhouse, Davis, and other social liberal commentators, this understanding of state- 
society relations should not be understood as being contrary to liberal principles. 
Instead, social liberals argued, they corresponded to liberal principles of the obligation 
of the state vis a vis society. In his book Liberalism from 1902, Herbert L. Samuel 
attempts to bring these principles out.166 In fact, Samuel argued that social interventions 
correspond to that foremost liberal principle: the first task of the state is to secure for its 
citizens their possibility to live happy lives. A life in poverty could never be happy, 
Samuel asserted. And therefore, ‘to lessen the causes of poverty and to lighten its effect 
are essential parts of a right policy of State action’.
When introducing Samuel’s tract, future Prime Minister Herbert H. Asquith pointed out 
that this new ‘positive’ conception of freedom implies that to ‘be really free’ people 
‘must be able to make the best use of their faculty, opportunity, energy, life’. It is here, 
Asquith asserts, ‘in this fuller view of the tine significance of Liberty that we find the 
governing impulse in the later developments of Liberalism in the direction of education, 
temperance, better dwellings, an improved social and industrial environment’.167
In the rest of Liberalism, Samuel outlined the circumstances that had been leading up to 
a rethinking of social reform policy within liberal circles. Gone is the time to rely on a 
laissez-faire approach, argues Samuel. Modem life and industrial society demands a 
view of state action as positive and enabling. He writes, ‘[s]elf-reliance is a powerful 
force, but not powerful enough to cure unaided the diseases that afflict society. Liberty 
is of supreme importance, but State assistance, rightly directed, may extend the bounds 
of Liberty’.168
Actually, extending regulations within the social domain had not proved to diminish 
freedom, according to Samuel. Instead, further regulation of the social domain had 
slowly come to ease intolerable social conditions. Consequently, housing and education 
top his list of future reform, but the list also includes temperance, conditions of
166 Samuel, H.L. (1902) Liberalism: An Attempt to State the Principles and Proposals o f  
Contemporary Liberalism in England. London: Grant Richards.
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employment, aid to the distressed and much more. Indeed, Samuel’s is an attempt to 
argue how state-guided social action along the lines prescribed by him actually 
conforms to existing liberal tenets. Samuel, as did Asquith, used the occasion of the 
book to outline how the state must work through society by way of intervening into it. 
Only then could welfare be realised.
The liberal encouragement for more intense social interventionism by the state was a 
break with the past, philosopher John MacDonnell wrote. It was a significant break, he
argued, since liberals of late had ushered in a sort of modern ‘benevolent despotism’, by
imposing temporary yet coercive means to ensure reform throughout society. This new 
encouragement for a socially engaged state was not necessarily wrong, MacDonnell 
argued. In fact, he also found that the position could be defended with traditional liberal 
principles. MacDonnell formulated the new problem of freedom in modem industrial 
society by suggesting that:
a starving man is free even as is one well fed. So, too, 
is one who lives from birth to death in an 
environment of dirt, squalor, poverty. But such 
freedom scarcely compatible with a higher life might 
be little more than nominal; in effect it might be 
almost indistinguishable from servitude. Accordingly, 
to secure the reality of freedom we have seen 
coercive measures passed.169
However, he argued, it would demand new and much more elaborate techniques of 
governance. In order to address this situation, regulations and governmental 
interventions within social spheres may in fact be ‘inevitable’ under a ‘prolonged stage’, 
wrote MacDonnell. Yet ‘there is something beyond’ this phase, he asserted, ‘something 
better’. What lay ‘beyond’, however, he did not formulate. For socially informed 
commentators of the time good government was no longer understood to be as little 
government as possible.170
169 MacDonell, J. (1914 August) T h e  M odem Conception o f Liberty’. C.R., 106, 190-202.
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How social liberals turned from voluntary action, charity oriented approaches, and the 
minimal state, towards state action within the social domain marked an intensification 
of liberal bio-political concerns. One must be cautious, however, to think the shift total. 
Charity, of course, had long lineages as being complementary to state action in the 
British history of poor relief, and those lineages structured turn of the twentieth-century 
social policy as well. Chanty would form a significant part of what Alan Kidd has 
called ‘the mix economy of welfare’ in Britain. In reality, the state did take a greater 
responsibility during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries than it had before, 
yet charity still contributed significantly to official efforts to ameliorate social 
conditions.
For example, both Charles Booth’s first volume of his Life and Labour o f the People o f  
London (1889) and Seebohm Rowntree’s study of York, Poverty: A Study o f  Town Life 
— published a decade after Booth’s seminal research effort -  had shown how about 30 
per cent of the population could be categorised as poor. Still, only 2.7 per cent of the 
population received state granted poor-relief Kidd shows. In fact, Kidd points out how 
in 1899 the national cost of poor-relief was £11.2 million, while charity in London alone 
contributed with £6 million towards amelioration of poverty.171 The political 
ramifications of organised charity were not reduced in late Victorian or Edwardian 
Britain. Kidd describes it as ‘the principal expression of middle-class resolve to manage 
the forces, as well as to alleviate the suffering created by urban growth and social 
change’.172
Yet, clearly, the ways in which L.T. Hobhouse, R.G. Davis, H.L. Samuel, and their 
contemporaries turned to state action for the managing of society reflect a shift in liberal 
conceptual frameworks at this time. These examples show how the social domain was 
first invented, and then politicised within liberal thought. The way socially oriented 
liberals and other reformers conceptualised actual state-led social action was, as I have 
pointed out, multidimensional and, quite often, vague. The meaning given to the 
concept could easily include technical ideas on how to ameliorate the conditions of the 
poor and labouring classes through housing and education, and it could include 
philosophical discussions on how to bring long-term progress to the whole of society.
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Liberals believing in social interventions began to view such interventions as ongoing, 
and perhaps never fully realisable. And so, interventionist agendas turned into an end in 
itself; it became an ethical process as much as a social-political one.173
Still, this debate and reformulation of liberal ideas show how liberals saw that, in order 
for industrial society to evolve, it was imperative to invent a form of politics that would 
look to state intervention not as infringements, but as mechanisms that would enable 
human competence and capacity. It was not yet a discourse centring rights to social 
security; it was an acknowledgement that modem industrial society presented a new set 
of problems that would ultimately have an effect on markets and government. These 
new problems demanded a new form of management that would explicitly take life as 
its referent object. In the next section I will outline how this movement introduced a 
social component into imperial thought, and how an impetus for new ways to govern 
within empire emerged within influential liberal imperialist circles.
3.2. Social liberals and their empire
During the latter part of the nineteenth century and the first quarter of the twentieth 
century, when the ‘Age of Empire’ reached its zenith, imperialism and empire continued 
to be discussed within British liberal circles. In this section I will describe how British 
liberals during this time began to partly re-conceptualise what they thought already 
existing empire was intended to achieve within dependencies. I will show that the idea 
that governments need to act on social problems for the sake of stability and progress 
was given much more attention by liberal imperialists. Below I will discuss how the 
notion of social intervention as a legitimate aspect of state responsibility transplanted 
into views on how to successfully run the empire.
This movement helped focus the previously tentative return of an interventionist agenda 
011 the Subcontinent, discussed in an earlier chapter. The moral emphasis that had toned 
early liberal justifications of empire was reconceptualised as a social one. Social 
interventions were not to reform the character of Indian subjects; they would, instead,
173 Hobhouse, L.T. (1911) Liberalism. London: Williams and Norgate, 41.
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tend to conditions of life of Indians. Effective management of society, its condition and 
environment, made a strong argument for the continuation of existing empire. It was 
even used as an argument against expansionist imperialism: if the British Empire sought 
more territory, how could it, then, still tend to the welfare of the colonies it already had?
My argument here is this: the liberal demand for a social imperialism was grounded in 
the understanding that bio-political management of society might prove a more effective 
means to govern, than force and domination. In order to govern successfully, the 
colonial state had to continuously work through society, rather than treat it with 
indifference.
Not surprisingly, as was the case with nineteenth-century liberal tradition, a notion of 
universality of movements in world history was widely spread in the twentieth-century 
form of liberal thought and action. The image of industrialising areas outside Britain — 
such as Bombay -  was put up to mirror western progress. The ability to influence this 
process, to supervise it, and to directly intervene into it, now became the aim of colonial 
statecraft. This helped to cement the notion of primacy of western ideas.
3.2.1. Twentieth-century liberal critique of expansive im perialism
Clearly, by the turn of the twentieth century, as had been the case during the early 
nineteenth century, proponents as well as antagonists of British imperial expansion co­
existed within the broad British liberal camp.174 Most liberals still found that continued 
overseas expansion was essentially an aristocratic project of extending landed estates 
through militaristic means. This aristocratic militarised enterprise was upsetting free 
trade, liberals argued, and finance driven imperialism would only promote the privilege 
of rent-seeking elites.175
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Moreover, in concurrence with a long radical tradition of liberal views on imperialism, 
some liberal critics argued that an empire threatened the stability of Britain in two ways. 
First, it militarised government. When new areas were conquered by the sword, rather 
than trade, military branches of the state were made disproportionately influential.176 
Secondly, homecoming administrators and officials had no sense or experience of 
democratic governance from the colonies or dependencies, and therefore they corrupted 
political relations on their return to Britain. This argument was not new; returning 
higher servants of the East India Company who had made fortunes in India, so-called 
Nabobs, found it hard to integrate into British high society and politics. The Nabobs 
were met with disdain, and were caricatured as petty despots.177
An influential contemporary argument against imperial expansion, however, was that an 
ever-expanding empire diverted interest from the pressing need for social reform in 
Britain. In fact, it was argued, territorial expansion of the late nineteenth century proved 
costly for Britain, and seemed to increase state expenditure and put interventions for 
social reform at risk .178
3.2.2. Social liberal views in im perialism
While being critical of ongoing overseas expansion, a majority of turn of the twentieth- 
century British liberals did not object to already existing empire. Liberals would not 
argue for the abolition of empire. Cain suggests that most liberals who were against 
colonial expansion still ‘assumed that Britain had a duty to bring civilization and good 
government to Africa and Asia and few questioned its ability or right to do so’.179 
Gladstone, for example, Cain points out, regretted that Britain took control over the
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Subcontinent. However, that being the case, he argued, when in India Britain had a duty 
to bring its industrious energy and progress there.180 Gladstone had a vague idea about 
how to achieve these ends in India, historian David Gilmour writes. The Gladstonian 
policy towards India seems to have been riddled by intellectual tension. If aspiring to 
anything, it looked for slow change on the Subcontinent so that ‘when we go, if we are 
ever to go5, Gladstone told his newly appointed Viceroy Northbrook in 1872, ‘we may 
leave a good name and a clean bill of health behind us5.181
In this section I will discuss, how from the late nineteenth century onwards, 
conceptualisations about a distinct social domain, and in extension how it formed a 
proper and politicised object of government, began to influence British liberal ideas 
about government within their empire. Many leading liberal politicians and thinkers 
who would argue progressively for addressing social questions in Britain, would use 
similar arguments in their defence of existing British Empire. For them, the side effects, 
and also the benefit, of industrial society became obvious to all by the turn of the 
twentieth century, and, as H.L. Samuel writes with hindsight in his memoirs, similar 
social problems and similar positive prospects called for a unified perspective on 
modem industrial society. For Samuel and his contemporaries, this meant that:
[t]he same motives which led us to be social reformers at 
home made us favour, for the backward peoples, a stage of 
colonial administration, as the best means of helping them to 
reach a higher level of civilization.182
In fact, Samuel saw no contradiction between progressive social policy and the 
continuation of empire.183 Prominent liberals like Lord Cromer, Prime Ministers 
Rosebery and Asquith, Herbert L. Samuel, E.S. Montagu, as well as J.A. Hobson, were 
all at some point finding in progressive views on social reform within British 
dependencies arguments for a continuation of existing empire.
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Samuel elaborates further in his book Liberalism, referred to above. Empire, Samuel 
recalled, was a ‘trust as well as a pride’.184 Still, imperialism has been questioned from a 
liberal standpoint, he asserts. How could an empire, which was ruled despotically, ever 
conform to principles of liberalism, Samuel asks rhetorically.
[Independence, however valuable to a people, is not 
their highest good. Liberals hold that the ultimate 
purpose of politics is nothing narrower than to help 
men to advance towards the best type. No people can 
reach the goal, indeed, unless they have liberty; but 
there may be stages in the march when unrestrained 
liberty is rather a hindrance to them than a help. A 
barbarian race may prosper best if for a period, even 
for a long period, it surrenders the right of self- 
government in exchange for the teaching of 
civilization.185
H.L. Samuel even found liberalism intrinsic to, and constitutive of, empire. Samuel 
argued that ‘[n]o accusation can be more false than that Liberalism is identified with 
ideas of uncompromising opposition to empire...The empire is indeed largely the 
creation of the statesmen of this school’.186
Ten years after Samuel’s take on the intimacy of liberalism and empire, his views were 
echoed by his cousin E.S. Montagu, then Liberal Under Secretary of State for India. I 
will return to E.S. Montagu in a following section of this chapter. In a speech delivered 
in Cambridge, Montagu tried to prove how ‘the Empire, as we know it, and the ideal it 
fulfils, is the production of the Liberal Party’.187 Entering into the British Parliament in 
1906 at the age of 27, Montagu arrived as an M.P. for the Liberal Party at the very 
beginning of a social liberal era. He had for a long time shown a keen interest in the 
administration of India. Montagu was, as was L.T. Hobhouse, highly influenced by the
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liberal philosopher turned Secretary of State for India, John Morley. Montagu’s interest 
in India found practical outlet when he was appointed Under Secretary of State for India 
four years later. When Montagu left the India Office to become Financial Secretary to 
the Treasury in 1914, he always looked for ways to return.
So he did, in 1916, but now as Secretary of State for India. During his latter cabinet 
period, Montagu left some significant imprints on imperial high politics. He was the 
architect of the scheme of reforms that he and the then Viceroy Chelmsford piloted 
through Parliament in 1917-19. The scheme moderately changed the political structure 
of government in India.188 Moreover, he was Secretary of State for India on that 
disastrous day, 13 April 1919, when a peaceful protest at the Jallianwala Bagh in 
Amritsar against the Rowlatt Act -  a piece of legislation which, in effect, agreed to 
detention without trial — ended in a massacre leaving more then 370 people dead and 
more than a thousand wounded. I will return to the massacre below.
Montagu finally resigned from his post in 1922, in protest against the peace treaty with 
Turkey, which he thought unfair for the Muslim world and dangerous to imperial 
sentiment. Although he struggled with the conservative bureaucracy that 
administratively governed India, he did apply for the Viceroyalty upon his resignation 
from cabinet. His application was rejected and he died two years after leaving the India 
Office. For Montagu, as for many social liberals, it was the Liberal Party that had 
contributed to the good of the empire. Many in the Liberal Party found in empire a 
progressive force of governance and a moral and material commitment on behalf of 
Britain.
The Liberal Party had, Rosebery argued in 1885, turned empire into a progressive force. 
Empire had ‘struck the chains off the slaves’ and had fostered trade among its 
constituent parts and the rest of the world. That the British Empire freed slaves was, as 
we know, a dubious claim when referring to India. The existence of bonded agricultural 
workers had been a source of debate within various administrations on the 
Subcontinent, yet very little had actually been achieved to free the unfree. There were 
widespread hopes among officials of the Raj that education might erode the feudal grip 
over landless labour, and there were some more forceful attempts to legislate on the
188 Montagu, E.S. (1930) An Indian D iaiy. London: W. Heinemann.
92
issue in the 1930s. However, ultimately, the need for feudal landlord loyalty weighted 
heavy on successive administrations.189 Nonetheless, Rosebery continued:
having so saved and developed it, I hope and believe we will 
yet be permitted to broaden and strengthen the foundation of 
that noble structure by basing them on affection, sympathy, 
and intelligence of the scattered but united races of the 
Empire.190
As social theorist Barry Hindess concludes — there were many liberals in favour of 
empire by the turn of the twentieth century.191 Moreover, as this section has begun to 
outline, there were many liberals in favour of an interventionist imperialism who made 
connections between social reform in Britian and India.
What influenced the return of a reformist and interventionist imperialism in India by the 
turn of the twentieth century has been a matter of debate among historians. The main 
quarrel concerns whether nineteenth-century evangelicalism continued to inform 
reformist liberal imperialism at this time. Metcalf suggests it did not. He finds a form of 
secularised moral action replacing evangelicalism at this time.192 Lord Curzon, perhaps 
the most influential viceroy during the period here under review and an advocate for a 
reformist and efficient colonial state, seems to prove him right. Curzon called reforms in 
India a ‘secular religion, embodying the most sacred duty of the present’.193
But C.A. Bayly challenges Metcalf. Bayly underlines a lingering Christian Anglican 
influence on late colonial reforms. He finds that recent studies of imperial ideology -  
including M etcalfs -  exaggerate how a ‘secular post-enlightenment rationality’ 
underpinned reforms during the period here under review.194 Rather, Bayly suggests, 
‘[cjhristian moralism influenced the agenda’ throughout all periods of British presence
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on the Subcontinent, including the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.195 For 
Bayly, religious views and commitments continued to inform colonial officials in India 
until they left at independence.
The tension within reformist rhetoric was expressed by that prominent radical liberal 
coterie The Rainbow Circle, when it met for its session in 1899-1900. The theme for the 
session was ‘Liberalism and Imperialism’.196 Debates such as this of the Rainbow Circle 
point out how a reframing of moral language within liberal circles was under way, but is 
lost to both Bayly and Metcalf: reformist action, underpinned by moral language, was 
re-inscribed into the newly invented social domain. It used ‘the social’ as a new 
framework through which forms of intervention could be elaborated. The re-emerging 
reformist agenda began to tone down its urge for moral reform aiming at the character 
of Indians’; rather, it invented a self-proclaimed responsibility to address social 
problems and conditions of life within India and empire in general. It extended social 
liberal language and mode of action from the metropole into the context of empire.
H.L. Samuel, who was known for his interest in imperial issues as well as social reform 
opened the discussion of the Rainbow Circle that day. He did so by bringing his 
favourite themes together: he called his paper ‘Imperialism in relation to Social 
Reform’. In his paper before the Rainbow Circle, Samuel describes how empire has 
become ‘the most valuable ally of Social Reform’. Empire, Samuel argues, ‘subserves 
the welfare of other peoples’.197 Empire could help tend to the effects of modem 
society, he argues, while simultaneously reforming conditions of life. Through an active 
reformist policy, members of the Circle argued, it could be developed between 
‘ourselves & our subject peoples’ a bond of ‘moral responsibility -  a kind of imperial 
strength which no other empire has enjoyed’.198
The liberal idea of empire as a community where its constituent parts link together not 
by force, but by affection, influenced social imperialists. Of course, an imperial 
community, according to them, did not necessarily have to be an equal one, or a 
democratically governed one. The order underlying it could easily be both hierarchical
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and exclusive. E.S. Montagu gave word to that emerging liberal imperial ideal. Empire, 
he argued, was ‘not a question of land, but of hearts’.199 Lord Cromer echoed Montagu: 
empire, Cromer argued, must build on ‘affection’ not ‘coercion’.200
3.2.3 Social liberals and India: E.S. M ontagu’s outline o f a new imperial 
approach
During the early years of the twentieth century, social liberals began to argue that local 
colonial governance in an industrial age had to express a new ideal of how imperial 
power could work within colonial society. The social liberal fear that increased squalor 
in British industrial society might threaten moral sentiments and create tension among 
sections within the community, now extended outwards into industrialising areas of 
empire. Obvious destitution in areas under the British might have a negative affect on 
the prospects of future progress.
Modem industrial society placed before liberal politicians and administrators a set of 
new challenges: perceived urban sprawl, and, as I pointed out earlier with reference to 
the famine reports in India, the existence of rampant poverty within areas under British 
rule, could threaten the legitimacy of the colonial state. In order to build a form of 
modem colonial government that would endure under shifting circumstances, social 
liberals found that any action taken over many new questions of governance needed 
serious thinking through.
Social liberal imperialists of the early twentieth century now began to describe empire 
as a platform for launching, in their view, progressive social projects in extension to the 
programmes attempted in Britain. Indeed, it took only a few years of social legislation 
and action in Britain for commentators in the liberal press to proclaim that ‘interest in 
humanity need not stop with the shores of England’. Instead, they found that ‘[ejmpire
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offers a magnificent field for social experiment’ and that ‘Liberal Imperialism goes 
hand in hand with social reform*.201
Entering the twentieth century, the liberal argument for a continuation of colonial 
governance within industrialising areas, thus, slowly shifted towards protecting colonial 
industrial society from further menace, to ameliorate conditions of life, and to manage 
populations in order to make them productive and less inclined to dissent. The 
introduction of an idea of ‘the social’ into liberal imperialism enabled this conceptual 
shift to occur. So did the sense of a new age and society emerging -  a globalising 
industrial society under empire that would demand up-dated forms of socially informed 
governance.
The emergence of social liberal ideas into the long tradition of liberal imperialism 
helped re-focus the interventionist agenda within industrialising areas on the 
Subcontinent, such as the urban Bombay Presidency. Liberals began to reformulate 
interventions so that they would regroup around the newly invented social domain. This 
implied a reframing of interventions through social language. The social domain as a 
political entity was being discovered in imperial discourse, and several previously 
unconnected issues, like education and housing, were being linked together and placed 
therein.
The new view of empire differed from that of nineteenth-century liberal imperialists by 
its emphasis on the aspect of social welfare of the population as a justification for 
continued empire. The view reinvigorated the argument for increased action of the 
colonial state.202 Social liberal imperialists increasingly found laissez-faire unable to 
deal with the many problems facing developing industrial societies, wherever that 
society may be located.
In a series of speeches on Indian affairs the liberal then Under Secretary of State for 
India, E.S. Montagu, began in 1910 to formulate into politics the views discussed 
above. Generally, Montagu often and openly admitted that early twentieth-century 
debates in the House of Commons over Indian affairs were lacklustre events, and the
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attendance at the time of debate was usually low. Most external military threats to 
British rule on the Subcontinent seemed to be under control, except tribal raids on the 
northwestern frontier. Rather than dealing with military matters, debates over India 
focused on how to cany out effective and economic administration. However, when 
Montagu delivered his series of speeches, as we shall see below, British rule in India 
was being tested, and this fact influenced his account.
Although written before the massacre in Amritsar that rallied nationalist support, and 
before nationalist mobilisation had broadened its base into a popular movement, tension 
was mounting in India. When he began to lay the Indian Budget before the House of 
Commons in 1910, Montagu elaborated a narrative wherein he made the case for the 
need of a new kind of imperialism in India -  a form of colonial governance that would 
include social concerns, that would work through society, and build on the capacities 
and industrial energy of the governed. He found old style repressive government 
counter productive and impractical.
Curzon, Viceroy in India 1899-1905, had forced through the first partition of Bengal in 
1905 for the puipose of administrative convenience. The partition was later revoked, but 
at the time it pitted the Bengali intelligentsia against the Raj, as well as mobilising 
sections of the emerging nationalist movement. Soon, local protests against partition 
formed into a much wider struggle for Puma Swaraj -  full independence. Within this 
struggle, which levelled out around 1908, traditional means of political protest, such as 
petitions and open meetings, co-existed with more radical ones, such as the boycott of 
British goods. Some within the movement in Bengal turned towards terrorism and 
violent anti-British action.203
A nascent nationalist movement soon had an impact elsewhere in British India. 
Maharashtra and Hindu chauvinist Bal Gangadliar Tilak was successful in rallying anti- 
British political mobilisation in Bombay. Tilak’s revival of certain Hindu festivals in 
order to score political points, especially the processions in honour of Ganpati, 
provoked clashes between communities in Bombay. Although Tilak’s boycott of British 
goods between 1906 and 1908 led to increased profit margins for indigenous 
industrialists, his sectarian approach had little appeal to influential Bombay based textile 
mill-owners who often belonged to other regional or religious groups. Tilak, however,
203 Sarkar, 2005, 123.
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made a great effort in connecting with mill-workers in an attempt to mobilise them for 
political purposes.
Repression followed in the wake of the first Swara/’-movement, not so much in Bombay 
as in Bengal. British tactics raised much indignation among influential Indians. 
Nonetheless, revolutionary activity receded in Bengal, and the Indian National Congress 
was on the back foot. Soon, a scheme of political reform was being developed in 
Calcutta by the then Viceroy Lord Minto. He and the Liberal Secretary of State for India 
in London, John Morley, agreed on the Indian Councils Act of 1909, which introduced 
the minor element of elections into local council. The Act also gave Indian members of 
the legislative councils more influence over budget decisions. This effort to please 
influential Indians was short-lived, and was reworked in 1916-17 when Montagu 
himself presented another, more far-reaching reform scheme.
In Montagu’s first speech on the Indian budget in particular, and on Indian affairs more 
generally, he set out to address the situation described above by addressing ‘the political 
unrest and its genesis’.204 Montagu was surprised, he said, by the fact that recent unrest 
in India had upset British political circles. Unrest, he argues, must be welcomed. 
Suggests Montagu:
what ever was the reason for British occupation, it must be 
obvious that Eastern civilisation could not be brought into 
contact with Western...without bringing new ideas into 
play.. .without, in a word, causing unrest.
In fact, India was changing rapidly, said Montagu, and suggested that rapid changes 
must have been felt and left its mark in society. ‘Viewed broadly’, Montagu said,
India may be said to be passing from the stage of society in 
which agricultural and domestic industries of the cottage 
order have predominated, in which each village has been an 
isolated community, and each individual attached to a
204 Montagu, E.S. ([1910] 1917) ‘The Indian Budget -  1910’. In Montagu, E.S. On Indian
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particular spot and hereditary occupation, to a stage of 
organised over-seas commerce and capitalised industry.205
Until now -  that is 1910 -  the development was only visible in a few districts, Montagu 
argued. But already the process of industrialisation touches the whole Subcontinent: it 
causes labour migration; it transforms wages and payments; it changes the market value 
of local produce and even the variety of crops produced. These new circumstances, 
Montagu argues, will and must eventually produce unrest. Instead of suppressing unrest, 
British rule must now turn to foster ‘germs of progress’.206 Colonial administrators must 
locate sources of discontent in society and address those grievances. They must learn 
how to channel unrest so that it may produce beneficial outcomes.
In 1911 Montagu told his honourable friends about new signs of progress on the 
Subcontinent. The industriousness of Indians under British tutelage, said Montagu, was 
now channelled in new, but for the British, familiar ways. Modern industry was 
establishing itself in India, he suggested, and this movement was expressed through the 
forming of a modern industrial society. However, it was imperative that this movement 
in history was guided carefully, he said, for India was at a critical juncture:
This period in a country’s history brings with it many 
possibilities of evil...but it brings also possibilities of 
wealth and greatness... if the industrial revolution has 
begun, nothing can stop it...Our task is rather to 
guard against the evils that our Western experience 
enables us to foresee.207
Imperial presence in India, according to Montagu, could prevent inherent problems of 
industrial society from tainting India. For Montagu, industrialising areas in India and 
Britain were obviously similar. He found that modem industrialisation in India would 
inevitably enable India to develop Western political institutions. Yet this achievement 
would not come about if the process was left to its own devices. In order to wholly 
realise the prospect of industrial society, India must go through what Montagu called
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‘Western social development’. Indians, Montagu asserts, ‘must turn their attention to 
organizing an industrial population which can reap the agricultural and industrial wealth 
of the country, and attain a higher level of education and a higher standard of living’.208
British colonial government would be there to guide this process, Montagu asserted. 
With the help of the British, the Subcontinent could then, Montagu argued in 1912, 
move faster through history than Europe, ‘because it is governed and created by men 
who have inherited the results of European and British development’ .209
Montagu lists signs of progress: there is increasing concentration of labour in factories 
in British India. There is a stricter division of labour. He describes how mechanical 
power rationalises the production processes in factories. New loyalties and aspirations 
well-known to modem Europe have emerged as well: new social reform associations 
form in urban India to do social ‘good’. In these associations Montagu spots an 
emerging bourgeoisie taking its historic responsibility in the form of ‘civilising and 
educational movements which are summarised in the word “progress’” . These 
associations, Prashant Kidambi shows, were gatherings of professionals and 
businessmen who found ways to address what they perceived to be the ills of society. 
Women in general, but also workers of all kinds and the urban poor, were the immediate 
beneficiaries of voluntary social work.210
Montagu then curbed his enthusiasm. With modem society evolving, India might 
experience new sorts of pressures. In Bombay he found the case to prove his point. 
Using Bombay as an example, Montagu calls attention to how the ‘evils of town life’ -  
overcrowding and destitution -  ‘with which we are too familiar’ now were being 
‘reproduced in India’. He vividly describes the social conditions in Bombay, and 
concludes that India may ‘profit by the abundant mistakes that we have made in this 
country if she takes advantage of our experience, and with a wise forethought, closes the 
door to industrial abuses before they have grown strong’.211
While acknowledging the effect industrialisation will have on social relations, Montagu 
points out where to look for mitigation: after describing the social situation in Bombay
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in some detail, he concludes ‘of course a situation such as that demands activity from 
the Government’-212
Some years after delivering his last speech as Under Secretary of State for India, 
Montagu took charge of the India Office. When he entered his post the situation in India 
was still unsettled, if seen from a British point of view. In 1915 the Indian National 
Congress had still not developed into a political party, and had no real mass appeal and 
very little radicalism in its ranks. Yet as an organisation, it began to develop better co­
ordination and had begun to work its message within new sections of society. Already 
in 1916, the Congress and the Muslim League worked out a joint programme.
At the same time the British theosophist Annie Besant, and Tilak, started two separate 
Home Rule Leagues. These associations drew large crowds to public meetings. They 
also formed study groups and debating societies where the question of Home Rule for 
India was discussed. When Gandhi entered the political scene in India around 1918, 
much groundwork had already been done for mobilising nationalist sentiments.
The British were still anxious about the level of rising political consciousness in India. 
However, they insisted it was only a small section of educated Indians who actually 
shared nationalist ideas. That perception would soon change: the years between 1919 
and 1922 saw significant mobilisation in various social strata, outside the educated 
urban middle classes. Apart from a widespread peasant awakening, where anti-colonial 
resistance and bits of nationalist discourse often forged into protests against oppressive 
landlords, British policy towards Turkey aroused Muslim discontent. Subsequently, the 
Khilafat movement grew strong, especially in the northern parts of India, and Gandhi 
was quick to forge alliances with Muslim leaders. An All-India movement was clearly 
on its way.213
For liberals like Montagu, the question of how colonial rule ought to handle Indian 
nationalist mobilisation was complicated. He was clear that old forms of colonial 
repression were out-dated; still, he did not waver his support for continued British rule. 
In his speeches in Parliament, that I discussed above, Montagu had made tentative 
suggestions towards a new approach of imperial power on the Subcontinent that took
212 Ibid., 93-94.
213 Aziz, K.K (2002) Pakistan: Studies in H istoiy and Politics. Lahore: Vanguard, 42.
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into consideration movements within society, social problems, and conditions of life of 
Indians. He had made a start from a liberal standpoint to expand the bio-political 
framework of existing colonialism in India.
Montagu would go further, however, and suggest a bio-political approach as an 
alternative to force. His outline of a new approach is highlighted with some clarity in 
the correspondence between him and then Viceroy Chelmsford regarding the massacre 
in Jallianwala Bagli in Amritsar on 13 April 1919. On this day the British Indian Army 
caused the death of more than 370 innocent men, women and children. The atrocity 
naturally caused outraged in India, as well as in sections of British political society. 
However, many British politicians agreed with the British Indian Army officer 
responsible for the miltary employment in Amritsar that day, General Reginald Dyer. In 
fact, Dyer was awarded promotion and a medal after the massacre.
Montagu described Dyer’s use of indiscriminate firing upon unarmed and peaceful 
protesters as an act o f ‘terrorism’. He found the decision to promote Dyer disastrous, yet 
he conformed to it. Purnima Bose has suggested that for Montagu, and the section of 
British parliamentarians that denounced the violence, Dyer was a bad character, a 
‘rotten apple’ that had acted according to his own impulses.214 By blaming an 
individual, Bose argues, Montagu and the British could avert attention from the 
systemic failures and internal contradictions of colonialism. For Bose, the massacre 
proves how the colonial state would always rely on force to secure and maintain its rule, 
despite its rhetoric of liberal values. The blame-game in which Montagu and others 
involved themselves only left intact ‘the structurally asymmetrical relationship that
■ l i e
binds the colonial centre to its peripheral territories’.
But, I would suggest, Montagu was not unaware of the contradiction within colonial 
rule; he expressed this quite openly in his letters. He complained about the differences 
in attitudes between more progressive views of the India Office, and the reactionary 
‘machinery’ of the Viceroyalty and its Services. In the ways in which the Punjab was 
governed, and in the massacre in Amritsar, Montagu saw expressions of a tradition of 
government under the Raj that he found it necessary to move away from.
2.4 Bose, P. (2003) Organizing Empire: Individualism, Collective Agency, and India. Durham 
and London: Duke University Press, 47-48.
2.5 Ibid., 12.
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Turning to the period immediately surrounding the massacre Montagu wrote on the 
subject to Chelmsford, then Viceroy, on 8 March 1919. The letter concerned 
‘revolutionary crime’ and ‘extremism’ in India. In his letter Montagu suggests to 
Chelmsford that there are two kinds of extremists on the political scene in India. One is 
the ‘Congress Wallah of no particular political wisdom or training or knowledge’. This 
category, Montagu writes, uses catch words and becomes excited by agitation. The 
Congress Wallah ‘loves caste’ but ‘steers clear of crime’.
The second categoiy, says Montagu, is ‘a real social reformer’. These men are ‘anxious 
to elevate the Depressed Classes, to do social service’. They are intellectual, Montagu 
continued, they are young, and full of political will. These are the real revolutionaries, 
writes Montagu. If they were to be won over with all their reforming spirit, Montagu 
suggests, ‘how ridiculous the Extremists of the Congress would appear!’.
In several places in India, however, the opposite was being done, Montagu writes. 
‘There is nothing so easy at any particular moment as to govern through the Police’, he 
writes to the Viceroy. But the result of such governance, he argues, is that ‘you sow the 
whirlwind for your successor to reap, and you bring down the Government in God’s 
own time as certainly as it was brought down similarly in Russia’.216
In his approach to revolutionary activity, E.S. Montagu echoed the British sociologist 
Professor Patrick Geddes, who will be further discussed in chapter four. Geddes had 
done plenty of work in British India and in the Princely States, and had come to reflect 
on revolutionary activity and political extremism. Soon after the Bolshevik revolution in 
Russia in 1917, Geddes argued that the revolutionaries on the Subcontinent functioned 
without ideology. Their actions were not even grounded in real resentment of British 
rule, he asserted. Rather, he argued, revolutionary action expressed frustration over poor 
social and economic conditions.
Geddes argued that Indian revolutionaries had, in fact, made correct observations of 
their everyday realities when they found that their conditions of life hindered social 
progress. But, he said, they were wrong in their conclusions. They blamed the British
216 0.1.0.C. Montagu Papers Mss Eur D523. Collection 3. Private letter Montagu to Chelmsford
8 March 1919.
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for their situation, when they ought to turn their energy to reform their own conditions 
of life in industrial society, Geddes asserted.
In Calcutta, Geddes put his views before W.R. Gourlay, Private Secretary to the 
Governor of Bengal. Geddes had suggested to Gourlay that the revolutionaries in 
Bengal were not driven by ‘entirely bad’ motives. Actually, ‘if  they had only been 
shown what the real cause of poverty, disease and death is, they would have become as 
active social workers as they have become active revolutionaries’, Gourlay reported
Geddes to have said. They could, as it were, be set straight, and their destructive energy
could be channelled into ‘social service’, Geddes assumed.217
E.S. Montagu continued his exchange with Chelmsford on the issue in early May 1919. 
He ventured to put his view across: government needed to change tact. Again writing to 
Chelmsford about unrest in Punjab, Bombay and elsewhere:
[a]s regards the causes, the more I read of these occurrences, 
the more I am struck by the fact that there is every reason to 
believe that they are the inevitable consequences of that 
easiest of all forms of government, firm, strong 
government.218
If British rule addressed the sources of discontent, rather than repressed its 
manifestations, if it realistically tended to the welfare of its subjects, and managed 
society better, it would govern more effectively. The idea that the ‘social’ could 
function as a space for productive politics was being integrated into Montagu’s call for a 
new imperial approach.
The colonial state needed to expand its bio-political concerns because, for Montagu, it 
now had to compete with the agenda of those anti-British elements he called ‘real social 
reformers’. That is, the power of the colonial state must be put to work within the social 
domain to channel, and manage existing but misdirected energies. The colonial 
government must acknowledge those capacities internal to colonial society, and work
2X1 Univ.S.A. T-GED 12/3/58. Private letter Gourlay to Cuming 24 July 1917.
m  O.I.O.C. Montagu Papers Mss Eur D523. Collection 3. Private letter Montagu to Chelmsford
1 May 1919.
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through them. Social interventions seemed indispensable; nowhere more so, as Montagu 
pointed out in a speech mentioned above, than in Bombay.
The First World War had proved a turbulent period in Bombay. Real wages in the 
cotton textile industry fell and prices rose considerably. Shortage in supply made for 
speculation in cotton, in land, and in staple foods. This period saw much industrial 
action, partly triggered by high inflation. Before 1914, writes historian Rajnarajan 
Chandavarkar, strikes in the cotton textile mills occurred, but were rarely, if ever, co­
ordinated. Between 1919 and 1940, however, the mill industry in Bombay experienced 
eight well-co-ordinated general strikes. Soon Bombay, the most important area for 
modem industry in India, turned into what Chandavarkar calls ‘the most dramatic centre 
of working-class political action’.219 Simultaneously, during this period, A.D.D. Gordon 
suggests, the local arena became an ‘essential area of policy concern’.220
George Lloyd, newly appointed Governor of the Bombay Presidency, had several 
interviews with E.S. Montagu before Lloyd took up his new posting. Montagu was 
hoping Lloyd, along with other ‘liberal’ Governors, would promote his reformulated 
liberal approach to colonial governance. In a letter, Montagu writes to Lloyd that he had 
enjoyed the ways in which Lloyd went to India ‘with an enthusiasm for the progressive
99  1development of your Presidency’. Later George Lloyd recalled the intensity with 
which Montagu, as Secretary of State for India, pressed the issue of social intervention, 
especially into housing conditions. In fact, Montagu had several times declared ‘the 
urgency of the problem’, said Lloyd to an enquiry committee in 1926. Lloyd continued:
I had not until I went to Bombay any knowledge of what the
Government there had thought, but he [Montagu] pressed it 
upon me, saying that the last four or five Governments had
failed to deal with the problem, he considered it was vital and
222I was to take it up with the greatest urgency that I could.
2,9 Chandavarkar, 1994, 6.
220 Gordon, A. D. D. (1978) Businessmen and Politics: Rising Nationalism and a Modernising 
Economy in Bombay, 1918-33. New Delhi: Manohar.
221 O.I.O.C. Montagu Papers Mss Eur D523. Collection 22. Private letter Montagu to Lloyd 1 
May 1919.
222 O.I.O.C. Government o f India (1926) Report o f  the Bombay Backbay Enquiry Commission, 
part 2. Written and Oral Evidence. Witness 54 Lord [George] Lloyd. Oral Evidence 15 October 
1926.
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Although considering himself a reformist Tory, Lloyd shared Montagu’s social liberal 
view that the colonial state needed to be reformist, even activist, within the social 
domain in industrialising areas in India. He described before the committee the 
appalling living conditions for all sections of the population. Not only were the working 
classes affected, said Lloyd; the situation was equally intense for the middle classes. In 
fact, Lloyd argued, the majority of the population was living ‘under conditions which 
were a menace to public health and probably dangerous to society’.223 His government
2 2 4had to take urgent steps to ‘try to put an end to so grave a social ill’.
After his arrival in Bombay as the new governor of the Presidency, Lloyd regretted that
22 5he had not been more studious on the parliamentary social reform committee. Facing 
the ‘social problem’ of Bombay, he thought he ought to have studied issues of housing 
and education in much more depth. This did not, however, prevent him from arguing for 
a social interventionist agenda while speaking to the Legislative Council of the Bombay 
Presidency. Lloyd sent a draft of his speech to Montagu. ‘I desire now to say a few 
words in regard to the general question of social reform, especially in regard to housing, 
sanitation, primary education’, Lloyd would argue in his speech, and he continued,
I conceive that there is no greater thing a Government 
can accomplish, no greater task that a Government 
can apply itself to, than that of attempting to 
ameliorate the lot of the great mass of the work 
people who labour in its urban and rural areas.
Rhetoric on these questions is apt to be cheap, pious 
aspirations veiy easy to make...It is far more difficult 
to find a remedy for evils which have been allowed to 
grow up and be fair to wreck the very foundations of 
the social life in our midst. Better conditions are 
useless without better education... The
problems...can only be solved by the cooperation of 
all concerned. I have only this to say...that 
Government alone cannot solve these problems. It
223 Ibid., 392.
224 Ibid., 393.
225 O.I.O.C. Lloyd Papers B158. Private letter Lloyd to Halifax 22 December 1918.
106
can, it must, and it will provide the impetus for 
reform. It will go further; it will assist in practical 
manner those public bodies who attempt to make 
these reforms.. .226
The statement made by Lloyd reflects the extent to which social language, as well as the 
idea of social intervention as a legitimate aspect of imperial power, had penetrated 
various layers of imperial operators. Montagu’s new approach stressed the need of 
working through colonial society: by amending problems within in society, and 
channelling its capacities, colonial society could be effectively governed. For Lloyd it 
seemed not far-fetched to propose large-scale interventions into society, and he enjoyed 
the backing of the India Office when doing so. Interventions into the social domain 
were considered well within the capacity of the colonial administration.
3.3. Conclusion
This chapter has shown how turn of the twentieth-century British liberalism carried 
some nineteenth-century liberal ideas into the new century, while reframing others. 
Experiencing conditions of life in industrialising Britain, witnessing rural poverty, and 
sensing growing polarisation in British society, impressed upon sections of twentieth- 
century liberals an urgency to reformulate their political standpoint. It also became 
increasingly important for them to hear out the voices of the liberal movement’s 
subaltern base, after continuous expansions in franchise.
I pointed out how the social and intellectual milieu of London was at the centre of this 
reformulation in liberal thought. New liberal ideas were worked out in radical networks 
of politicians and thinkers. These networks were not exclusively based in the liberal 
party: Fabians and Christian Socialists contributed as well. The press provided an 
important platform for carrying out and debating new political ideas.
226 O.I.O.C. Montagu Papers Mss Eur D523. Collection 24. Private letter Lloyd to Montagu 18
March 1919.
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The most radical shift in liberal thought of the time, I showed, came with the ways in 
which liberals attached and contributed to the conceptualisation of a new terrain of 
human existence: ‘the social’. The social domain was thought of as interrelated though 
distinct from domains of polity and economy. This newly defined social domain was 
considered key to future progress and welfare, as well as to possible discontent. What 
the social actually constituted was, perhaps purposefully, loosely defined in liberal 
discourse. Debates referencing this newly invented domain ranged from abstract views 
on the future evolution of industrial society, to exact estimations of various indicators of 
conditions of life measuring overcrowding, nutrition and household budgets in society.
The social domain was soon given political charge, and, accordingly, the role of state 
action and of political power within society was reassessed and reformulated in liberal 
circles. In contrast to their tradition, early twentieth-century liberals saw a need to 
regulate the social and keep it under the gaze of the state. Accordingly, I pointed out, 
social liberals sought to increase state action and expand the state’s bio-political scope.
The rise of the social in British liberal thought, and the formation of social liberalism, I 
argued, influenced contemporary imperialism in original ways. While demands of the 
popular base of the liberal movement were important in furthering the social agenda in 
Britain, I showed that it was squalid conditions, assertive nationalism, and the forming 
workers’ politics that began to influence contemporary liberal imperialists. Late 
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century social liberals might sometimes have opposed 
British territorial expansion, yet as industrial society developed elsewhere -  for 
example, in Bombay -  social liberals began to argue that already existing colonial 
administrations might guide dependencies through the perils of modernity, without 
giving up on modernisation.
1 argued that the rise of the social within imperial thought provided a new dimension to 
liberal imperialism. I used the political speeches of the then Under Secretary of State for 
India, E.S. Montagu, to exemplify my argument that for high-placed liberals within the 
imperial machinery, new social interventions proved effective in the government of 
colonies. To reach into colonial society and address mundane bio-political questions of 
housing, education and sanitation, proved a more sustainable strategy of government 
than the use of force. The return of an interventionist agenda, I argued, and the
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socialised language framing that return, bore witness to the strong social liberal 
influence over actual policy in colonial Bombay.
In Britain, the social liberal challenge to previous liberal tenets was greatly influenced 
by the formation of British sociology as a distinct discipline. Sociology provided 
methods to approach, and theory to conceptualise, new realities of modern industrial 
society. Sociology helped advance social liberal arguments. I will now turn to how this 
formative and productive relationship extended into the context of colonial India.
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4. Knowledge in social imperialism: sociology in 
colonial Bombay
Above I discussed a late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century movement within 
liberal thought, which helped create a distinct social domain, and turn that domain into a 
political entity. This movement reformulated liberal ideas about the necessity to tend to 
questions of welfare and conditions of life. It marked the birth of social liberalism. 
Social liberalism, I found, stressed the need for increased state engagement with the 
social domain. The movement, I argued, expanded bio-political considerations within 
liberalism.
I further suggested that the social turn in liberalism had imperial ambition and reach. 
Liberal activists, as well as politicians and administrators, I argued, began to discuss 
social conditions in the industrial towns of the empire and wondered what affect those 
deteriorating conditions of life would have on progress and stability. These liberal 
activists began to stress the need for imperial power to act on these issues and to 
elaborate forms of government up to date with developments in modem industrial 
society. They looked for ways in which imperial power could work through society, and 
enable energies therein, rather than suppress them. They, in short, looked for a new 
approach centred on the expansion of the bio-political scope of government, and began 
to re-inscribe earlier moral or civilisational agendas into the social domain. The final 
section of my previous chapter discussed how a social approach was considered more 
effective in colonial government than the use of force.
Clearly, the emergence of social liberalism in Britain and the rise of ‘the social’ in 
liberal imperialism reflected a growing awareness of the potentials and pitfalls of the 
new realties of industrial society. Such a social focus of politics and state built on 
existing social investigations and knowledge, and also demanded more specialised 
knowledge about the newly invented social domain.
The invention of the social as a political entity happened at a time when sociology 
consolidated as a field of knowledge in Britain. This was no coincidence. British
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sociology, described by L.T. Hobhouse as the ‘science of society’, had a constitutive 
role in the expansion of the bio-political scope of domestic policy and legislation.
An outstanding question, which I will answer in this chapter, is whether the 
corresponding social focus we saw emerging in imperialism at this time placed 
increased demands for sociological knowledge in governance elsewhere in empire. In 
this chapter, with reference to India and the Bombay Presidency, I will argue that it did: 
the rise of the ‘social’ in imperialism corresponded to a demand for sociology within 
reach of the colonial state.
My aim in this chapter is to explore, with particular reference to the Bombay 
Presidency, how the colonial administration actually met new demands for sociological 
knowledge in colonial state action, how sociology formed and operated within the 
colonial context, and what was the function of sociology when utilised by a colonial 
administration.
I will pursue my argument as follows. Initially I describe the early debates in Britain 
through which sociology found its form as a discipline. This helps me introduce certain 
people of interest for the argument. It also allows me to pin-point certain constitutive 
debates inherent to sociology by the turn of the twentieth century that would influence 
its operation within social imperialism: the debate over ‘social’ or ‘biological’ 
explanations to changes in society, and the debate over whether sociology ought to be 
abstract (theoretical), or applied (practical).
I then turn to how sociology moved eastwards from its initial moorings in Britain into 
colonial Bombay. I will initially, and briefly describe the context of social science under 
the Raj, in order to underline the extraordinary circumstances under which knowledge 
was produced in a colonial situation. I then turn to a close reading of the records 
produced when colonial officials in Delhi and Bombay began to discuss how the new 
demand for social knowledge in colonial administration could be met. I look into the 
ways in which the first sociological research facility in British India -  the School of 
Economics and Sociology in Bombay -  was initiated.
I will show that although the School of Economics and Sociology was established only 
in 1919, it had been discussed since the beginning of the twentieth century. The School
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would be granted some freedom from official governmental influence, or so it was said, 
although the government controlled its funding as well as the recruitment of staff. The 
School of Economics and Sociology would be awarded an independent chair of 
sociology, which in itself was a powerful expression of the significance attached to the 
discipline by local officials. I will investigate into the establishment of this school, and 
the hiring of sociologist and city-planner Professor Patrick Geddes as its first professor.
Helen Meller has briefly but nicely described how Geddes experienced great difficulties 
in developing fresh sociological insights about life in Bombay, as well as in promoting 
his Department with any real success.227 However, my interest lay not with Geddes’s 
professional accomplishments, but with what the founding of a School of this kind 
could tell us about the new governmental focus on social issues and the need to 
understand social questions through sociological methods and theory, in the face of 
modem industrial society. The enthusiasm shown by colonial officials when incepting 
the School is revealing, I argue, for an underlying belief in the necessity of a continuous 
and scientific production of sociological knowledge for administrative purposes within 
the Presidency.
Clearly, empire’s relationship with science in general was riddled with contradictions. 
On one hand science provided authority and legitimacy for colonial state intervention 
into colonial society. Especially from the late nineteenth century onwards, writes David 
Arnold, ‘the colonial regime employed science as both a means of self-legitimation and 
an aid to more effective government’.228 On the other hand, the freedom of science in 
the context of empire was limited; science was always measured by its utility for 
colonial administration.
James Ferguson’s investigation into how the colonial situation framed early encounters 
between modernising aspirations of colonial administrators, and the discipline of 
anthropology, sheds further light on this discussion. Ferguson points out that social 
science in the context of empire carried with it an internal tension between what was 
perceived as ‘pure’ or theoretical social science, and ‘applied’ or practical social
227 Meller, II. (1990) Patrick Geddes: Social Evolutionist and City Planner. London: Routledge.
228 Arnold, D. (2000) Science, Technology and Medicine in Colonial India. The New Cambridge 
History o f India, 3 (5). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 129.
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science.229 Ferguson suggests that anthropology became increasingly ‘applied’ and 
promoted its own utility exactly at a time when it looked to become more integrated into
* 2 3 0the colonial self-proclaimed project of modernising governance.
This experience is telling also for how sociology would operate within social 
imperialism, I will argue in the last sections of the chapter. The debate by the turn of the 
century concerning whether sociology was to be abstract and predominately of 
theoretical import, or applied and of practical administrative use was, in the colonial 
context, always won by the latter. I use the ultimate marginalisation of Patrick Geddes 
in Bombay to illustrate this.
The ways in which the administrative apparatus would utilise sociological knowledge 
only in applied form interplays with the expanding bio-political concern of the 
administration in important ways. Gyan Prakash’s discussion on science as modem 
technology points out a way to conceptualise this relation.231 Prakash relies on Martin 
Heidegger’s ideas about the ‘essence’ of modem technology not being ‘technology 
itself, but a ‘form of revealing’ resources that lay beyond the procedures and measures 
or machinery employed. Technology is an instrument which both delineates, and 
‘enframes’ -  that is, confines but also makes known a resource to be explored and 
exploited. Technology enables the state to tap into energies and resources. It inserts 
itself in between the resource and the state.
In analogy, I will argue in this chapter’s final section that during this time the social 
emerged as a new set of problems to enframe. Applied sociology in the colonial context 
inserted itself between the ruler and the ruled, in order to ‘reveal’ the social domain as a 
source of discontent, and as a resource for future development. Sociology made the 
social known to colonial administrators and helped enlarge the bio-political scope of 
action of the colonial administration.
229 Ferguson, J. (1997) ‘Anthropology and Its Evil Twin: “Development” in the Constitution o f 
a Discipline’. In Cooper, F. and Randall, P. (Eds.) International Development and the Social 
Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics o f  Knowledge. Berkeley, CA: University o f 
California Press, 150-175.
230 Ibid., 157, 161.
231 Prakash, 1999, 159-161.
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4.1. Approaches within early British sociology: constitutive 
debates
The years between 1900 and the outbreak of the First World War were decisive in the 
formation of a sociological discipline in Britain. For sure, during the latter part of the 
nineteenth century, several outstanding sociological studies were published in Britain, 
and British sociologists like Herbert Spencer, Charles Booth and Seebohm Rowntree all 
published with some frequency. Yet it was only in the early years of the twentieth 
century that a full-fledged disciplinary debate emerged and regular transactions of 
sociological papers were established. The consolidation of British sociology owes much 
to debates and transactions of the newly established Sociological Society in London, 
and I will revisit some of these debates in this section.
The modem discipline of ‘sociology’ opened up fresh avenues for research, and enabled 
connections between disciplines. ‘Sociology’, explained L.T. Hobhouse in his editorial 
of the first issue of the quarterly Sociological Review, was nothing less than a ‘Science 
of Society’. To frame sociology as a science of society, Hobhouse suggested, meant to 
understand life as ‘a distinct field for investigation’, rather than as various unconnected 
elements of interest.232
More importantly, however, sociology connected social knowledge to ethical 
consideration and political action in innovative ways. While studying everyday realities, 
Hobhouse argued, sociologists frequently came across positive and negative aspects of 
life where some negative aspects formed actual obstacles to progress. When 
encountering these obstacles, it was the duty of the sociologist, wrote Hobhouse, to 
suggest their remedy. For him, sociological studies produced actionable knowledge, 
where ‘scientific truth is at once translatable into a moral command’.233 Or as 
Hobhouse’s fellow in the Sociological Society Patrick Geddes pointed out: social 
survey and social service were closely related.234
232 Hobhouse, L.T. (1908 January) ‘Editorial’. Sociological Review  [S.R.], 1(1), 3.
233 Ibid., 6.
234 Univ. S.A. T-GED 3/4/17. Geddes, P. (1904) Observation and M ethod in Sociological 
Studies. An Introductory Course by Professor Geddes. Synopsis o f  a Course o f  Lectures fo r  the 
Second Term. School o f  Sociology and Social Economics.
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Sociology, as discussed by Hobhouse, had travelled far from its original propositions in 
the latter half of the nineteenth century. However, Hobhouse’s editorial was not 
representative of the views of the entire sociological community. Still, at the time of 
Hobhouse’s editorial, not a few sociolgists adhered to ideas of scientific selection of 
‘human stock’ for the evolution of human kind, or general biological explanations of 
social development.235 Hobhouse, however, found the idea reactionary.236 The sociology 
formulated by Hobhouse took a clear collectivist view of social development. For
23 7Hobhouse it was not nature that was the ‘environment of men’, but ‘society’. But 
written in 1908, Hobhouse’s article reflects the growing confidence felt by adherents of 
his views.
In order to understand the early development of British sociology as reflected by 
Hobhouse, and the ways in which constituting debates within circles of sociologists 
later came to influence the official establishment of sociology in India, it is necessary to 
revisit the early transactions of the Sociological Society in London. Victor Branford 
originally founded the Society. It met for its first session in the spring and summer of 
1904, but plans and details of its inception were hammered out in early 1903.238 
Branford would continue to run the Society for years to come. The Society was initially 
housed close to the Strand in London, but moved to the London School of Economics in 
1917. Branford himself published several sociological books and articles, while 
following a profession in corporate finance.
Already at its inception the Society drew several well-renowned British researchers and 
politicians together for readings and discussions. Charles Booth and Professor 
Bosanquet shared many sessions during the following years. The Society’s first editorial 
committee was chaired by L.T. Hobhouse; with him in the committee were radical 
economist J.A. Hobson, eugenicist Benjamin Kidd, liberal M.P. J.M. Robertson, and 
Branford..
235 For a contemporary summary see: Barnes, H.E. (1925 April) ‘Representative Biological 
Theories o f Society: Introduction’. S.R ., 17 (2); Barnes, H.E. (1925 July) ‘Representative 
Biological Theories o f Society: The analogy between society and the individual organism’. S.R ., 
17 (3); Barnes, H.E. (1925 October) ‘Representative Biological Theories o f Society: “Social 
Darwinism’” . S.R ., 17 (4),
236 Hobhouse, L.T. (1911 October) ‘The value and limitations o f eugenics’. S.R., 4 (4).
237 Collini, 1979, 172.
238 Collini, 1979, 198-199.
115
Members of the Society did not adhere to a common view. A wide variety of 
perspectives were represented: positivist, eugenic, evolutionary, biological, and 
ethnographical. In its formative years the Society successfully linked its work to that of 
leading sociologists in continental Europe and the United States. Papers were submitted 
by Beatrice Webb, Hoffing and Durkheim, and commented on by Talcott Parsons and 
Tonnies — to name only a few. The British press commented vividly on the proceedings. 
The T im es , W estm inster G azette  and D a ily  Chronicle, among others, wrote reviews and 
lengthy notes on debates and presentations.
The wide range of papers and articles that were presented before the Society were 
published annually as a collection of S ocio log ica l P a p ers . Beginning in 1908, the 
publication So cio lo g ica l P apers  turned into the quarterly S o c io lo g ica l R eview , as a 
measure to keep abreast of the output of this fast-developing discipline.
In India, as we shall see later in this chapter, the start and consolidation of the discipline 
of sociology was inevitably slower, and the introduction of the discipline was much 
more linked to official agency than was the case in Britain. In fact, as I shall show, 
sociology was promoted by the colonial administration and incorporated into its 
governmental practises.
Revisiting the early transaction within the Sociological Society gives an indication of 
the constitutive debates in British sociology in its early years. A substantial amount of 
papers presented, as well as points made during discussions following presentations, 
deal with the aim, scope and character of the scientific discipline of sociology. The 
question of originality of sociological research is always present in these debates. It was 
asked what actually distinguished sociology in relation to disciplines of biology, 
economics, ethics or anthropology. There existed two main fault lines causing tension 
within the proceedings of the Society.
23 9First: the stress put on contemporary sociology’s affinity to the discipline of biology. 
Some members or commentators, like Francis Galton, Benjamin Kidd and Karl Pearson, 
promoted eugenics as an essential part of sociology. Pearson, who travelled widely, and 
Galton drew parallels between their experiences elsewhere in the British Empire and
239 Collini, 1979, 200.
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what they saw in the industrial towns of England. Galton argued that among the 
unemployed of the European working classes existed the ‘same lack of endurance’ that 
he had observed in ‘savage’ Africa.240
Others, like L.T. Hobhouse, forcefully argued against the ‘attempt to deal with the 
science of society as if  it were a department of the science of biology’.241 Despite 
differences of opinion on the disciplinary classification and location of sociology, it was 
mostly agreed that sociology must provide a wide approach to the study of life in its 
various aspects and development, that it was closely related to social service and social 
reform, and that it would attempt to synthesise knowledge from various disciplines. For 
Hobhouse, sociology provided the experience upon which ethical considerations could 
be made. For parliamentarians like Charles Booth or J.M. Robertson, sociology 
systematised experience upon which politics could rest.
The second issue of debate was to what extent sociology, as a science, ought to be 
mainly applied or mainly theoretical. At first glance, it seems a minor point. In the 
colonial context, as we shall see in a following section, it would prove of great 
importance. In fact, what was at stake here was the prospect of an autonomous social 
science, or one measured by practicability and often bureaucratic or administrative 
utility. For many, as for two of the members of the Sociological Society with whom we 
will soon become better familiarised in the Bombay context, Harold H. Mann and 
Professor Patrick Geddes, sociology implied on one hand detailed analysis of actual 
social situations that could enhance knowledge of the public and government alike, and 
on the other hand sociology could provide facts for grander schematisations of social 
evolution.
Both Mann and Geddes presented papers during the Society’s first sessions in 1904. 
Mann’s paper ‘Life in an Agricultural Village in England’ was submitted with the 
assistance of the sociologist Seebohm Rowntree, whose social survey of York had 
already become a sociological classic.242 Mann’s paper was a social-economic study of
In Adas, 1989,209.
241 Hobhouse, L.T. (1905 11 May) Chairman’s oral introduction to Bridges, J.H. ‘Some Guiding 
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242 Mann, H.H. ([1904] 1905) ‘Life in an Agricultural Village in England’. S.P., 1, 161-193.
117
Ridgmont village, in his native region Bedfordshire. Mann was inspired by the research 
approach designed by Rowntree, but also by Charles Booth and his survey of London. 
Mann suggests that by applying the methodology of Booth and Rowntree to a study of 
village life, he aims ‘[t]o complete the chain of evidence as to the economic position of 
the people’. Subsequently he outlines in great detail household budgets, rent levels on 
housing, prices of staple food, family income, occupation, and percentages of families 
in poverty. Armed with his data Mann tells of a bleak prospect for village-England; the 
living standards in the countryside seem lower than in the industrial cities. This leads 
him to conclude ‘the cry of “back to the land” has a curious commentary in the results I 
have obtained’.243
The inclusion of Mann’s paper in the proceedings of the Society was awarded some 
editorial remark. The editorial committee found Mann’s paper embodying a 
‘sociological re-orientation of economics’. Mann’s approach was significant, the editors 
pointed out, because it applied Booth’s sociological methodology for the first time to 
English village life.
The audience was more excited, but a little confused, by papers presented by Patrick 
Geddes. Geddes was a student of T.H. Huxley. He considered himself an entrepreneur 
in social sciences and, as such, as Helen Meller has pointed out, his work is notoriously 
difficult to pin down. Geddes’s focus was ‘man in his environment’; he was an idealist 
in the sense that he strongly believed in modem knowledge as a force for change in 
society.
He made a point of being in constant motion, both with regards to subject matter: 
transgressing academic disciplinary boundaries, and geographically: he travelled almost 
obsessively. Geddes worked on sociological, botanical, historical, geographical, 
architectural and educational questions. He wrote between 40 and 50 town-planning 
reports. He worked all over Britain. He worked in Palestine, and both in British India 
and in several Indian Princely States.
243 Ibid., 193.
118
Social issues, according to Professor Patrick Geddes, must be studied in the 
multifaceted ‘everyday life’.244 Accordingly, his experiences of late nineteenth-century 
urban Britain made him think seriously about urbanisation and what he perceived the 
related social problems. He aimed at finding ways to channel social change into less 
destructive trends than those he saw developing in Britain. Geddes also claimed that 
nationalist and revolutionary movements with their urban base could, and indeed must, 
be turned into education and social reform.
Meller points out that although critical of capitalism, Geddes distanced himself from 
socialist movements. He had much scorn for the Fabian Society and believed that their 
views on the efficient state could become outright dangerous for state-society 
relations.245 In fact, Geddes opted out of political debate; his energy was directed 
towards research and social action.
Charles Booth himself chaired the first two sessions when Professor Patrick Geddes 
read out a series of papers before the Sociological Society. Geddes’s first paper ‘Civics: 
As Applied Sociology’, was delivered in July 1904.246 Sociological studies must be 
‘concrete’ and appeal to ‘practical men’, argued Geddes in his introduction to the paper. 
Nonetheless, he ventured on a very abstract exploration of the historic evolution of 
cities. Geddes described the civic evolution as a climax of historical forces, which he 
then schematises through various tabulations. To understand this process, suggested 
Geddes, the sociologist must engage both geography and history of the city, and 
combine those into a social and regional survey. Geddes concludes his discussion by 
outlining forms for civic evolution.
In a subsequent paper, read before the Society in January 1905, Geddes fleshed out 
these ideas. He positioned them between pure sociology and pure biology. The 
researcher, he argues, should aim to study civics by combining the investigations of the 
categories of place, work, and folk. These categories correspond as social analogies to
244 Geddes, 1904.
245 Meller, 1993, 67.
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the biologists’ environment, conditions and organism.247 These aspects of Geddes’s 
approach had a profound impact on the young, but soon to be influential, writer and 
historical sociologist Lewis Mumford in New York.248 However, Geddes’s sociologist 
collegues in London were not easily won over, and his presentation before the 
Sociological Society was followed by a discussion that brought out some interesting 
themes.
Charles Booth congratulated Geddes on his ‘charming’ paper, but emphasised the need 
for sociologists to conduct practical research and focus on real problems. For Booth it 
was ‘practical work [which] at the present needs most attention’ 249 Liberal M.P. J.M. 
Robertson joined him in his criticism. Robertson argued that sociology would become a 
dead science if it only dealt with forms and ideal types. But Robertson also challenged 
Booth’s study of London. Booth had studied the social conditions of London in great 
detail, he argued. But he had merely replaced general knowledge with more exact 
knowledge, argued Robertson. Booth’s study did not prescribe ways to deal with those 
conditions. Instead, he suggested, sociology must ‘grapple with political questions’. A 
sociologist must always ask ‘[h]ow has this inequality of wealth and of service arisen, 
and how is it prevented in the future?’.250 Sociology could provide an argument for 
political considerations, thought Robertson, and as such it was explicitly linked to 
political action and action of state.
In his third paper presented before the Society -  ‘A Suggested Plan for a Civic Museum 
(or Civic Exhibition) and Its Associated Studies’ -  Geddes further developed his 
approach and returned to some of the criticism of his previous papers.251 This time he 
focused on trying to theorise everyday realities of cities. He argued that only ‘in the 
general everyday life and aspect of our urban environments’ could ideas and ideals that 
defined polity and cultures become ‘deciphered’.252 It was the role of the sociologist to 
construct analytical frameworks for that deciphering. In this ambitious endeavour,
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studies of the present as represented by Booth’s study of London brought valuable, yet 
inconclusive, insights. The sociologist needs to add an historical and geographical 
understanding to present social conditions, argued Geddes. However, in order to 
understand the present ‘machine-civilisation’, suggested Geddes, ‘[o]ur standpoint must 
be more general, and therefore sociological; yet at the same time more concrete, and 
therefore civic’. To this end, he asserted, addressing his critics, a study of ‘concrete 
family budgets’ would not be enough.253
These examples from the Sociological Society and those of Mann, Booth, Geddes and 
Robertson describe the tension within, and scope of, sociology as it emerged as an 
integrated field of knowledge. The issue whether sociology was mainly an 
administrative tool that could provide useful information about social questions upon 
which politicians or administrators could act, or whether sociology had grander 
theoretical ambitions to provide explanations and proof for social evolution, was still to 
be hammered out within circles of sociologists.
The views expressed here were carried along within a sociological corpus while 
sociology consolidated as a discipline, and they would, as we shall see, resurface again 
in the context of colonial Bombay. The debate was not overtly political: Fabians, 
Conservatives, Liberals and Marxists could share particular views on the future 
direction of the discipline of sociology. The quarrel was, rather, between those who 
despite political affiliation, argued for an autonomy or at least independence of science 
and research, and those who would be happy to measure knowledge strictly through its 
utility for political or administrative power.
4.2 New demands for social knowledge in colonial India
Life in industrial areas of India by the turn of the twentieth century was perceived as 
familiar by colonial administrators; they saw in it a mirror image of the past experience 
of Europe: urbanisation, industrialisation, and class-segmentation. Bom out of that
253 Ibid., 215.
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sense of shared experience emerged ideas of employing similar sociological methods as 
were used in Britain in coming to know conditions of life in modem industrial India. 
These new demands for sociological knowledge were also shaped by the fact that the 
early twentieth century proved to be politically troubled times in India for the British. 
Unrest added urgency to the administrative preoccupation to locate and understand 
sources of popular discontent.
In this section I will discuss how ‘the social’ emerged as a new terrain to be surveyed as 
a source of discontent, but also as a future resource to develop. To elaborate new 
techniques and institutions through which knowledge about the social domain could 
accumulate was now a priority for colonial officials in, for example, Bombay: demands 
were raised among colonial administrators for sociological method and theory. Shifting 
social and political realities surrounding the First World War were instrumental in the 
awakening of colonial interest in social science in India.
The period surrounding the war, when discussion of establishing a sociological research 
facility in Bombay came to fruition, proved dramatic for India in many ways. David 
Washbrook has argued that it came to change ‘both the political context within which 
issues of economic growth and social welfare were considered and the economic 
context within which they had to be resolved’.254 These intentions of creating a context 
for economic and social reform coincided with shifts within the fiscal structure of the 
Raj.255
The outbreak of war produced a sharp rise in prices of staple goods in urban India. 
Rising prices caused hardship among the Indian population. After a period of slow 
consolidation Indian nationalists now began to broaden their appeal in various sections 
of society: nationalists could tap into growing discontent within business elites, as well 
as within large sections of peasantry and urban lower and middle classes.256
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The emergence of mass nationalism and anti-British sentiment was problematic for the 
British administration. On one hand, sections of the administration rhetorically attached 
to the emergence of a sense of shared nationhood a positive sign of the beneficial rule of 
the British: the Raj, they argued, had helped India to overcome its internal differences 
and advance toward national self-government. On the other hand, it had no real 
intentions of providing such self-government, and it feared the instability that could be 
unleashed by mass nationalism. Anti-British sentiment was more than an 
embarrassment to the Raj, David Washbrook notes, as the British during this period 
attempted to ideologically recast their empire as opposite to the totalitarianism and 
despotism of Bolshevism and Fascism.
Indeed, the basic structures of the colonial state in India had to undergo significant 
changes after the war.257 Troops were moving out of India in large quantities to take part 
in action outside the Subcontinent. Massive recruitment campaigns caused resentment 
among Indians, especially in Punjab. Also, the war came down heavy on the budget of 
British India. The Government of India gave a war gift of £100 million to Britain, and it 
paid for its overseas expeditionary forces with £20-30 million a year.
Between 1913-14 and 1920-21 defence spending rose 300 per cent, producing a large
* 2 5 8deficit. Land revenue could not carry such expenditure; war loans, but also fresh 
taxation, financed the war effort. This, of course, was a fine balance to tread, as 
increased taxation put pressure on already dissatisfied urban populations, such as those 
in Karachi and Bombay.
In Bombay a workers’ politics was in the making. The First World War had brought 
great fortunes to Bombay manufacturers. Increased profits coincided with a general 
price rise, and demands were being made for higher wages. Before 1914, strikes had 
occurred within the cotton mill industry, although with little co-ordination between the 
various sections of workers on strike. Around 1917-18 that would begin to change, and 
between 1919 and 1940 eight well co-ordinated general strikes were carried out in 
Bombay.259
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The situation caused much anxiety among British officials, who had little idea of what 
was going on in workplaces and poorer neighbourhoods. This is indicated by how E.S. 
Montagu, then Secretary of State for India, involved in the peace negotiations at 
Versailles, wrote worried letters from Paris to the then Governor of Bombay, George 
Lloyd, suggesting that Montagu would perhaps convince the socialist and trade unionist 
John Bums to go to Bombay and organise the workers properly.260
A sense of urgency had also crept into Lloyd’s private communication to London. He 
found that a section within the administration shared a view that the social problem in 
Bombay had gone unchecked due to the inaction of his predecessors. Administrators 
now worried about Bombay becoming increasingly ungovernable.
At the basis of the strikes lay demands for higher wages and an end to wage-cuts. Sumit 
Sarkar notes how in Bombay City an increase in wages by an average 15 per cent was to 
balance an 80-100 per cent increase in the price of food grain. Also, unemployment hit 
hard at certain sections of workers in Bombay. However, Sarkar argues, the formation 
of mass workers’ politics in the larger industrial towns in British India could not be 
explained by economic hardship alone: there was a general political awakening among 
workers and peasants throughout the industrialising world at this time 261
The general strike in Bombay in 1919 and 1920 involved 200,000 people and lasted 
several months, and had the backing of a sustainable organisation and networks 
reaching out in surrounding villages in the Presidency.262 In fact, workers’ action did 
push up wage levels in Bombay, compared with, for example, Calcutta. In fact, in 
several industrial centres in India strikes broke out at this time. During 1921 alone, 
strikes involved more than 600,000 workers in various places across India.263
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Of immense significance was the start of the nationalist all-India Non-cooperation 
movement in 1919. Under M.K. Gandhi the movement evolved into the largest 
manifestation against the British presence on the Subcontinent since the Indian Mutiny 
of 1857. It included such elements of non-violent protests as picketing, boycott of 
foreign goods, and the resignation by Indians from government funded posts -  although 
few Indians actually resigned from their government posts. The movement had both an 
economic impact and a psychological one. It had secured a strong backing from several 
sections of Indian society. Industrialists, especially in Bombay, initially kept the 
movement at ami’s length, as they feared it would cause labour unrest. On the other 
hand, Gandhi himself was against strikes for political purposes.
In 1919, however, protests would occasionally turn violent. Gandhi was jailed in 1922, 
without having realised his promise of 1919 to bring independence to India within a 
year. The non-co-operation movement scattered. Smaller sections of the movement 
were radicalised, and after the Bolshevik revolution in Russia, British officials feared a 
spread of communism.
During the strikes of 1919 and 1920 a small section of communists were actually 
involved in strike action in Bombay. The group had emerged from an amalgamation of 
radicalised and disillusioned former members of Gandhi’s non-cooperation movement. 
Hence, rather than being an off-shoot of the revolutionaries in Russia, it sprung from 
local movements. Initially communists had a marginal influence over Bombay trade 
unions, but communist elements asserted themselves more forcefully again by the mid 
1920s.264 Yet Sumit Sarkar reminds us: the real Bolshevik influence was small and the 
fear of its effect blown out of proportion.265
In the meantime, however, suggest financial historians Peter J. Cain and Antony G. 
Hopkins, the Raj was ‘revitalised’ with a new sense of ‘mission’. The political reforms 
introduced in 1917-18 by the then Secretary of State for India, E.S. Montagu, and the 
then Viceroy in India, Chelmsford, brought ideas about nation building into the colonial 
administration. Certain departments of government were assigned to cany out
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infrastructure and educational programmes. However, in reality very little came out of 
the many committees at work. Most plans were shelved, or stood without funding.266
4.2.1. A  short history of science in colonial India
The development of science and social science in India was always closely connected to 
the shifting aspirations of British officials and the agendas of the British Raj. 
Obviously, it is indeed difficult to imagine the official introduction of sociology into 
British India outside of the contemporary parameters set up by the turn of the twentieth- 
century colonial administration; social science, as applied in India, formed within 
contemporary imperial realities described above.
Indeed, for sociologists empire did not only provide a field of opportunities in terms of 
data-collection, but in terms of employment. For some, empire as a phenomenon was 
even of theoretical interest. Margaret Elizabeth Nobel (Sister Nivedita) wrote to her 
fellow sociologist Victor Branford to complain about the lack of interest shown in 
empire by her sociologist colleagues. Nobel had taken great interest in India after 
meeting the Hindu reformist Swami Vivekananda in London around the turn of the 
twentieth century. He took her as his disciple, and she left Britain for Calcutta.
For Nobel, empire -  both as a reality and an analytical category -  provided a structure 
for the enhancement of human evolution. As such, it could be of great importance in the 
formulation of sociological theory. Nobel found that:
[t]he outstanding phenomenon of the present age for the 
English people is undoubtedly the existence of empire. 
Sociologists may be assumed to be persons who are not quite 
intoxicated with vanity, but aware of many of the dangers and 
difficulties which empire involved, both for rulers and ruled, 
and are prepared to consider these facts in a calm and
266 Washbrook, 1997, 36-49.
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unprejudiced manner, with a view of the determination and 
perhaps even the promulgation of true ideas on the subject.
Empire, Nobel continued, ‘implies synthesis’, and it was the role of sociologists to 
compile and theorise knowledge from far-flung places. They must seize the opportunity 
provided through the formal structure of empire. Why, she asked, ‘should the English 
sociologist know nothing of what the Frenchman is discovering in Cambodia, or the 
Dutchman in Java?’. These were questions that those ‘at work on the world’s moral and 
social frontiers’ needed to be informed about, Nobel argued, and sociology could cany 
the message.267
Yet, despite the hopes of Nobel and many of her colleagues of an autonomous 
production of knowledge, science, when developing within the context of the empire, 
was unable to detach itself from local colonial administrations. Gyan Prakash points out 
the historic contradiction inherent in the ideal universal and free science acting within 
the confines of empire. ‘On the one hand’, writes Prakash, ‘science was projected as a 
universal sign of modernity and progress unaffected by its historical and cultural 
locations; on the other hand, science could establish its universality only in its particular 
history as imperial knowledge’.268
The debate about how and on what premise science actually established itself outside 
metropolitan societies was established even before George Basalla published his 
seminal article The Spread o f Western Science in 1967. Yet, it is his diffusionist model 
that is still most frequently referenced in discussions about the development of science 
in the context of empire. Basalla described a three-phased movement of science and 
reason, outward from the metropolitan society towards science-less colonies of the 
periphery.269 During the first phase colonies primarily functioned as sources of data for 
Western science. Scientists went out to collect things of interest, and went back to 
organise and theorise their findings. During the second phase colonial administrations 
established a ‘colonial science’ within the dependencies. Now a highly rudimentary 
infrastructure for scientific enterprise becomes imposed and implanted. It operated,
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however, within the confines of wider colonial objectives. The third phase was marked 
by a struggle for an independent scientific culture, often along nationalist lines.
Basalla’s model has successfully been put to rest by, for example, Michael Adas in his 
Machines as the Measure o f  Men. There were several flaws in the model that needed to 
be accounted for. For example, it did not give credence to pre-colonial networks of
2 7 0information-gathering and indigenous modes of analysis. The model furthermore 
suggested a one-way flow of science and reason emanating from the metropole. This is 
obviously a false claim. David Arnold, instead, points out the geographically shifting 
centres of influence in scientific work.271 Moreover, Basalla’s model suggests colonial 
science to be a closed container, out of touch with local systems of knowledge. 
Historical sociologist Bernhard S. Cohn has shown why this is a disputable suggestion. 
Local knowledge was, in fact, often absorbed by colonial scholarship, yet biased by
2 7 2local hierarchies of power.
David Arnold, however, describes how the early British East India Company, and later 
the colonial state, were never keen on being advised by, or promoting, scientific work in 
their administration of the Subcontinent. Arnold points out that the East India Company 
and the subsequent early Government of India showed little interest in providing a 
beneficial milieu for research. In return, science had little influence over governance. 
With the exception of a few invited scientists working on zoology or geology — areas 
where scientific knowledge obviously could enhance revenue -  most research took the 
form of general surveys earned out by Indian Civil Servants without research training.
Still, the notion of colonial science has some currency, I will suggest, if it is thought of 
in terms of science as an instrument of imperial power. The relationship between 
science and colonial administrative power was a close one. Deepak Kumar finds science 
to be ‘inextricably woven into the fabric of colonialism’.273 The import of a rudimentary 
colonial infrastructure for science did, however, take a long time coming, and it was 
structured by administrative expediency. The universities of Bombay, Calcutta and
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Madras were promoted after long debate at the end of the 1850s in order to examine 
students — not to carry out research.274
However, this was about to change during the late nineteenth century. During the 
viceroyalties of Elgin (1894-99) and Curzon (1899-1905), the colonial state began to 
think scientific influence over policy a matter of necessity. Elgin admitted that the 
government’s ‘isolation’ from modem science was a problem. He did so, Arnold points 
out, as public resentment mounted over intrusive plague measures carried out after the 
plague epidemic in the final years of the nineteenth century. Were the administration in 
better touch with medical knowledge, many ineffective measures to counter the plague 
would have been avoided at an early stage.
For Curzon, Arnold argues, science more clearly became a tool of government. Curzon 
found science useful, as it could help promote actual change in society at the same time 
as it enabled more efficient governance. The notion of science as positively contributing 
to, and being a factor in, government had in fact been with colonial officials for more 
than a decade at the time Curzon pronounced it. For the famous Strachey brothers, John 
and Richard, who both held high positions in India during 1870s-90s, science enabled 
‘certainty’ in government.275 What was new under Curzon, however, was the way in 
which science was promoted by the colonial officials -  in Arnold’s words: to ‘provide a 
fresh source of legitimation’ as Indian nationalism became much moro vocal.276 The 
colonial state, in short, argues Kumar, becomes central to any discussion on science in 
the colonial context.277
This intimacy between science and colonial administration provided little freedom for 
scientific thought and research under the Raj. In fact, Kumar argues, science under 
colonial circumstances had no real sovereignty. Although it sometimes provided 
original thought, science was, Kumar argues, utility driven rather than formed by 
curiosity. He suggests that colonial science could best be described as ‘science-as-
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enterprise’, rather than ‘science-as-avocation’. This holds especially true for scientific 
endeavours under the Raj, Kumar writes.278
As we shall see, this central tension within the relationship between science and colonial 
administration was that of science and social science as primarily a policy oriented and 
apolitical tool used for efficient administration, or as something wider, and less 
conformed. In colonial India, Kumar points out, ‘the local civilian [administrator] 
wanted...practical results rather than research papers’.279 This tension, which 
crystallised around the question about the utility of social science, became pronounced 
during the period here under review as science more frequently was called forth to 
legitimate colonial policy.
4.2.2. Initial proposals to establish sociology in India
Clearly, social realities in urban industrial India begged serious scientific investigation. 
To fall back on scientific research concerning the perceived causes of the unstable 
situation in British India could signal how serious the colonial state was in coming to 
terms with social problems, and could furnish government with practical plans.
At the time of Harold H. Mann’s and Patrick Geddes’s productive roles at the inception 
of the Sociological Society, their respective work was taken up in India and, in 
particular, in the Bombay Presidency. Soon after he took part in the first session of the 
Sociological Society, Harold H. Mann took up a position as principal of the agricultural 
unit in Poona, Bombay Presidency. The unit formed part of the Poona College of 
Science. This college had been initiated in 1854, but agricultural research was 
conducted from 1879 onwards.
Kumar, 1997, 16.
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As will be further discussed below, Mann took a very active role in the expansion of the 
University of Bombay, and the establishment of a School of Economics and Sociology 
at the university. In this connection, Mann worked hard to secure Geddes as the 
School’s first professor in sociology. Moreover, in the next section of this chapter I will 
show how Mann himself earned out or assisted in new sociological studies in the 
Presidency.
Geddes had been active in promoting sociology in India for some time, and he attached 
his effort to the highly anticipated proposal for a research institute by J.N. Tata. In 1898, 
Tata, a wealthy and influential Bombay based industrialist, had proposed to create a 
Trust that would finance the setting up and maintain a research institute in India. He 
would donate a sum of 3,000,000 rupees, an enormous donation for a single individual 
to make in turn of the century India. Associations interested in the promotion of science 
and funded by Indians had existed before Tata’s initiative. Bengal Social Science 
Association, for example, had already begun to promote positivism in the tradition of 
Comte in 18 67.280
Tata’s scheme was devoted to actual research, and with his donation, Kumar points out, 
Tata came to symbolise The rising aspirations of the Indian bourgeoisie’, which had 
become conscious of the need for Indians to engage scientific research. Tata’s initiative 
created massive support in the Indian press, and it helped position science and the 
politics of higher education within wider nationalist politics. Initially the Indian 
National Congress focused almost exclusively its critique of the lack of scientific 
institutions and training in India on higher technical education and medical training. 281 
The nationalist swadeshi movement made a more urgent, wider, and more politically 
charged appeal for improved science and higher education under ‘national control’ in 
India282
Returning to Tata’s proposal: when floating it, Tata had asked the Government of India 
to reciprocate his donated amount in almost equal terms. The Government of India was 
wary about such an ambitious research venture in India, Kumar writes. The then
280 Prakash, 1999, 58.
281 Kumar, 1997, 208-9.
282 Ibid., 210.
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Viceroy Curzon attempted to bring the costs down on behalf of the government, thus 
reducing the ambition of the plans. Tata refused to bow down, and died in 1904 without
283realising his plans for a research institute.
Before the death of J.N. Tata, however, in 1901, professor Patrick Geddes’s wrote him 
open letters outlining what he called a ‘needed type of research institute, geographical 
and social’. Geddes letters were printed in two Indian publications, The Pioneer in 
August 1901, and in the East and West, in September 1903. In his articles Geddes 
suggested an integrated institute focusing on civics, and which centred the social and 
geographical ‘regional survey’ as its main feature.284 The knowledge coming out of 
such an institute would be beneficial for government as well as for the general public, 
Patrick Geddes asserted.
Geddes’s plans were not successful with Tata. His proposals had, however, ignited the 
interest of local officials elsewhere in British India. Hopes of studying urban social 
questions in an Indian context were nourished by sections of colonial administrators. 
For them, sociology as a science of society brought with it concrete methods for 
studying modem life, yet it could be sensitive to various local forces, of which progress 
was contingent. How to formalise and institutionalise sociology as a research discipline 
in India was, however, becoming a difficult -  and political — question for the 
Government of India.
At this point the future of the entire university system was becoming increasingly 
debated, and especially so after Curzon had appointed an Indian Universities 
Commission. Curzon had high ambitions with his university reform plans. He aimed to 
significantly transform the relation between the universities and the state. He wanted to 
curtail their independence while simultaneously channelling their accumulating 
knowledge into the administrative machinery. He had found the relative freedom of the 
university syndicates and senates too cumbersome to cope with.
283 Ibid., 202-5.
284 Univ.S.A. T-GED 12/2/449. Geddes, P. (1903) On Universities in Europe and in India and a 
Needed Type o f  Research Institute, Geographical and Social. Five Letters to an Indian Friend . 
Madras.
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In Bombay, sections within the university’s governing bodies worried about the 
University of Bombay becoming a department of the Government of Bombay, and 
attempted to resist such moves. Debates emerged in Bombay over specific topics and 
reformulations of syllabus and curriculum. The Government of Bombay had asserted 
itself within these debates, attracting criticism from local influential Indian sections of 
society.285
4.2.3. Establishing sociological research in the Bom bay Presidency
Within this context, ideas about establishing sociology as a university subject were 
floated in Bombay. Establishing sociological research in Bombay would turn out to be 
an urgent yet slow process, with interesting twists and turns.
In response to the question about the utilisation of grants put foiward by the 
Government of Bombay in 1912, a committee was appointed by the University of 
Bombay.286 The appointed Committee met during June to August to outline a scheme of 
how best to put the grants into work. The committee consisted of members of the 
Bombay University Senate, members of the Legislative Council, and local businessmen.
The University of Bombay had the doubtful privilege of having an active, but quite 
autocratic Chancellor in the former Governor of the Presidency, S.G. Clarke, later Lord 
Sydenham of Combe. In fact, much of the stipulated committee’s work was pre-empted 
by Clarke as he widely circulated a letter addressed to the University Vice-Chancellor, 
formulating his view on how the grants ought to be put to use.
285 Ganachari, 2008, 80.
286 M.S.A. Government o f Bombay [G.B.] Education Department [E.D.] Compilation 360 of
1914. Letter no. 2195. Dastur to secretary o f G.B. E.D. 5 Sep 1912.
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In his letter Clarke argued that the grants open up ‘new possibilities of the greatest 
importance to the Presidency’.287 If utilised well, Bombay University could significantly 
strengthen its position as a centre of learning, and also widen its scope. There were also 
new opportunities for the university to focus on primarily social, economic and 
historical studies, and subsequently contribute to the running of the Presidency. Hence, 
it was important, Clarke argued, that the conception of the function of the university 
within the polity must be seriously rethought. ‘A living university’, Clarke writes, 
‘should not concern itself with its students alone. It should be an intellectual force in the 
[s]tate’ 28S
This process would imply centralisation of higher education in the Presidency, and a 
integration of social science into colonial administration. Clarke asserted that the 
different colleges in Bombay must from now on be better-coordinated, and in this co­
ordination the Government of Bombay must play an active role. Moreover, government, 
university and business must form strong links for their mutual benefit, Clarke 
suggested. In order for the university to carry its new role as an intellectual force in the 
state, it would have to recruit prominent staff. To this end, according to Clarke, only 
British professors and lecturers would do.
In its final report, the appointed Committee was left with little choice but to basically 
adopt the outline made by Clarke. The Committee recommended that one or more 
‘eminent’ professors or lecturers should be brought annually from Great Britain to 
deliver lectures in Bombay over a wide range of topics in economics, sociology and 
history. Moreover, a ‘beginning should be made’ to organise Bombay University into a 
teaching university, by appointing a university professor. The most important subject to 
be taught was that of economics and political economy, with a particular emphasis on 
economics in Indian conditions.289
287 M.S.A. G.B. E.D. Compilation 360 o f 1914. Private letter Chancellor to the Vice-Chancellor 
University o f Bombay 4 July 1912.
288 Ibid.
289 M.S.A. G.B. E.D. University o f Bombay (1912) Report o f  the Committee o f  the syndicate 
appointed to consider proposals o f  the utilization o f  the Government grants and the letter o f  
Government regarding the contribution by the university towards the cost o f  the Examination 
Halls,
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When writing back to the Government of India on the subject of how the University 
would utilise its grants, the Government of Bombay reiterated the positions of the 
University Senate Committee and the Chancellor. It added that it is ‘absolutely 
necessary to draw largely upon extraneous sources for the teaching agency required’ if 
one wants to bring teaching to a ‘higher plane’. In the Indian Education Service there 
are but a few professors who would be able to ‘deal[ing] effectively’ with the specific 
subject. ‘If  a new start is now to be made, it is essential that the impression created 
should be strong and lasting. This result can be obtained only by the employment of 
brilliant men’, the Government concluded.290 The committee proposal was accepted in 
late 1912.
In a simultaneous but separate exchange between Bombay and Delhi, the Government 
of Bombay discussed whether to establish a Commercial College in the Presidency. A 
Commercial College, the Government of Bombay argued, ‘must be under Government 
control’ but would consult with an advisory board where the commercial interests of 
Bombay would be represented. The focus of the college had, up to then, been restricted 
to commercial issues such as the training of actuaries and auditors, but that could now 
be broadened, the Government suggested.291 The Secretary of State for India welcomed
907a broader scope when accepting the proposal.
Shortly after hearing out the Government of Bombay on the two separate issues of the 
grants for the University and the establishment of a College of Commerce, the 
Government of India published its Educational Policy of 1913. In it, Delhi now found 
that due to the expansion of interest in commercial education in British India, it would 
be worth considering ‘the question of making arrangements for organised study of the 
economic and allied sociological problems of India’. For the first time the Government 
actually combined the topics of economics and sociology into one distinct field of 
knowledge requiring an institutional home, and in that context, it put forward Bombay 
as the best place suited for hosting such an institution.
290 M.S.A. G.B. E.D. Compilation 360 o f 1914. Letter no. 2910. Rieu to secretary o f 
Government o f India [G.I.] E.D. 11 Nov 1912.
291 M.S.A. G.B. E.D. Compilation 360 o f 1914. G.B. Resolution no. 888 E.D. 3 April 1912.
292 M.S.A. G.B. E.D. Compilation 360 o f 1913. Letter no. 16. Secretary o f State for India 17 
January 1913.
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The idea of a college of commerce had met ready response in Bombay. Building on that 
response, the Government of India suggested that ‘arrangements for the organised study 
of the economics and allied sociological questions in India...might advantageously be 
attached to the College of Commerce. Bombay, with its busy industrial and commercial 
life so largely the result of Indian enterprise and ability, seems peculiarly well placed 
for an experiment of the kind’. Although there had been previous attempts to treat 
‘political economy in its special application to Indian problems’, these attempts had 
been isolated and not coordinated, wrote the Government of India. Instead, they now 
argued that there was a possibility to cany out a ‘detailed investigation of facts by a 
series of monographs to be subsequently co-ordinated into a broad survey’. Indeed, they 
suggested:
Indian sociology or Indian history treated from the 
sociological point of view is a science to which little or no 
attention has hitherto been given...The aim of a sociological 
history of India would be to arrive at the conditions which 
made the politics, the religion and the general structure of 
Indian society in its distinctive features.293
By synthesising ethnographical, sociological, historical and economic ‘facts’, keen 
observers of Indian conditions might derive a better understanding of contemporary 
Indian social, political and commercial life, the Government of India suggested 294
While the Governments of India and Bombay discussed the establishment of a 
sociological connection to the proposed College of Commerce, the University Senate 
now attempted to wrestle the control over sociological research in its favour. In its new 
scheme for post graduate studies the Senate outlined four departments of teaching and 
research. Among those four, one department was to combine the study of ‘Sociology 
and Economics’.295
293 M.S.A. G.B. E.D. Compilation 360 of 1914. Letter no. 951. H. Sharp to secretary G.B. E.D. 
27 May 1913.
294 M.S.A. G.B. E.D. Compilation 360 o f 1913. Resolution G.I. E.D. no. 301-C.D [paragraph 
43] 21 February 1913.
295 M.S.A. G.B. E.D. Compilation 360 o f 1913. University o f Bombay [U.B.], ‘Scheme 
prepared by the Syndicate for the development o f University Postgraduate Studies’, 2 Aug
1913.
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Subsequently, the Government of Bombay notes that it was now under consideration 
whether it would be more advantageous to create a ‘School of Indian Economics and
296Sociology’, and place it under the management of the University of Bombay. Both 
the Government of India and Government of Bombay agreed to this new set-up in 
August 1914.297 The cost of two professorships in Bombay, one in sociology and one in 
economics, was sanctioned with effect from financial year 19 1 5-16.298 However, the 
First World War put the planned expanded teaching in sociology on hold. Since the 
Government and the University Senate so thoroughly disbelieved in recruiting within 
India, they found it impossible to hire suitable professor from Britain until after the
4.2.4. Getting Patrick Geddes to Bombay
The interest in the new forms of applied sociology was not reduced by the War within 
the wide circles of Government in Bombay. Harold Hart Mann, now fellow of the 
University and increasingly comiected with the Government of Bombay -  he would 
later be Director of Agriculture in the Presidency -  was in touch with Patrick Geddes 
through their affiliation with the Sociological Society in London. Mami nourished hopes 
of bringing Geddes to Bombay, in order to help establish sociological research there.
In 1914 Lord Pentland, the then Governor of the Madras Presidency, invited Geddes to 
Madras. Geddes, as well as Pentland, hoped other ‘liberal’ governors would take 
interest in his work. Most of Geddes’s initial work in India was practical and his reports 
were published as governmental papers. This restricted his audience. In the pages of the 
Sociological Review, however, his reports were praised for their applicability and 
‘“concrete” sociological method’, thus their translatability into planning and actual 
policy in India.300
296 MSA. G.B. E.D. Compilation 360 o f 1914. Departmental note 22 January 1914.
297 M.S.A. G.B. E.D. Compilation 360 of 1914. Letter no 2425. J.L Rieu to registrar U.B. 1 Aug
1914.
298 M.S.A. G.B. E.D. Compilation 360 o f 1915. Government Order no 270 F.D. 20 January
1915.
299 M.S.A. G.B. E.D. Compilation 360 o f 1918. Departmental note [n.d.].
300 Farquharson, A. (1919) ‘An Indian Exam ple’. S.R., 11 (1), 65-68.
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Geddes found interested administrators in the industrialising Bombay Presidency, as 
well as in Calcutta, but was not able to influence administrators all over British India. 
For many he seemed too radical. While working for colonial administrators, Geddes 
often turned to Indian leaders, both nationalist and traditional, for consultations on the 
problems of urban India. Geddes insisted that modem urban social questions demanded 
new administrative and political approaches in order to be resolved. According to 
Meller, Geddes thought that ‘it would be possible to by-pass some of the stages of 
change suffered by western cities under the impact of industrialisation’.301
Geddes elaborated his ideas about what could be done in India under contemporary 
forms of administration. He thought it necessary to approach in a very detailed manner 
all aspects of life in urban India -  to study occupation, housing, family life; to collect 
statistics, and ethnographies through social surveys; to thoroughly, and intimately, come 
to know life in modern industrial and urban India. When all the data was collected, 
administrative and political power might be employed in order to address particular 
issues. This approach seemed like a fresh one to observers outside colonial India. ‘Your 
business in India’ wrote his admirer and acclaimed American writer Lewis Mumford in 
New York, ‘seems to be...to regionalize British imperialism; in other words to give it a 
larger raiso.n d’etre than sanguine map-painters of the City or Downing Street have any 
conception o f .302
H.H. Mann wrote to Patrick Geddes in November 1914. Geddes’s European tour with a 
portable exhibition of ‘Cities and Town Planning* had been compromised by the War, 
and he was about to travel to Bombay with his exhibition. Mann found that the new, 
more holistic sociological perspectives on social life were not yet fully appreciated 
within influential circles of the colonial administration. Maim hoped for Geddes to exert 
some influence in that direction. A new Town Planning Bill was about to be put forward 
in the Legislative Council by the Government, Mann pointed out, and it had been found 
autocratic by many in Bombay.
jUI Meller, 1990, 203.
302 Private letter Mumford to Geddes ([1918 n.d.] 1995). In Novak, F.G (Ed). Lewis M umford 
and Patrick Geddes - Their Correspondence. London: Routledge, 49.
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Mann worried that the Bill ‘when passed may and possibly will be used to rivet on us 
Haussmannising schemes which will be extremely difficult to modify afterwards’.303 
Mann feared a fight between more technocratic engineers on the one hand, and those 
like him who were interested in what he thought socially sensitive development, on the 
other. He expressed his hopes that Geddes would help hold back the enactment of the 
legislation.304
The Bill was passed, yet Geddes’s exhibition and accompanying lectures -  with the 
main theme of ‘citizenship’ - were welcomed as important contributions to ongoing 
debates about civics, rights, and urban governance in Bombay. Geddes argued in his 
lectures that in order to reach its frill potential, a city like Bombay would need a new 
‘civic infrastructure’, and would need to reduce levels of material poverty if it ever was 
to be able to establish a more inclusive fonn of citizenship. Geddes identified a series of 
amenities in his lectures, which he argues were actual entitlements falling within the 
realm of real citizenship. These amenities were ‘decent homes, affordable public 
transport, universal access to water supply, and a comprehensive system of urban 
sanitation’.306 Geddes also produced a series of town plans for towns in the Presidency.
After leaving Bombay in 1915, Geddes kept in contact with local administrators. S.M. 
Edwardes was one of them. It was to him that Geddes suggested the need to set up a 
‘Civic Institute’ in Bombay. Edwardes welcomed this idea. From his sick leave in 
London, he endorsed it as ‘very sound’. And, wrote Edwardes, ‘although in Bombay we 
are only in the beginning to think of grappling with the various problems, social, 
sanitary, economic etc. which arise in every urban area’, the main problem was still 
Tack of coordination and little exchange of experience between the various bodies or 
organisations that are at work’.307 Edwardes’s answer to Geddes reflects a growing hope 
nourished by officials in Bombay to find an institutional structure for the exchange and 
accumulation of knowledge about social conditions.
303 In France Napoleon III assigned Georges-Eugene Haussmann to reorganise Paris after 
recurrent rioting in the city. Haussmann’s was an attempt to improve housing and sanitation, but 
also to transform Paris in ways which benefited surveillance and policing.
304 Univ.S.A. T-GED 12/3/42. Private letter Mann to Geddes 24 November 1914.
305 Hazareesingh, S. (2000) ‘The Quest for Urban Citizenship: Civic Rights, Public Opinion and 
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Clearly, by the end of the First World War the field of sociology had become central to 
the new scheme for expansion of higher education within the University of Bombay. 
Sociology was no longer attached as a contingent to commerce as an ‘allied subject’ -  it 
was understood as valuable knowledge in its own right. Due to the substantial changes 
to the original proposal from the University of Bombay from 1912/13, a new approach 
was called for from the University Senate.
Subsequently, Harold H. Mann drafted an outline of a proposed ‘School of Economics 
and Sociology’ in which he conferred with the previous suggestion put forward by the 
Government of Bombay. Mann’s outline suggests that the administration of the new 
school would be placed under a standing committee appointed by the Senate. The 
purpose of the school should ‘definitely be to give the opportunity to students to 
conduct research in economics and sociology’.308 The proposal was to be put before the 
University Senate in June 1917. Mann forwarded it to Geddes in May the same year, 
hoping he could soon come to Bombay again and perhaps take charge of the school.309
A new committee was constituted to present a revised plan for the ‘School of Indian 
Economics and Sociology’ as outlined by Mann. In a report submitted in late October 
1917, the Committee formulated the purpose of the school as to ‘promote the study of 
the Indian social institutions with reference to their effect on the economic and 
industrial life of the people and to conduct research in economics and sociology’. The 
School would consist of two professors with ‘intimate knowledge’ of Indian social and 
economic conditions. They, in turn, would be supported by two assistant professors.310
The main crux of the proposal at this point was that of recruitment of staff. Some, like 
Mann and the principal of the University of Bombay, Percy Anstey, had set their minds 
firmly on recruiting British sociologists to the school. Anstey, who had attended the so- 
called ‘Summer meetings’ in sociology and economics at King’s College in London 
convened by Geddes, along with the Madras-based economist Gilbert Slater, dissented 
to the majority report.
308 Univ.S.A. T-GED 9/1384.2. University o f Bombay ‘Scheme prepared by the syndicate for 
proposed School o f Economics and Sociology 20 February 1917’.
309 Univ.S.A. T-GED 9/1384. Private letter Mann to Geddes 6 May 1917.
310 M.S.A. University o f Bombay (1917) Report o f  the Committee appointed by the Senate on 
the 7 th o f  July 1917 to consider and report upon the scheme fo r  the proposed School o f  
Economics and Sociology.
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According to Anstey, the School could not reach the standard it aimed for, unless 
European -  read British — scholars were attracted to the University. This was 
particularly the case concerning the discipline of sociology. Wrote Anstey, ‘[a]s for 
sociology, I am not aware that there is in India a single teacher or writer in this subject -  
which even in Europe is the most recent of social sciences — who could by any stretch 
be called qualified to occupy a first rate professorial chair’.
Interestingly, for Anstey, familiarity with the subject matter was secondary to a sense 
for method and general theory. O f course, wrote Anstey, a European scholar ‘would 
have to make it his first business out here at once to familiarize himself with Indian 
life...But I emphatically hold that if you have the right type of man practising the right 
method, temporary unfamiliarity with his environment will prove a quite secondary 
consideration. Were it not so, there would, as a matter of fact, be no science of 
sociology in existence’.
The idea of sociological method as a universal grammar, applicable to various social 
contexts, was at the core of the discipline. The question now was what was more 
important, a deep knowledge of those social facts, or a deep knowledge of the methods 
through which they could be ascertained and made known? The University Senate had 
been quite clear on the issue. Indian students should go for training to England, rather 
than having young English lecturers without knowledge about India sent to Bombay. 
Wrote Mann to Geddes, ‘[o]ur people won’t look at a European who does not already 
know India unless he is a man of established reputation’.311
The report, and Anstey’s minute of dissent, were forwarded for comment to Selby, the 
Bombay Government’s Director of Public Instruction. Selby agreed with the suggestion 
that the proposed School of Economics and Sociology should be linked to Bombay 
University directly, rather than to one of the smaller colleges existing in Bombay. But, 
the Director argued, with the increased prestige of the School, and more importantly 
with the kind of sociological and economic research conducted in the school, the need 
to tighten control on behalf of the Government increased.
He argued that the Government of Bombay must now make it clear that any 
appointments of professor, assistant professor, or secretary to the new School would
3,1 Univ.S.A. T-GED 9/1453. Private letter Mann to Geddes 9 July 1919.
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have to be sanctioned by the Government of Bombay. Such a procedure was never 
mentioned in Mann’s outline. But the Director noted that ‘[i]n view ...of the nature of 
the subjects which are likely to be studied and of their connection with important and 
far-reaching political and administrative problems I think it is essential that all 
appointments.. .in the school should be subject to the sanction of Government’.
Subject to minor changes, the Governor of Bombay approved the revised scheme in 
August 1918.313 Mann had suggested that Patrick Geddes be appointed to Professor of 
Sociology in Bombay. He wrote to Geddes that his proposal had been received 
positively, yet he worried that the ending of the War would see Geddes looking for new 
appointments in Europe.314 In fact, the University was very active in its attempts to get 
Geddes to Bombay. It invited him to come and deliver six lectures on “Western 
Universities, in their origins and developments, their decline and renewals”.315 Geddes 
declined to come to Bombay at an early date, due to outstanding work in Calcutta -  and 
then he left for Jerusalem.
Mann wrote again to Geddes telling him how anxious the University was to get him as 
its first professor of sociology. The University pleaded with Geddes to come to Bombay 
as early as possible to get things started. In fact, Mann wrote, the University Syndicate 
was so interested in seeing Geddes return to India as soon as possible that they ‘would 
be prepared to entertain at least any proposal [Geddes] may make on the subject’. 316
Geddes put forward his conditions to Percy Anstey, the Principal of the University. The 
conditions stated by Geddes implied that he would only be in Bombay between 
November and March each year of his contract. Moreover, the contract would present 
him ‘with liberty to him during that period to do extraneous work which does not 
interfere with his university duties’.317 Anstey found the conditions acceptable, and he 
moved in the University Senate that Geddes be appointed as Professor of Sociology.
312 M.S.A. E.D. Compilation 360 o f 1918. Government unofficial note no. M-79 13 May 1918.
313 M.S.A. E.D. Compilation 360 o f 1919. Letter no. 4757 U.B. to secretary G.B. E.D. 5 
December 1918.
314 Univ.S.A. T-GED 9/1426. Private letter Mann to Geddes 5 January 1919.
315 Univ.S.A. T-GED 9/1432. Private letter Dastur to Geddes 11 February 1919.
316 Univ.S.A. T-GED 9/1438. Private letter Mann to Geddes 2 May 1919.
317 M.S.A. E.D. Compilation 360 o f 1919. Departmental note [n.d].
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The day after the meeting of the University Senate, Anstey wrote to Geddes that in his 
speech for the members of the Senate, Anstey had described Geddes’s concepts of 
applied sociology, of city design, Geddes’s practical work in Jerusalem, and his idea 
about civics. Anstey had been much helped by quoting from the spring issue of the 
Sociological Review, which favourably discussed Geddes’s work in Indore. Anstey had 
put before the Senate that both the University and the city of Bombay -  ‘supreme 
example as it is of the total absence of rational forethought and co-ordination’ -  would 
benefit widely by Geddes’s approach to applied sociology.318
Consequently -  as recommended by Mann, Anstey, and then the Bombay University -  
Patrick Geddes was to be appointed as Professor of Sociology, with effect from 1 
August 1919, subject to the Government of Bombay’s approval. After trouble finding 
transport from Port Said, Geddes took up his duties as Head of the Department of 
Sociology and Civics, within the Royal Institute of Science in Bombay, by the very end 
of 1919.319
4.2.5. The m arginalisation of abstract sociology
It is hard to say exactly how Geddes came to influence intellectual and governing circles 
in Bombay. There are few concrete examples that proves his influence over individuals 
or institutional structures. Geddes’s initial hopes to engage students and to conduct wide 
surveys of the city and region were never fulfilled. As Meller points out, he had relied 
on the prospects of finding an Indian assistant who could cany out much of his work.320
One example where he did exercise some influence, however, is provided from the 
work of the Improvement Trust of the City of Allahabad in the Bombay Presidency. 
Geddes had made no secret of his lack of enthusiasm for the replication of urban 
Improvement Trusts into the context of India. Geddes was particularly critical of the 
Edinburgh Improvement Trust, which had been carrying out work in Edinburgh 
between 1867-89. British Improvement Trusts had been set up in order to transform and
318 Univ.S.A. T-GED 9/1456. Private letter Anstey to Geddes 24 July 1919.
319 M.S.A. E.D. Compilation 360 of 1920. Letter no. 4816 Registrar U.B. 17 December 1919.
320 Meller, 1993, 223-227.
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sanitise urban landscapes. Their focus had been to broaden streets, ventilate houses, and 
to tear down insanitary buildings. But the Improvement Trusts had largely disregarded 
conditions of life.
Jagenath Pd.Srivastava, an official of the Allahabad Improvement Trust, wrote to 
Geddes to describe in detail how he conducted social surveys in accordance with 
guidance given in Geddes’s sociological work. Pd.Srivastava had previously worked on 
a research project with Stanley Jevons at the University of Allahabad, but was now 
appointed special officer for ‘civic survey and housing’ in the ‘Department of Civic 
Survey’ of the Allahabad Improvement Trust. In his survey Pd.Srivastava studied the 
‘population’ according to its: movement, distribution of occupation, health (birth rate, 
death rate, areas specially affected by epidemics, areas of special poverty, etc.), density, 
distribution of well being (family conditions, etc.), and education. The survey was to be 
included in the town planning schemes that would later become implemented in 
Allahabad.321
Nonetheless, most of Geddes’s wide-ranging plans came to nought. He had made 
attempts to connect sociological studies at Bombay University with other sociological 
departments in Paris, Brussels and London. He even asked Lewis Mumford to help him 
investigate whether The New School in New York would be interested in the exchange 
of students and staff.322 This idea failed.
Geddes also had high hopes to integrate the University and the city surrounding it. By 
diffusing knowledge produced within Bombay University, he assumed that actual 
reform could come about. The Government of Bombay and the Municipality initially 
saw the benefits of the idea. By the end of 1921, after recently attending the Conference 
of Universities of the Empire in Oxford, Geddes wrote to the Registrar of Bombay 
University proposing the constitution of a committee including ‘representative citizens 
as well as members of the governing and teaching body of the university’. The 
Committee should aim at considering practical areas of fruitful collaboration between
323the University of Bombay and the city of Bombay, Geddes suggested.
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The Committee was constituted and its results greatly anticipated. However, due to 
Geddes’s frequent absence, the Committee worked slowly and, in fact, rarely met.324 It 
initially tried to channel its work towards the new schemes of the Bombay Development 
Department. The Committee drew a list, where academic subjects of the university were
* 3 25related to the work of the Development and Housing schemes in Bombay City.
Geddes pointed out that the University, in collaboration with the city of Bombay and the 
business community, could help energise a society of ‘discontented and unhealthy 
population with low outlook’. In fact he argued:
the University is called upon to lead in the spread of 
knowledge into new fields, in the actual increase of 
knowledge that is necessary to development, and in 
the creation of that bond between those who are 
pressing forward in the mutual development of the 
city and country, and those who insist that material 
development must be accompanied, at least to the 
same extent by moral, intellectual and aesthetic
3 2 6progress.
But these plans also failed. Geddes’s ideas were too ‘aloof for Bombay businessmen 
and colonial administrators, wrote Harold Mann.327
In the latter part of Geddes’s tenure, influential Bombay citizens began to question the 
work of the School of Economics and Sociology. Two influential men of business in 
Bombay, P.A. Wadia and Lakshmidas Raowjee Tairsee, wrote to the Times o f In d ia 2* 
and to the Bombay Chronicle respectively329.
324 Univ.S.A. T-GED 12/1/213. [N.d], ‘Note to Committee members o f the Committee on 
Collaboration Between the City and the University’.
325 Univ.S.A. T-GED 12/1/208. F. Dastur. [n.d.] ‘The Committee on Collaboration Between the 
Bombay University and the Bombay City. Agenda o f the meeting o f the committee 9 February 
1923’.
326 Univ.S.A. T-GED 12/2/451. Memorandum Committee on Collaboration between the 
Bombay University and the Bombay City, [n.d.]
327 Univ.S.A. T-GED 9/1539. Private letter M ann to Geddes September 17 1922.
328 Univ.S.A. T-GED 12/2/360. Wadia, P.A. (1923 14 September) ‘Readers V iew s’ -  Bombay 
University -  Post-Graduate Studies’. Times o f  India.
329 Univ.S.A. T-GED 12/3/6314. Raowjee Tairsee, L. (1923 25 April) ‘School of Sociology and 
Economics’. Bombay Chronicle.
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While Lakshmidas blamed particularities in Geddes’s contract for his failure in 
Bombay, Wadia levelled a more comprehensive and devastating critique. Citing an 
acknowledgement made by H.H. Mami that the School had yet to live up to its 
expectation, Wadia advocated either closing it down or cutting its budget into a 
manageable size. Wadia pointed out that there had been a lack of coordination between 
the Department of Economics and the Department of Sociology, and this lack of 
coordination produced mistrust within the School. Sociologists were aloof with their 
concepts of “bio-technics” and “etho-polity”, Wadia concluded. The Government of 
Bombay worried about these views. The Government of Bombay wrote to the university 
and requested a full report on the School and its work.330
These comments, and the Government of Bombay’s reaction, reflect how Patrick 
Geddes was being increasingly marginalised in Bombay. He left Bombay in 1924 
without managing to alter how his sociology was viewed. Geddes interest in theoretical, 
or abstract, sociology put him at odds with both the Government of Bombay, and the 
business community. For them sociological knowledge needed to be applicable, ready 
to use, in lines of business or administration. Ultimately neither the government, nor the 
business community, would assess Geddes’s tenure as a success. Geddes’s 
marginalisation reflects the ways in which abstract social science -  in this case 
sociology -  had no place within a colonial context.
The University’s close proximity to the colonial administration limited the prospects of 
the development of sociological knowledge that was not solely for the purpose of 
administrative, or business utility. The administration had nourished high hopes for the 
Department of Sociology and Civics of bringing it useful information about local social 
conditions and economic life.
In order for sociology to function as a technology of government, as Prakash put it in 
the introduction to this chapter, social science could not be as abstract as Geddes 
presented it. Administrators in Bombay had clearly not worked towards the 
establishment of sociological research for the sake of general advancement of 
knowledge and academic debate; they looked for tangible results ready for integration 
into local projects. As Prakash suggests with reference to the British Raj: ‘[wjhile
330 Univ.S.A. T-GED 12/3/63/6. Letter no. 1303-2095-E. Ziman to Dastur 25 May 1923.
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recognising that science was primarily concerned with theoretical discoveries, they 
wished to use it to yield practical knowledge and techniques’.331 For sociology to enable 
efficient government, and for it to contribute to the actual running of the Presidency, it 
needed to provide administrators with actionable knowledge. In the next section of this 
chapter I will consider how this was being done.
4.3. Applied sociology in colonial Bombay: coming to know 
6the social5
Above I discussed how sociology as a discipline consolidated in Britain and was taken 
up in the Bombay Presidency. Growing local pressure and deteriorating conditions of 
life made the colonial administration look to the prospects of sociology. The idea that 
the state needed to tend to the side effects of capitalism, as well as cater for the well­
being of its subjects, expanded the colonial administrations bio-political scope. 
Sociology, administrators thought, would help them to come to know the newly 
conceptualised terrain of the social; sociology became both fashionable and useful in the 
eyes of administrators. Sociology, however, could only work for the administration in 
an applied form -  abstract sociology had no place in the colonial context.
Below I will further detail how both sociological method, and sociology as a body of 
knowledge, were put to work in Bombay. In the following section we will see how 
sociological methods were utilised by the colonial administration in its attempts to 
comprehend social conditions in the Presidency. Of course, there were plenty of data on 
social problems in the Bombay Presidency to be found in late nineteenth-century 
official records. But with the increasing social interest of the colonial state, and the 
urgent need to grasp social realities in colonial India, sociology began to influence how 
the colonial administration collected data and accumulated knowledge. As I will point 
out, during the time here under review, traditional survey methods were partly redefined 
and given an explicit social character.
331 Prakash, 1999, 170.
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This new form of reporting worked in ways of ‘revealing’ social and human conditions 
in Bombay. Through the scope of the new kind of surveys emerging during the first 
quarter of the twentieth century helped to delineate the social domain, and turn it to an 
object of social intervention. Surveys helped define the social as a resource to develop, 
as well as source of potential discontent.
4.3.1. The traditional ‘survey’ in India reinscribed into the social domain
Beginning in 1871 the Census became a central tool in mapping the whereabouts of the 
subjects of the Raj, and the conditions under which they lived. Every tenth year a new 
census would be conducted on an all-India level. The Census painted with broad strokes 
various aspects of life and society in colonial India. Local colonial administrations also 
gathered and published information through Local and District Gazetteers. These were 
complemented by the Imperial Gazetteer, which first appeared in 1881.
Trained scientists rarely contributed to this series of official documentations. Instead, 
they were placed under the Indian Civil Service; ordinary administrators earned out the 
work. Censuses and the Gazetteers provided a wealth of information, although parts of 
their accuracy were questionable. Bernhard S. Cohn describes how the systematic 
surveying made colonial society known to administrators, and how surveys categorised, 
and simultaneously attached political meaning to, various discreete phenomena of 
eveiyday life in colonial India.332
Actual ‘surveys’ were initially conducted with military objectives. Their focus was 
either trigometrical, topographical or revenue-enhancing. In 1878 the three themes were 
brought into one organisation. The timing was significant: as I pointed out in chapter 
two, the period was dominated by revenue-enhancing interventions, and the accent of 
the survey was increasingly put on information that could meet that end. During the
332 Cohn, 1996, 7-8.
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1880s and 90s, Kumar points out, 50 per cent of those employed to carry out
333government surveys were working with surveys carried out for revenue purposes.
The focus on revenue enhancement did not, however, reduce the political dimensions of 
the survey. David Arnold suggests suiveys ‘subordinated science to an ultimately 
political understanding of India and an administrator’s sense of what constituted 
necessary knowledge’.334
If surveys and censuses were main the sources of social knowledge, there were plenty of 
other sources as well. Municipal health- and sanitation officers produced detailed 
statistics on rates of birth and death, police records describe riots from various points of 
view, and departmental annual reports and returns speak of conditions under which 
people lived and laboured. Campaigns against malaria, famine relief, flooding 
assistance and other particular interventions were followed by report-producing 
committees and commissions, where each and every report includes a wealth of 
information about conditions of life.
During the first decades of the twentieth century, however, a new style of reporting on 
conditions of life bears witness to the strong influence the invention of the social in 
imperialism had on governmental practices in India. At this time there emerged a form 
of reporting that investigated social problems in themselves — that is, exactly in their 
capacity of being ‘social’. This reporting was not contingent of, or extensions to, 
investigations into natural calamities or disease. It looked into a new terrain of human 
existence, a new dimension of life: the social for its own sake. This form of social 
reporting takes its cue explicitly from contemporary sociological method; it refers to 
those methods and places itself within a longer tradition of social studies. The social 
survey attempted to investigate a wide range of social issues -  for example housing, 
education, and sanitation -  simultaneously and in a holistic manner.
For the first time, British colonial administrators and their Indian colleagues began to 
report on social issues placed within a distinct and integrated social space. The reporting
333 Kumar, 1997, 75.
334 Arnold, 2000, 131.
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discussed here delineated that social space, and outlined problems brought to that space 
by modern industrialism. And for a variety of reasons, it attaches a sense of urgency for 
the resolution of those problems.
Reporting on social issues followed, at this time, a certain pattern of almost standardised 
tabulations and inclusion of ethnographic detail. Household budgets, debt levels, 
conditions of housing, food prices and family income -  all packaged along with 
descriptions of the home- and work-lives of workers and the middle classes. And here, 
within this compiled data of social-economic relations, officials claimed, lay the 
prospect of welfare and progress, and the risk of discontent.
The scope of the ‘social survey’ conducted by Arthur Edward Mirams, consultant 
surveyor to the Government of Bombay, on behalf of the Indian Industrial Commission, 
was wide. It covered almost all aspects of life in an industrial city. Mirams followed the 
format of similar studies made in industrial Britain. He submitted his memorandum and 
was called to give oral evidence in late November 1917, when the Commission stopped 
over in Bombay.
While Mirams’s oral evidence concentrated on the issue of housing of workers, which 
he most ‘emphatically’ found the most important area of reform, his written evidence
335was more comprehensive. For A.E. Mirams the ‘improvement of industry’ was 
intertwined with the ‘improvement of labour’. For industry to develop, he asserted, the 
wage-earning classes had also to develop socially. However, Mirams was at pains to 
suggest that the ‘improvement of the employee for his own sake’ is a ‘highly important’ 
topic in itself. Although Mirams explicitly hoped that sociologists, as well as local 
authorities, would investigate further into the matters brought up in his survey, his is an 
account narrating the social conditions of the city through methods of contemporary 
sociologists.
A.E. Mirams used his social survey to argue that solving social problems would 
increase the industrial output of the population, enhance progress, and stabilise 
neighbourhoods and social structures. He was not alone in his assumptions, as we shall
335 Government o f India (1918) Report o f  the Indian Industrial Commission. Written and Oral 
Evidence. Mirams, A.E. oral evidence 23 November 1917, 369.
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see in chapter five: officials and influential sections of public opinion alike shared them. 
Witnesses before the Indian Industrial Commission argued that, for example, better 
housing would keep workers at home rather than hanging out on the streets after work; 
others suggested that the rise of Japan as an industrial nation was caused by how Japan 
had managed to reform its system of education.
Indeed, Mirams wrote in order to convince his colleagues in the Bombay Presidency 
and members of the Industrial Commission that contemporary social conditions had an 
undeniable effect on the population. Mirams wrote in his survey that he was:
convinced that the manner in which the Industrial 
workers live in India today causes.. .lack of interest in 
public affairs, loss of industrial efficiency, bad 
training and development of children, as well as 
moral and mental delinquency and deficiency, 
especially among the young.336
Mirams’s survey showed how living and working conditions for sections of society, 
especially the Indian middle and working classes, were abysmal. By studying social- 
economic indicators such as household budgets and levels of debt, Mirams pointed out 
that when coming to Bombay, workers and artisans incurred debts; in 1914-15, 80 per 
cent of the mill workers were indebted.337 The monthly earnings for a whole family 
were just under 26 rupees a month, and of this amount 22 rupees were, in average, spent 
on food and everyday necessities. Less that four rupees were left for occasional 
expenses such as medical help and clothing.338 The main social problem, and the most 
pressing area of reform, suggested Mirams, was that of housing.
The survey neatly played into administrators’ growing anxiety about the future 
industrial progress of the Presidency. As officials better came to know the conditions 
under which workers, artisans, and also the lower-middle classes lived their lives 
outside of the factories, they began to argue that living conditions slowed industrial
JJb Mirams, 1916b, 8.
337 Government o f India (1918) Report o f  the Indian Industrial Commission. Written and Oral 
Evidence. Mirams A.E. (1916) Memorandum of Evidence for the Indian Industrial Commission 
1916-17, 22.
338 Ibid., 2, 12, Appendix F.
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progress.339 Were these conditions not ameliorated, then, other reforms to increase 
industrial productivity would have no real impact.340 In fact, it was suggested that with 
the continuation of present conditions of living, other reforms could become contra- 
productive. Mirams, on his part, hoped that his study would help ‘emphasise...the 
correlation of Housing, Education and Recreation’.341 It seemed to him that various 
social issues were clearly interlinked, and must be presented within the same 
investigation.
Following the main stream of contemporary sociology, Mirams’s survey did not lend 
support to purely biological and deterministic explanations of poor health, poverty, and 
ignorance. Instead, he positions himself in between sociological and biological 
explanations, in that he stressed the interaction between populations and their 
environment as a decisive factor for progress. The state could act on both the population 
and the environment, Mirams indicated. While moral problems of the population were 
more difficult to address, perceived social problems could be more easily remedied 
through active state policy.
In an outburst of optimism, A.E. Mirams wrote in his survey of Bombay that most of 
the problems facing the city were rooted in poverty. And, he says,
[pjoverty is remediable. Economists of the highest 
authority do not subscribe to the belief that want is a 
biological necessity or inseparable from social 
conditions, although very much bound up with and 
affected by them...Amelioration is a question of 
national policy, social wisdom, sound economics and 
common sense.342
As a result, the ‘remedy’ to various kinds of alleged social problems now became 
‘[cjhange the environment’.343 Since it was the environment and not the individual that
339 M.S.A. G.B. General Department [G.D.] Compilation no. 1258. Letter no. 628 12 August 
1920.
340 M.S. A. Proceedings o f the Indian Legislative Council o f 1920. Holland, T. Proceedings o f 19 
February 1920, 817.
341 Mirams, 1916, 19.
342 Ibid., 13.
343 Ibid., 21.
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needed change, the government must focus now on how to carry out technical and 
combined interventions aimed at both populations and their environments, Mirams 
argued before the Industrial Commission.
A couple of years after Mirams submitted his memorandum, Harold Hart Mann wrote 
his report of the Sakchi industrial estate in Jamshedpur, where Tata had set up an 
expanding iron and steel enterprise. The plant proved significant for nationalist 
imaginations; Gandhi went here to praise the harmonious relations between labour and 
capital. Later, it also had a great impact on the emerging industrial sector of independent 
India. Interestingly, the industrial estate at Jamshedpur was founded upon an iron ore 
that geologist Pramatha Nath Bose located when he went into service of the Maharaja of 
Mayurbhanj, after being sidestepped for promotion by Thomas Holland in the 
Geological Survey in Bengal.344
Mann had been called upon to lead a survey of the social conditions and social welfare 
provisions in this expanding industrial town. He arrived in late September 1918 and 
stayed for one and a half months. At the time of his arrival, Sakchi had grown out of 
proportion, Maim pointed out. Amenities and infrastructure on the industrial estate had 
originally been developed for a population of around 20,000 people. In 1918, a decade 
after its inception, more than 100,000 were dependent on the works of the estate, or its 
dependencies. Maim, who we saw earlier had been involved in the work of Seebohm 
Rowntree and was later involved in the Sociological Society, still persisted in his 
sociological methodology. It might also be recalled how Mann, who had been 
influenced by Patrick Geddes, had been most eager to establish a sociological 
department at the University of Bombay. Mann was now the principal of the 
Agricultural College in Poona in the Bombay Presidency, and would soon become 
Director of Agriculture in Bombay.
In his study of Sakchi, Mann covered a similar wide range of social topics as Mirams 
had done in his memorandum submitted to the Industrial Commission. Mann brought to 
the survey his intimate knowledge of conditions in Bombay, and his keen sociological 
interest. His final ‘Report on Investigations with regards to Social Welfare Work at 
Jamshedpur’ was included in the ‘Jamshedpur Social Welfare Series’, along with a 
detailed report on town planning. The study had the size of a small monograph and
344 Arnold, 2000, 139.
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covered 120 pages. Mann’s report was published in January 1919 and classified as 
'strictly confidential’.345 In the report Mann describes in great detail the existing social 
provisions at the Sakchi industrial estate. He also gives recommendations regarding how 
a social welfare organisation could be further developed, in order to secure that the 
estate shapes into one ‘where a healthy, decent, happy, and contended population can 
continue to exist’.346 As was Mirams’s, Mann’s study is firmly placed within an 
emerging tradition of social surveys. It heavily draws on contemporary sociological 
methods, as well as categorisations.
The study investigates household budgets for various groups working in Sakchi. Mann 
meticulously lists food items and their prices, and amends quantity and expenditure 
according to ethnicity and occupation. An ‘Aboriginal Coolie’ and his family, a ‘United 
Provinces Hindu’, or ‘Bengalis of the Artisan Class’, all have their budgets broken 
down and analysed. Mann discusses the drinking habits of various sections of the 
inhabitants under the heading ‘Moral Tone of the Town’. With the ‘risk of appearing to 
be a fanatic’, Mann suggests the abolition of drinking shops on the estate. It would 
improve the conditions in the town, he insists, and would help foster a sense community 
in Sakchi.
The survey discusses the alarmingly high frequency of discharge and complaints about 
bribes to secure works at the plants. Indian labour has a reputation of being 
‘notoriously’ unstable, Mann points out, but a secure work environment would raise the 
efficiency of the plant.347 He then discusses health facilities, facilities for women and 
children, ‘Social Welfare in the Works’, education levels, housing conditions, public 
amenities -  in short, almost all areas conceived of as important dimensions of social life 
are studied and followed up for conclusions.
Indeed, Mann himself found that even questions about sewage, sewage disposal, and the 
supply of goods to the town had to be considered ‘from the social point of view’.348 He 
concluded, ‘I am taking...social welfare work as including the interests of the workers 
in every aspect. Its object is to endeavour to make Sakchi a healthy, happy home for all
345 Univ.S.A. T-GED 23/1/20.2. Mann, H. H. (1919) Report on the Investigations with regard to 
Social Welfare Work at Jamshedpur. Poona.
346 Ibid., 2.
347 Ibid., 100.
348 Ibid., 1.
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those who live at the place, - both while working and while at leisure’.349 An industrial 
town like the Sakchi estate must continuously be monitored from a sociological 
perspective, Mann asserted. A future social welfare organisation, he mentions, should 
include ‘social workers’ contributing to the welfare of the population. Social workers 
would enable future welfare provisions by carrying out ‘actual careful scientific
*3 C A
inquiries’ into conditions of work and leisure.
Between his article in Sociological Papers and his study of Sakchi, Mann had spent 
more than 15 years within the wider circles of colonial government in Bombay. Yet 
clearly, he was consistent in his way of conducting social surveys. He, along with others 
within the governing circles, saw the benefit of including sociology into governmental 
practice.
This approach was further entrenched and applied on a wider scale through the 
establishment of the Government of Bombay Labour Office. The Labour Office, under 
G. Findlay Shirras ~ former Director of Statistics with the Government of India -  
carried out almost yearly studies into social and economic conditions of the Presidency 
from the early 1920s.351 In the radicalised climate in Bombay after the First World War, 
the Labour Office began studying a wide range of aspects of the lives of workers in 
different sectors, artisans, and the middle classes.
Under Shirras’s leadership, the Bombay Labour Office began with studies of wages and 
working hours of those employed in the cotton mill industry. The impulse to cany out 
those studies came from the mill owners, as well as from the Government of Bombay. 
The studies provided by the Labour Office helped industrialist keep track of demands 
on wage levels. Studies into the lives of sections of colonial society helped the 
Government as well, in its attempts to grasp the conditions of workers and the middle 
classes.352 Harold Mann himself later collaborated with the Labour Office in a study of 
wages within the agriculture sector in the Presidency. The study was ambitious in that it 
attempted to cover the annual changes in agricultural wages over two decades.
349 Ibid., 118.
350 Ibid., 93.
351 Government o f Bombay. Shirras, G. F. (1923) Report on an Enquiry into the Wages and  
Hours o f  Labour in the Cotton M ill Industry; (1924) Report on an Enquiry into Agricultural
Wages in the Bombay Presidency:; —. (1925) Report on an Enquiry into the Wages and Hours o f  
Labour in the Cotton M ill Industry in August 1923.
352 Shirras, 1923, 1.
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Shirras explained how he had been reminded by members of the legislative Council in 
Bombay that the International Labour Office collected data on labourers within the 
agricultural sector, and the Imperial Statistical Conference had called attention to that 
issue as well.353 Although Shirras carefully attended to ethnographic detail, the 
organising categories used in the study were strictly social-economic and occupational.
Shirras and the Labour Office also published reports looking into working-class family 
budgets in Bombay City, where statistics were compiled to describe general social 
conditions of various sections of the labour force. The study was a success among 
influential circles in Bombay, and it was decided in 1923 to follow it up with an enquiry 
into ‘sociological and economic’ subjects concerning the middle classes.354 By the late 
1920s, the Labour Office began probing into working- and middle-class unemployment.
The timing of the inception of research under the Bombay Labour Office was 
significant. The Labour Office began to submit its information to the Government of 
Bombay and the Government of India, as well as to the International Labour Office, at a 
period of growing industrial unrest. I mentioned earlier how the period from 1918 
onwards saw increased social tension, waves of strikes and a growing politicisation of 
trade unions.
The investigations conducted by the Labour Office not only exposed interesting data 
concerning life in contemporary Bombay, they depicted the ways in which workers and 
the middle classes lived their lives. For the Government of Bombay, this was valuable 
information. The radicalisation of the post-war environment made it important for the 
administration to understand what moved the working and middle classes. Shirras stated 
this purpose plainly in his introduction to his enquiry into the wages and working hours 
in the cotton mill industry. ‘In short’ he wrote:
the necessity of full and accurate statistics of current 
wages has been clearly shown during periods of 
industrial unrest in this Presidency and elsewhere.
353 Shirras, 1924, 1.
354 M.S.A. Government o f  Bombay. Finance Department [F.D.] File 5781 (ii) o f 1927. 
Government o f Bombay Labour Office (1927) Report on an enquiry into the middle class fam ily  
budgets in Bombay City, 1924.
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This information is in the interest of those directly 
connected with labour questions (whether as 
employers’ or workers’ leaders), and of economists, 
historians, and politicians. The publication of this 
knowledge simplifies labour problems... This 
information is of a kind that can best be collected 
through official channels, and it is also important that 
it should be published by an impartial and 
authoritative organisation such as a Government 
Department.355
However, as is apparent from the above quote, with die establishing of a Labour Office, 
government-sponsored social surveys of the Presidency narrowed down. From the mid 
1920s labour related issues were of primary concern; it was the ‘labour problem’, rather 
than the ‘social problem’, that now begged investigation.
The ways in which applied sociology both helped to delineate and reveal the new 
terrain of the social, and turn it into an area of administrative concern, was 
unprecedented in Bombay. Social surveys, this new way of reporting on the conditions 
of life, and of the social as a distinct space, proved their utility to the colonial 
administration. Reinscribing the traditional survey into the newly conceptualised social 
domain helped administrators to come to know that domain, in partly new ways. As the 
social domain grew in importance, so did the command of methods to study it. The 
ways in which sociological methods were universalised tell of how sociologists and 
local colonial officials thought of modem industrial society as having similar 
characterstics wherever it emerged. Sociology, in its applied form, produced a kind of 
action-oriented knowledge colonial administrators thought they needed when dealing 
with the new realities they were facing.
355 Government o f Bombay. G. Findlay Shirras (1922) Report on an enquiry into the wages and 
hours o f  labour in the cotton mill industiy. Bombay, 2-3.
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4.4. Conclusion
The emergence of modem industrial society brought to the imperial scientific 
community a sense of bewilderment; to British politicians and local colonial 
administrators it brought anxiety. Above, I have discussed that combination. While 
social scientists asked what characterised life in industrial towns and how could these 
new realities be studied, predicted and compared, domestic bureaucrats and colonial 
officials asked: what were the effects on market and polity of the perceived 
deterioration in modem industrial society?
I discussed how by the final decades of the nineteenth century there were calls for a 
science of modem society that would synthesise findings of biologists, anthropologists, 
and philosophers. By the end of the nineteenth centuiy, British sociology consolidated 
as a discipline in its own merit, rather than, as before, forming a fringe part of other 
disciplines. Sociology became central to progressive policy discourse in Britain. It 
influenced greater social focus of the state and played an important role in the 
emergence of social liberalism. Many leading social liberal politicians and thinkers took 
active an part in sociological debates.
A new forum for such debate was the Sociological Society in London. I pointed out that 
the Society’s transactions from 1904-7 reveal two constitutive debates within sociology 
of the time: first, the question of whether biological or social-economic explanations 
took precedence in explanations of social change. A section of active sociologists 
argued for eugenics as a more plausible and effective determination of social 
development. Yet those who denounced the racial argument and relied on social- 
economic explanations in social change were strong within the Society.
Second, I stressed the emergence of a debate over the issue whether sociology ought to 
be abstract and theoretical, or applied and practical. This debate proved most important, 
and I showed how it was later carried into the colonial context of Bombay. Sociologists 
arguing for sociology as applied found the discipline most valuable to progressive 
politics in its attempt to tend to conditions of modem life. Politicians and, as I showed, 
colonial administrators in, for example Bombay, found that sociological methods 
enabled them to approach reality in new ways. Sociology could provide knowledge that
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would, in turn, feed into the expanding social concern and bio-political scope of 
colonial policy.
I used the debate between 1912-19 surrounding the establishment of a School of 
Economics and Sociology in Bombay to exemplify the growing interest in the discipline 
of sociology among colonial officials. They hoped to establish a department of 
sociology where actual research into sociological questions could be conducted, which 
would, in turn, help them come to know the issues that mobilised urban Indian society. 
Those colonial officials hoped to hire prominent British sociologists. Knowledge about 
India was not of any great importance, they argued. What was important was a 
command over sociological method. Local administrators recruited professor Patrick 
Geddes, well known in Britain and India for his sociological work.
Yet, I pointed out, social science in a colonial situation acted within strict confines. 
Social science was always measured against its utility for government. Research into 
life on the Subcontinent had previously been conducted by administrators. There were 
plenty of data on conditions of life in colonial India provided by censuses or 
administrative reports. I argued, however, that the growing influence of sociology 
helped reinscribe the traditional survey into the social domain. Now a new kind of 
reporting emerged, which took the social as its referent object.
When formalised into a university subject, sociology was institutionalised within close 
proximity of the colonial state: appointments, allowances, etc. had to be run by the local 
government. The very ways in which social surveys delineated the social, and made it 
known to colonial officials, are revealing for the positive view of science of the time. 
Science brought certainty to government, and it helped reduce the factor of chance- 
making; it rationalised government.
The ways in which abstract sociology was pushed to the side lines, ultimately shown in 
the context of Bombay through the marginalisation of Geddes’s sociology, are 
significant. The colonial administration only had use for applied sociology that would 
help them reveal colonial society: they turned sociology into a technology of 
government. By providing social experience to colonial government, sociological 
method would contribute to its new social approach.
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5. Social imperialism projected in Bombay 1895-1925
Before I venture to describe the ways in which social imperialism was projected in the 
Bombay Presidency, a brief recollection of parts of my discussion so far will help 
situate this chapter. By the turn of the twentieth century, focus had shifted concerning 
what kind of projects colonial administrations privileged within growing industrial 
centres of British India. Now, justifications of colonial rule drew less on large symbolic, 
but mostly ineffective, gestures of moral reform that had marked early nineteenth- 
century British Empire. Gone was Macaulay’s slant to educational reform of Indian 
minds and character, or ineffective campaigns against thuggery or ‘suttee’. Large 
revenue-enhancing infrastructure interventions of the second half of the nineteenth 
century slowed down, although interventions into specific sectors of the economy, for 
example in agriculture, continued.
Instead, more comprehensive approaches to the government of society were elaborated. 
New forms of bio-political interventions aimed at conditions of life on aggregate levels 
of population or whole sections of society, and were hinged on state initiatives. I 
devoted chapters two and three to chart developments within nineteenth- and early 
twentieth-century British reformist ideology in Britain and empire, and related those 
developments to expanding bio-political concerns in imperialism.
I explicitly focused on the emergence of British social liberalism, and I then placed 
emerging social focus in imperialism in relation to that movement. I described how 
radical twentieth-century liberalism perceived contemporary society under pressure as 
the industrial system expanded, and how it saw in the social domain a location of 
progress as well as discontent. In order for society to advance, social liberals argued, the 
social domain had to be regulated and reformed. Within this conceptualisation, empire, 
liberals now argued, could function as a vehicle for dealing with social issues.
This movement within imperialism was further strengthened by its coupling with the 
newly established discipline of sociology. I described the ways in which sociology 
established itself in Britain and in India, and how sociology became applied in colonial 
governance in the Bombay Presidency. In Bombay, the administration institutionalised
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the production of social knowledge within the reach of the state. I suggested that 
sociology helped to enhance a social focus in governmental practice. I argued that 
colonial administrators utilised applied sociology as a means to reveal an integrated 
social domain.
5.1. A social turn in the government of the Presidency
In this chapter I will describe how social imperialism translated into actual colonial 
governance in Bombay. I will connect discussions from previous chapters with detailed 
descriptions of local planning and actual execution of local projects in the Bombay 
Presidency c. 1895-1925. Detailed description dramatises the ways in which the bio­
political concern of the colonial state, as well as its scope of action, expanded during the 
period here under review. Details show exactly how local administrators of the 
Presidency, on a day-to-day basis, became more inclined to discuss the social domain as 
an integrated and distinct space in need of management.
It will be further discussed below, but by the turn of the twentieth-century local 
administrators in Bombay increasingly worried over how they would manage society in 
order for it to. become more productive, conducive of progress, and less prone to dissent. 
Accordingly, I will present three cases of how the administration in Bombay planned 
and implemented projects with a view of intervening into the social domain in more 
comprehensive ways than before.
Historical circumstances, local forces and individuals, of course, shaped the ways in 
which social imperialism translated into local colonial administrative practices. The 
measures of early twentieth-century colonial administration, entangled, as they were, in 
the intricacies of everyday governance, came across as ciude and unnuanced. Yet I will 
show that social imperialism lent colonial administrators a set of new assumptions and 
concepts to work with, and it gave them a new socialised language, with which they 
could talk about their work.
The first case addresses sanitation and public health during a plague epidemic in the city 
of Karachi. I referred to this outbreak of plague earlier in the text, with reference to its
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ramification in Bombay City. The second case deals with the introduction of free and 
compulsory primary education in the Bombay Presidency. The third case looks into 
housing and town planning in the city of Bombay. These cases represent a periodisation 
of 30 years: c. 1895-1925.
In this chapter I discuss how these projects manifest important characteristics of 
expanding bio-political considerations internal to social imperialism. I will argue they 
do so in a very specific way: they expose where new limits were being drawn at this 
time between society, market, and state action concerning how to effectively tend to 
questions of welfare and conditions of life in Bombay. Among the amassed detail 
described below we will see the ways in which colonial governance in Bombay, 
influenced by social imperialism, turned social, and began to chalk out a bio-political 
space of state action.
I will suggest that debates over housing and town planning, as well as over primary 
education in Bombay, in different ways point towards how colonial officials 
encountered the limits of the self-sustaining capacity of markets and voluntarism, and, 
in extension, the limit of self-help. During the period here under review, it was no 
longer controversial to suggest that political power had to create the social conditions 
for markets to function.
In the case of the introduction of primary education in to the Presidency, this bio­
political shift was manifested through a rise of productivist arguments for education. 
The state, it was argued, had to intervene in order to educate urban labour, thus making 
it more efficient in ways a voluntary system could not. Poor housing conditions, on the 
other hand, showed with blunt clarity how markets failed to look to social problems 
that, in effect, threatened to disrupt economy and politics.
Epidemics, on the other hand, and in this case plague, illustrate how the colonial 
administration set the limits to possibilities of the social body to heal itself. The 
administration thus assigned itself the task of marking the limit of self-care. Plague 
meausres were early social interventions: the reaction to the spread the epidemic was 
often coercive, and lacked some of the more nuanced calculations made in relation to 
housing and education. Yet the ways in which the administration sought to handle the
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outbreak of plague are significant, as they ushered in a pronounced social focus in 
colonial government.
This process of expanding the scope of state action within the social domain did not 
happen without debate. In the intersection between political language, local pressures, 
and internal tensions, when actually implementing interventions the contradiction of 
social imperialism could be spotted. As we shall see below, to negotiate social-liberal 
ideas of universality to fit the need of local colonial administration was a complex and 
often contradictory intellectual effort, marked by both pragmatic and principled debate.
These negotiations, however, were not the subject of high politics of state; they were 
earned out on a decentralised level of governance: on the project level — the level of 
everyday governance. Here, questions about drawing new borders between state, society 
and market quickly dissolved into dealing with particular, yet interlinked, local social 
problems. On the project level, a most interesting space internal to imperial forms of 
government opens up: while dealing with mundane questions administrators had to 
remind themselves -  and they were frequently reminded by others — of exactly how 
much the colonial state could, might or ought to intervene into colonial society. Here, 
the actual balance between universal principles and colonial exceptionality was struck 
within an increasingly tested framework.
Although my intention is to explore the constitution and workings of social imperialism, 
and not the responses to it when imposed on Indian subjects, I believe it important to at 
least acknowledge the ways in which social interventions were met locally. So, while a 
full account of the various forms of resistance and response to social imperialism is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, I will, in the final section of this chapter, discuss two 
forms of responses occurring on the everyday level. I categorise these responses into 
two: spontaneous and mobilised. The first category of spontaneous responses is made 
up by instances of rejection of interventions functioning without ideological or 
organisational base, and primarily directed to rectify an immediate sense of harm or 
perceived injustice. The second category of mobilised responses relates to when people 
came together in organised and politically charged protests. In these cases, responses to 
social interventions often articulated into wider questions of nationalism or anti- 
Britishness.
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5.2. The limit of self-care: sanitation and plague, 
city of Karachi, 1896-1900
This section revisits an outbreak of epidemic bubonic plague in the city of Karachi, 
Sind, in the northern part of the Bombay Presidency, between 1896 and 1900.
I will place this specific instance of epidemic plague in Karachi — and the 
administration’s responses to it -  within the wider argument of this thesis. In its effort to 
halt the disease, the administration crossed and reworked previous boundaries in state- 
society relations. I am particularly interested in how the administration in times of crisis 
expanded its bio-political concern by stressing the limit to society’s ability to heal itself
— to self-care. I also look at what the records tell of how the colonial administration 
practically began to delineate the social domain and think of it holistically, and how it 
began to think of individual subjects as part of an aggregate ‘population’ -  a social body
-  in order to successfully combat the crisis.
Responses to the plague in Karachi were, however, early and acute forms of 
comprehensive and interlinked interventions at the beginning of the social turn. They 
show how colonial administrators grappled with exactly how to delineate the social; 
they found they lacked basic and sufficient knowledge about local social conditions. 
Officials began questioning their own ways of co-ordinating various interventions into 
society. When ultimately falling back on coercive measures of rule, administrators at the 
same time questioned the effectiveness of those measures. Yet during social crises of 
this magnitude, imperial bio-politics would set the limit to self-care: society, it was 
argued, was not in a position to cure itself of the plague epidemic.
In fact, the plague epidemic was on and off for an entire decade, causing death and 
disruption in the city. As has been described by Prashant Kidambi, outbreaks of plague 
in the Bombay Presidency took the administration by surprise, but made the 
administration reconsider the relationship between society, environment and disease.356 
These outbreaks, David Arnold points out with particular reference to Bombay City, 
panicked authorities for various reasons, and their occurrence triggered comprehensive
356 Kidmabi, P. (2005) ‘“An Infection o f Locality” : Plague, Pythogenesis and the Poor in 
Bombay, 1896-1905’. Urban History, 31 (2), 249-267.
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governmental interventions.357 Arnold focuses his study on how new and intrusive 
measures to combat plague borne out of the epidemic formed a colonial assault on the 
body, staged by government-sanctioned medical procedures. For Arnold, it is the body 
that is at the centre of analysis, and at the centre of colonial attention as the privileged 
site of intervention.
Prashant Kidambi, also focusing on Bombay City, instead points out how a section of 
the colonial administration in Bombay shifted attention from the body to the 
environment as the locus of disease. When taking this interest in the locality and 
environment into account, Kidambi argues, one is able to better tease out the subsequent 
colonial strategy of spatial reorganisation of the city.358
It is not entirely clear what caused this epidemic in Western India. It was indicated at 
the time that infested rats carried by ships from Hong Kong first entered the harbour of 
Bombay City, and that these rats later found their way onboard ships headed for Karachi 
and elsewhere. The disease had reached epidemic proportions in Hong Kong by the mid 
1890s. By the end of 1900 plague had caused approximately 400,000 deaths in India; by 
1921 estimated deaths due to plague had risen to 10 million.359
Local governments and the Government of India feared international ramifications of 
the epidemic. They worried it would spread to the Middle East, Europe, and even North 
America. The International Sanitary Conference in Venice in 1897 threatened to impose 
an embargo on British shipping. The threat was never realised. Yet, as a response, the 
British produced an Epidemic Disease Act, which was hastily put in place.
It was a far-reaching and coercive piece of legislation, Arnold notes. It authorised, 
among other things, compulsory hospitalisation of plague suspects, destruction of 
houses and infected property, and the banning of religious practices such as pilgrimages 
and fairs. As local resentment of intrusive measures grew in 1898-99, local governments 
in Western India opted for other ways of combating the disease.360
357 Arnold, D. (1987) ‘Touching the Body: Perspectives on the Indian Plague, 1896-1900’. In 
Guha, R. (Ed.) Subaltern Studies K Delhi: Oxford University Press India.
358 Kidambi, 2007, 49-51.
359 Arnold, 1993,200.
360 Arnold, 2000, 143.
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Facing opposition, sanitary awareness, rather than coercive plague measures, Arnold 
writes, became a new official line. On a local level, as we shall see, much remained the 
same in how plague measures were actually executed. Nonetheless, Arnold writes, the 
first years of plague in India proved significant for future colonial policy in several 
ways.
The outbreak of epidemic plague made authorities wary about the previous object of 
state medicine in India. The medical services in British India had up to then primarily 
served the military establishment, and the Anglo-Indian community. The occurrence of 
plague, however, caused an unprecedented sanitary and medical response from the Raj. 
Facing often violent public resentment towards those sanitary and medical interventions 
made government doubt the political wisdom of unleashing coercive measures. Local 
colonial administrations began to look for new ways to approach problems of 
sanitation.365
5.2.1. The infected social body: spread of plague in K arachi
A cook working in the home of a cloth merchant in the Bunder area of Karachi in the 
northern parts of the Presidency was reported to have suddenly fallen ill. He did so on 8 
December 1896. The same day, as his fever rose, the cook was moved by his friends to 
another house in the same area. While there, a Municipal Health Officer came to see 
him. Finding the case curious, the Health Officer went to see the Civil Surgeon at the 
Karachi Civil Hospital, in order to get further advice. At the hospital Dr. Braganza and 
Dr. Kaka labelled the case “certainly a very suspicious one”; the cook’s fever ran 
extraordinarily high, and by now his groin had swollen. Then, suddenly, the cook 
died.362 On 11 December 1896 a second case with similar symptoms was detected. This 
time a broker of the Khoja community was found ill in the crowded Old Town Quarters 
of Karachi. Friends of the broker noticed him coming to work as usual in the early hours 
of the day. However, at ten a clock he began to complain about fever. Soon afterwards
361 Arnold, 1993, 237.
362 Sindh Archives, Karachi [S.A.] Records o f  the Commissioner in Sind [R.C.S.] General 
Department [G.D.] (Plague). File no. 1, pt. 2 o f 1897. Letter no. G-932 o f 1897. Tahilram 
Khemchand to Gilles 10 February 1897.
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he too was dead.363 The following week Karachi saw more deaths following the same 
symptoms. And so, on 19 December 1896, H.C.L. Amim, then Deputy Sanitary 
Commissioner in Sind Registration District, wrote to the Government of Bombay that 
the symptoms by Tittle doubt were due to Bubonic Plague5.364 Ten days after the first 
case of death from plague was registered, Gilles, the Collector of Karachi, wrote to the 
Commissioner in Sind informing him that the Permanent Medical Board had 
pronounced ‘the plague to be epidemic in Karachi5.365
By the 24 January 1897, 600 deaths had been reported. Still, they had only occurred in 
certain areas of the City.366 Although the death toll initially was lower than expected, 
the situation was serious. Wingate, then acting commissioner in Sind, wrote to Gilles:
[pjeople should be warned that unless full 
cooperation is now given it will be necessary to resort 
to stringent measures for which they will have 
themselves to blame. The Collector will be good 
enough to impress upon the Municipality to inform 
the public of Karachi the great anxiety that the spread 
of Bubonic cases causes to the Government of India 
and to Governments abroad.367
Worried telegrams enquiring into the outbreak came in from Alexandria, Tehran, and 
from around British India. Plague, in a busy port city, brought out nightmarish scenarios 
for administrators around the empire.
363 S.A. R.C.S. G.D. (Plague). Box 7312, file no. 1, volume 1, pt. 1 o f 1897. Memorandum o f 
the Public Health Officer 12 December 1896.
364 S.A. R.C.S. G.D. (Plague). Box 7312, file no. 1, volume 1, pt. I, 1897. Letter Deputy 
Sanitary Commissioner Sind Registration District [Armin, H.C.L.] to Sanitary Commissioner 
Bombay 19 Dec 1896.
365 S.A. R.C.S. G.D. (Plague). Box 7312, file no. 1, volume 1, pt. 1, 1897. Letter the Collector o f 
Karachi to the Commissioner in Sind 21 December 1896.
366 S.A. R.C.S. G.D. (Plague). Box 7312, file no. 1, volume 1, pt. I o f 1897. Note by Director 
General, Indian Medical Service [Cleghorn, J.J on the outbreak o f bubonic plague in Karachi 2 
February 1897.
367 S.A. R.C.S. G.D. (Plague). Box 7312, file no. 1, volume 1, pt. 1 o f 1897. Memorandum. 
Acting Commissioner in Sind to Collector o f Karachi 10 Jan 1897.
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5.2.2. Containing the infected social body: the lim it o f self-care
As the epidemic spread, urgent measures were designed to contain the urban population 
— the infected social body. The period January to March 1897 was marked by intense 
activity on behalf of the administration and influential interest groups concerning what 
measures could be applied to counter plague in Karachi. In late January and early 
February, the Director General of the Indian Medical Services, Cleghom, went to 
Karachi and produced a note.368
After reiterating how the epidemic spread, Cleghom narrates information on basic 
conditions in the city available to him. Cleghom finds information sparse, bordering on 
insufficient. He approximates the population of Karachi at nearly 118,000. He describes 
how the city is divided into 31 wards, wherein 14 wards have been infected. Cleghom 
described the geography of the areas most infected, and found that most of the houses 
he visited were ‘quite unfit for human habitation’. He found that the rooms were 
‘overcrowded and the inmates lived in complete darkness’.369 Poor housing, he argues, 
is not helping coping with the epidemic. He suggests that out of 606 reported deaths, 
407 were reported from quarters like this. Until now, he suggest, the measures taken to 
combat the disease have been cleaning and disinfection of houses, and increased 
attention to the need for cleanliness.
On 11 1897 January the construction of 400 huts was commenced in order to replace 
housing for those bereft. In two weeks, about two weeks later 2,500-3,000 people had 
migrated to those huts, after initial protests. A civil officer, Cleghom writes, had been 
assigned to keep the population under ‘careful supervision’. Moreover, he suggests it:
appears to be necessary for the future safety of the city that 
all houses declared by the local medical authority to be unfit 
for human habitation, should be demolished and the ground 
acquired by the Municipality.
368 S.A. R.C.S. G.D. (Plague). Box 7312, file no. 1, volume 1, pt. 1 o f 1897. Note by Director 
General, Indian Medical Service, on the outbreak o f bubonic plague at Karachi 2 February 
1897.
369 Ibid., 392.
370 Ibid., 398.
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Cleghom concludes by pointing out that the arrangements to remove inhabitants to huts 
that had been made in Karachi will be closely watched elsewhere in India.371
Knowledge about conditions of life was lacking, found Cleghom. Age-old censuses 
seemed not precise enough for government to act upon. The Municipality attempted to 
gather information about the disease, but found it had neither skilled researchers nor a 
proper methodology to work with. Its rudimentary enquiries about the habits of the 
infected and so forth only caused alarm among inhabitants, Tahilram Kemchand -  the 
president of the Municipality -  wrote to the Collector of Karachi.372
The Municipality thus concentrated on palliative measures, and proceeded to expand the 
main local hospital with new rooms. But the hospital procedures were so detached from 
the sentiments of local communities that they lacked all credibility. Not a single patient 
showed up to take up a room, Tahilram wrote. And neither could the people at first be 
convinced to move to those segregation camps provided.
Problems in organisation that the Municipality faced when grappling with a social 
breakdown like this were all too obvious to Tahilram, and plague spread rapidly to other 
areas of Karachi. Soon, mortality was reported to be as high as 50 people a day. The 
commissioner in Sind found it necessary to strengthen the Municipal Executive. In 
October the Municipality in Bombay City had a boost of its powers.373 The Karachi 
Municipality had worked for increasing its powers for some time. Tahilram lobbied for, 
and formally requested, that the Commissioner made a notification under the Indian 
Epidemic Disease Act of 1897 that all persons in the Old Town quarters must vacate 
their houses within seven days.374
The Commissioner also stipulated new rules that would expand the reach of 
government: not only infected houses, but all houses in town, fell under the rules of
371 Ibid., 400.
372 S.A. R.C.S. G.D. (Plague). File no. 1, volume 1, pt. 1 o f 1897. Letter G932 o f 1897. 
Tahilram Kemchand to Gilles [Collector o f Karachi] 10 February 1897.
373 Arnold, 1993, 203.
374 S.A. R.C.S. G.D. (Plague). Box 7135, file no. 1, volume 2 o f 1897. Letter no. G 1111 o f 
1897. Tahilram Kemchand to W ingate 16 Feb 1897.
169
inspection.375 That is, authorities dealing with the plague epidemic could now enter any 
house in Karachi, at any hour, without producing particular search orders. The 
sanitation officer in Sind had already suggested that the health officer should divide 
infected districts into sub-divisions ‘as he pleases’ for purposes of containment and 
efficient supervision. Each subdivision ought to be observed by a Sub-divisional 
Inspector, wearing a special badge for recognition.376 Those and other servants of state 
were enabled to, at any time day or night, ‘inspect homes and localities in which any 
dangerous disease is reported or suspected to exist and to order destruction of any hut 
which by any medical practitioner was found infected’. Reasonable compensation might 
be paid to those who claimed it.377
As the disease continued to spread, the Surgeon Captain in Karachi, Borradaile, put 
forward new draconic ways to tackle it.378 He argued for compulsory notification of any 
suspected case of plague and the isolation of the sick. ‘I am aware of the strong feeling 
there is among almost all natives to this measure’, he says, ‘but I cannot help thinking 
that their resistance would soon give way before a firm attitude on the part of the 
authorities’.379 General measures to improve sanitation were necessary, but to improve 
conditions of the inhabitants would take too much time, he argued. Forced isolation was 
much more effective, wrote Borradaile. Moreover, he argued, healthy inhabitants need 
to be segregated from infected areas. Inhabitants living in infected areas should be 
forced to migrate to health camps located elsewhere. Subsequently, those- quarters 
vacated ought to be set on fire, Borradaile concluded.
The disease now presented a problem of governance. Local government, and in effect 
the Government of Bombay, had to deal with internal migration, disruption to trade, and 
growing social discontent. The Government of Bombay felt a need to take control of the 
situation.
375 S.A. R.C.S. G.D. (Plague). Box 3805, file no 1, volume 1, pt. II o f 1897. G.D. Memorandum 
30 January 1897.
376 S.A. R.C.S. G.D. (Plague). Box 7312, file no. 1, volume l ,p t .  1 o f 1897. Letter S.D -K -17 of 
1897. Arnim to Commissioner in Sind 4 January 1897.
377 S.A. R.C.S. G.D. (Plague). Box 7312, file no. 1, volume 1, pt. 1 o f 1897. Letter no G 9617 o f
1896. Tahilram Kemchand to A. Wingate 23 December 1896.
378 S.A. R.C.S. G.D. (Plague). Box 7135, file 1, volume 2 o f 1897. Letter Borradaile to the 
Commissioner in Sind 25 February 1997.
379 Ibid.
170
A Plague Committee was constituted under orders of the Commissioner in Sind. The 
Committee was to exercise authority and control of all plague operations in Karachi. A 
small group of civil servants and medical experts were given extraordinary powers 
concerning health and sanitation. As Arnold notes, this measure robbed municipalities 
of authority that had been theirs since the reforms of the 1880s.
The Plague Committee was given far-reaching powers. It could temporarily ‘rescind, 
suspend alter or modify’ any bylaw, rule or order issued by the Municipality. Moreover, 
the Committee could order the search of any buildings in the City; it could isolate 
people who were not even certified by health officers as sick. The Committee could 
impose restrictions on the amount of tenants in a building; it could prohibit the use of 
buildings, order cleansing and ventilation of dwellings. It could ‘for the purpose of 
Military camps, segregation camps, hospitals’, etc. ‘take possession of and occupy any 
vacant ground or building’ within as well as outside the boundaries of the Municipality. 
The Plague Committee could at any time ask the District Superintendent of the Police to
381back up its decisions with force, and it was the Municipality that had to foot the bills.
Suddenly, the Assistant Commissioner and District Magistrate J. Sladen, who was the 
chairman of the Plague Committee, sat on vast powers. By the authority vested in his 
office he prohibited migration from one part of town to another. Now, if a person 
needed to move around within Karachi, Sladen had first to grant an application for 
travelling.382 He did issue passes for urgent business trips in and out of Karachi, but 
very restrictively, and a rigorous system of reports and checks of the traveller were 
imposed.
Karachi’s working and lower middle-classes were most exposed to the plague; it was 
they who were most frequently falling ill, were being isolated, displaced or restricted 
from moving. As a result commercial and industrial life in the city was being disrupted. 
Under normal circumstances it was these sections of society who would keep the port 
and its surroundings running. Now, with the prolonged epidemic, the disruptions in 
trade and commerce displeased local business.
380 Arnold, 1993, 204.
381 S.A. R.C.S. G.D. (Plague). Box 7135, file no. 1, volume 2 o f 1897. Noted extracts from The 
Sind Official Gazette (Extraordinary) Monday 29 March 1897.
382 S.A. R.C.S. G.D. (Plague). Box 3651, file no. 1, volume 3 o f 1899. Office o f  the Plague 
Committee Circular 7 February 1899.
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The influential Karachi Chamber of Commerce sent a deputation of its most prominent 
businessmen to the Commissioner on 2 February 1897.383 Top-level officials and 
administrators also attended the meeting. Mr. Petrie, the most senior businessman 
representing Karachi’s biggest firm Messrs. Ralli Bros., spoke on behalf of the whole 
business community when he claimed that the plague epidemic threatened to cause an 
‘exodus of the whole labouring class’ from Karachi.
Although they all saw the necessity of removing inhabitants from the infected areas, 
Petrie assured, he now argued that unless accommodation was provided for displaced 
people, they would disappear to neighbouring provinces. Subsequently, he argued, very 
soon trade would come to a complete standstill in Karachi. The city of Bombay had 
experienced migration due to plague between the end of 1896 and early 1897. Around 
350,000 out of an estimated 850,000 inhabitants had moved out. However, as Arnold 
notes with reference to Bombay and elsewhere, this flight was due more to plague
384measures than the disease itself.
Petrie recommended that ‘suitable accommodation’ should be provided outside Karachi, 
but sufficiently close so that clerks and ‘coolies’ could come to Karachi for work. 
Health camps ought to be constructed close to the main railway lines, he suggested, and 
daily morning and evening trains should run into Karachi. He agreed that employers 
would construct huts in the health camps; however, most of the money, Petrie 
suggested, should come out of ‘local funds’ of the government.
After negotiation, Gilles, the Collector of Karachi, agreed to charge public expenditure 
for half of the amount of huts, and the Ralli Brothers would fund the rest.385 The same 
day, the Collector of Karachi telegrammed to the North Western Railways manager. 
Gilles made arrangements for the running of special trains between Karachi and the 
location of the future health camps, so that clerks and coolies encamped there could be
383 S.A. R.C.S. G.D. (Plague). Box 3805, file no 1, volume 1, pt. 2 o f 1897. Letter no. 11 o f
1897. The Chairman Karachi Chamber o f Commerce to Assistant Commissioner in Sind 2 Feb
1897.
384 Arnold, 1993,207.
385 S.A. R.C.S. G.D. (Plague). Box 3805, file no. 1, volume 1, pt. 2 o f 1897. Memorandum 10 
February 1897.
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transported to work and home again.386 And soon specially created huts were 
constructed in Landhi outside Karachi City. More than 2000 people were moved there. 
‘People move cheerfully’, wrote the Acting Commissioner in Sind to the Private 
Secretary in Bombay, which was of course not the whole truth.387
Despite displacement and segregation of people in health camps, and the concentration 
of power within the hands of a few officials, the epidemic continued into 1898. In fact, 
by any standards, it was getting worse. The Commissioner in Sind called for a meeting 
in the Government House in Karachi.388 High officials and members of local elites 
attended the meeting.
There were three main duties to perform for government and local citizens in a plague 
epidemic, argued the commissioner. The first duty was to ensure that the epidemic did 
not spread. The second duty was to stamp out the epidemic at home. The third was to 
cure the infected population. Karachi failed in this last duty, he claimed.389
The Commissioner was upset by the low turnout of people using the hospitals in 
Karachi. He said that the ‘native community’ must now persuade their ‘ignorant and 
prejudiced caste fellows’ to acquire information about the causes and symptoms of 
plague. The Commissioner had information that the Superintendents, who were out on 
Karachi’s streets, found it increasingly difficult to access and supervise homes in 
infected areas. They also found it increasingly difficult to move people from infected 
areas into provided health camps. The inhabitants of Karachi did not offer their houses 
for inspection, and they revealed very little about their lives for the Superintendents.390
The Commissioner argued that plague authorities simply did not know how the 
population lived, what their habits were, and how this might have an effect on the 
spread of the disease. Yet they needed to know, and lacking sufficient methods, they 
turned to local communities for assistance. Native communities must assist the plague 
authorities in order to defuse the growing resentment towards plague measures, the
386 S.A. R.C.S. G.D. (Plague). Box 3805, file no 1, volume 1, pt. 2 o f 1897. Telegram collector 
o f Karachi to the M anager North Western Railways 2 February 1897.
387 S.A. R.C.S. G.D, (Plague). Box 7312, file no. 1, volume 1, pt. 1 o f 1897. Telegram acting 
Commissioner in Sind to Private seer. GoB. 25 January 1897.
388 S.A. R.C.S. G.D. (Plague). Box 4839, file no 1, pt 1 o f  1898. ‘M em orandum ’ 4 May 1898.
389 Ibid., 2.
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Commissioner argued. Could the communities themselves reduce discontent and make 
better contact with the locals, he queried. In the meantime, however, as we shall see in a 
following section, the Commissioner sent military personnel to accompany plague 
intendents in the search for infected people.
In 1903-04 the plague epidemic had slowed down considerably. Only a few cases were 
now being reported. Yet the outbreak had made clear to the colonial administration that 
there were limits to what the social body could do to heal itself, and as the disease 
threatened to spread elsewhere, and had already upset trade and commerce, it intervened 
coercively. These early attempts by the colonial administration to constitute and 
intervene into the social domain were marked by the tact of previous approaches, where 
coercion had constituted a privileged mode of action.
Now, in wake of the epidemic, the pressure was mounting on the administration to 
engage conditions of life in the city. Questions were raised about how to link projects on 
housing conditions, sanitation and public health. Several issues highlighted by the 
plague would underpin the growing social concern of the colonial administration in 
Bombay. From the point of view of the administration, there was something missing: a 
sense of holistic perspective towards conditions of life that could function as a 
foundation for intervention. Officials in Bombay and Karachi found that previous 
administrations’ lack of interest in issues of sanitation and housing had contributed to 
the difficulties they faced when acting upon the epidemic. Moreover, the lack of 
knowledge concerning the very basics of conditions of life of the neighbourhoods of 
Karachi was acute, and became a real obstacle when trying to combat plague. Clearly, 
the experience of plague in the Presidency was an important factor in the expansion of 
bio-politics in Bombay.
5.3. The limit of voluntarism: primary education 
in the Bombay Presidency 1905-1925
A debate emerged during the mid 1890s between members of local councils, colonial 
administrators and officials, concerning whether to introduce free and compulsory 
education in the Bombay Presidency. The question was also debated in the press, where
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British loyalists and their opponents exchanged views. In this section I will probe into 
that debate.
On one obvious level this debate shows the essential inequalities of colonial rule: it was 
always in doubt whether Indian subjects were to be granted the same opportunities as 
domestic subjects. On another, less explored level, however, the debate occasions a shift 
occurring around the First World War in how the colonial administration viewed the 
population of the Presidency; at this time it began to see in it a resource to develop, and 
that education could be a means to further that development. The shift reflected a 
growing colonial concern with how to approach and manage life under new conditions 
of industrial society.
Compulsory education implied a far-reaching intervention into, and regulation of, 
society. Up till then education had been carried out on a voluntary basis, and on that 
premise many a local administrator did believe in the need for primary education for the 
progress of society. But they believed in it, then, as a means of individual self­
development for the benefit of society. As Kumar points out, ever since the much-cited 
stance by Macaulay on education in India, primary, secondary and higher education was 
always Framed by the objective of ‘character formation’ -  that is, with a civilisational 
slant.391
The emphasis on character formation informed Government of India policy for a long 
time: in its Educational Policy of 1913, the Government of India wrote:
There is reason to hope...that increased educational 
facilities under better educational conditions will 
accelerate social reform, spread female education and 
secure better teachers. Already much attention is 
being given to...social life, traditions, discipline, the 
betterment of environment, hygiene.. .392
The thought of shifting from an individually based voluntary system in elementary 
education to a population-based compulsory one made colonial administrators wary.
391 Kumar, 1997, 114.
392 M.S.A. G.B. E.D. Compilation 360 o f 1914. Extracts from the Educational policy o f 
Government o f India 1913.
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My argument in this section is that this wariness towards free and compulsory education 
receded during the period here under review, when new productivist objectives were 
introduced into the debate on education. The argument that education could help 
improve the industrial economy was promoted by administrators, as well as by Indian 
business elites. They pushed, for this purpose, a greater state involvement in education. 
Voluntarism had its limits when productivism began to set the tone of the agenda.
New and often contradictory positions emerged among colonial officials within the 
debate. While administrators in rural settings listed the problems with compulsory 
primary education -  for example, that educated children would leave fanning behind to 
pursue careers in learned professions -  urban administrators argued for the necessity of 
compulsory primary education for factory children, since compulsion kept children at 
the work place. Nationalists argued for its introduction because of its prospects of 
enhancing the general level of education among the populace, but also because an 
educated workforce might increase the output of goods from India.
The social turn in local colonial governance penetrated ways in which questions of 
education were perceived. By the end of the period discussed here, the principle of 
compulsory primary education had been established within the repertoire of the modern 
colonial state.
5.3.1. The old argum ent against: India is different
The issue of free and compulsory primary education had been promoted since the mid 
1890s in the Presidency by Hindu social reform movements. The Government of 
Bombay remained unmoved by petitioners and deputations, and replied: ‘In the present 
state of Society it is believed that a system of compulsory education is neither desired 
by the people, nor practicable without moving a burden on the rate payer which he 
would be unable to bear’.393
393 M.S.A. G.B. E.D. Volume 42, compilation 78 o f 1906. G.B. letter no. 2725 1 December 
1892.
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In late June 1905 education was again on the agenda. The Times o f India reported on ‘a 
long and animated discussion’ in the Municipal Corporation in Bombay. It was Ibrahim 
Rahimtoola who had initiated the heated exchange. Rahimtoola was then an influential 
member of the corporation, he would later become Sir Ibrahim Rahimtoola, and take his 
place in the Legislative Council in Delhi. Rahimtoola proposed to the Corporation that 
compulsory primary education for boys should be introduced into the Bombay City. He 
asked the President of the Corporation to request the Government of Bombay to appoint 
a joint committee on the issue.
Rahimtoola suggested that the benefits of free and compulsory primary education were 
many. This debate took place approximately 10 years after the outbreak of plague 
described above. Rahimtoola refers to that experience in his initial call for a reformed 
system of education. The Times o f  India reports Rahimtoola saying to the members of 
the Municipal Corporation that it had frequently occurred to him in the wake of the 
epidemic ‘that all the measures that they were adopting for the improvement of public 
health and general conditions of the people, did not result in the fullest benefit expected 
from them owing to the ignorance of the masses’.394
At this time the debate in the Corporation concerned not so much the principle of free 
and compulsory primary education. That principle was generally accepted. Rather, it 
concerned whether the time was right to introduce compulsion as a measure in India. 
The Governor agreed that a committee should be constituted to look into the matter of 
primary education in Bombay City. However, he ascertained, this would be done ‘while 
not in any way committing Government to the principle of either free or compulsory 
education’ in Bombay.395
The prospect of shifting a voluntary system of education to a compulsory one was first 
met by resistance from influential secretaries to the Government of India and 
Government of Bombay. They made a political calculation. Resentment would grow 
among poorer classes if  free education would not be introduced, the secretaries feared. 
One secretary wrote to another: ‘I was first inclined to regard the proposal to introduce 
compulsory education as so obviously impractible that it would be a waste of time to
394 M.S.A. Government of Bombay (1905) Report on Native Newspapers Published in the 
Bombay Presidency 1905. Extracts from Times o f India 30 June 1905.
395 M.S.A. G.B. E.D. Volume 42, compilation 78 o f 1906. Note by Governor o f the Bombay 
Presidency 30 November 1905.
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appoint a committee to investigate it, but on further reflection...I am disposed to think 
that we should not refuse to accept the lead of the Municipal Corporation in a direction 
which may prove to be exceedingly beneficial to the poorer classes’.396 Furthermore, he 
found ‘to refuse the committee might wear the appearance of backwardness on part of 
the Government’.
The two secretaries continued their exchange on education the following year. Now 
they worried that besides high costs for the Municipal Board and the Government, the 
introduction of free and compulsory primary education might be accompanied by 
another kind of considerable ‘political inconvenience’. Parents could create a fracas 
when being fined for not sending their children to school. Or, as one secretaiy put it, 
problems would arise with ‘the laying upon the population largely composed of illiterate 
bigoted persons restrictions and penalties which they would, presumably, not easily 
tolerate’. Any committee established in the future must, therefore, discuss the political
397risk involved, argued the secretaiy to the Government of Bombay.
A committee was finally appointed later the same year, in July 1906.398 It reported and 
submitted its recommendations more than two years later, in September 1908. With 
only one dissenting member, the committee proposed that primary education should not 
be made compulsory in Bombay City due to the tension it would cause to prosecute 
parents who withheld-children from schooling.399
Hindu reform associations once more opposed such recommendations and petitioned the 
Government of Bombay to introduce free and compulsory primary education. The 
question was now put to local collectors in the districts of the Presidency.400 Most of 
these local officials argued that in order to have a progressive effect on society, it was 
no use making education free if it was not made compulsory: that would only benefit 
the wealthier classes of society who already sent their children to school.
396 M.S.A. G.B. E.D. Volume 42, compilation 78 o f 1906. Departmental note 20 December 
1905.
397 M.S.A. G.B. E.D. Volume 42, compilation 78 o f 1906. Private letter secretary to G.B. Gilles 
to secretaiy to G.I. Quin 14 January 1906.
398 M.S.A. G.B. E.D. Volume 54, compilation 78 II o f 1908. Government resolution no. 1249.
399 M.S.A. G.B. E.D. Volume 54, compilation 78 II o f 1908. Government o f Bombay (1908) 
Report o f  the committee appointed by Government to investigate the question o f  the measures 
which should be adopted to further the spread o f  Primary Education in the City o f  Bombay.
400 M.S.A. G.B. E.D. Volume 54, compilation 78 II o f 1908. Letter no. 1419 o f 1907. Collector 
o f Ahmedabad to secretary to G.B. E.D. 31 March 1907.
178
However, on the other hand, they rejected compulsion in education on both practical 
and political terms. Were compulsion introduced, poor parents would end up being 
penalised by the district magistrate over and over again for withholding their children 
from education -  as they, by necessity, employed their children elsewhere.
There were also general economic risks involved in pursuing such a policy of education, 
argued some administrators. Education among artisans or peasants could lead to 
contempt for manual labour. Wrote one deputy collector: ‘[ejncourage education by all 
means in the masses, but please note that...an educated son of a peasant...becomes a 
permanent loss to agriculture’.401 This could increase the shortage of factory and rural 
labour, they argued.
Finally, the Government of Bombay wrote to the Government of India regarding the 
abolition of fees for primary education. It found it difficult to agree with the argument 
‘that the abolition of fees in the Primary Schools of England and other equally civilized 
countries necessarily justifies a similar abolition of fees in India’, simply because such 
arguments do not take into account that free education is an adjunct to compulsory 
education. Indeed the Government argued that the Bombay Presidency as a whole ‘has 
not yet reached the stage at which compulsory primary education can be imposed upon 
the people without giving rise to grave discontent’.402
Administrators, however, acknowledged that the state of education was becoming a 
source of discontent in India, and they saw the need to address their own failing policy. 
This come out with some clarity in the exchange of views within the administration 
when the Indian social reformer, Gokhale, introduced a Bill in the Indian (Imperial) 
Legislative Council in Delhi for the introduction of free and compulsory primary 
education throughout India.
401 Lakori, K. K. [Deputy Collector, Mirpur Mathelo] Quoted in Government o f Bombay 
Adminstration Report. Land Revenue Administration Report o f  the Bombay Presidency 
including Sind fo r  the year, part II, 1915-16.
402 M.S.A. G.B. E.D. Volume 54, compilation 78 I o f 1908. Letter no. 257 o f 1908. Edwardes to 
secretary G.I. Home Department [H.D.] 10 February 1908.
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The Bill itself did not even make it into select committee and a second reading; debates 
surrounding it, however, show how deputy and district collectors agreed that progress 
had been slow in education. Some were quite frank in their assessment:
When we see that only 5 percent of the population of 
this country are literate or that 7 out of 8 children are 
illiterate or that 4 villages out of every 5 are without a 
school we find that we have made very poor progress 
in the matter of the extension of the elementary 
education in this country. It is needless to say that 
elementary education is the ground work of the 
industrial, social, moral and political development of 
a country and therefore is the duty of the Government 
and people to see that it is extended as far as 
possible.403
Still, to shift the system and introduce compulsion was not really on the minds of the 
administration as a serious option.
5.3.2 The new argum ent in favour: education increases productivity
It would take the First World War to more substantially alter views and the framework 
for debate. The war had spread the need of ‘producing facilities’ for the development of 
the population, argued the Bombay Chronicle in late 1916. It was now seen as highly 
important, asserted the paper, to reconstruct the whole ‘fabric for education of people’. 
To this end, the state carried an ‘exceptionally heavy responsibility’. It is with the state 
the ‘duty of educating the people principally rests and it is the holder of public
j 404money .
403 M.S.A. G.B. E.D. Volume 49, compilation 78 of 1912. Letter no. 117 o f 1911. Ransing to 
collector West Khandesh 26 May 1911.
404 M.S.A. Government o f Bombay (1916) Confidential Weekly Report on Newspapers 
Published in the Bombay Presidency. Extract from the Bombay Chronicle 2 November 1916.
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Nothing new had come up in terms of moral or political argument. New, however, was 
the introduction into the debate of an argument rendering education a force for the 
higher productivity of local industries. Political power would be called forth, as it were, 
to intervene into the social domain and amend conditions there, enabling better 
operation of markets. It was a bio-political demand that explicitly sought to regulate an 
area of life previously unregulated.
So, when V.J. Patel in 1916 moved in the Bombay Legislative Council ‘[t]hat this 
council recommends that an early beginning should be made in the direction of making 
elementary education free and compulsory throughout this Presidency by introducing it 
in the first instance within the limits of its municipal districts’, he did so in a partly 
altered intellectual environment405 Patel argued that the Government must now 
prioritise education. He found that the arguments against the introduction of compulsion 
in primary education were ‘unsound’. He asserted that the government had itself been in 
favour of introducing compulsion in primary education for children employed in 
factories. Why would there be a difference for the rest of Bombay, he asked. And 
despite the Government’s fears, compulsory education would not make ‘alien’ British 
government unpopular, Patel asserted, because educated Indians were now themselves 
asking for the introduction of compulsion in primary education.
Indeed, just before the outbreak of the First World War, the Government of Bombay 
had raised the issue of compulsory primary education for children employed in 
factories. The suggestion of making education compulsory for children in factories had 
originally been made by the Indian Factory Labour Commission in 1908, but had not 
been met with much enthusiasm from local industrialists, who saw it as a tax on 
industry and a disadvantage in relation to foreign competitors 406 The Government now 
responded both to the work of that commission and to continued inspections under the 
Indian Factories’ Act, which had also raised the issue of education among children 
employed in factories in the Bombay Presidency.
A special committee reported to the Government of Bombay in 1913 on whether free 
and compulsory education could be granted to children working in factories. Three
405 M.S.A. G.B. E.D. Compilation 78 o f 1916. Extracts from Bombay Chronicle 2 November 
1916.
406 MSA. G.B. E.D. Compilation 447 o f 1915. Departmental note [n.d.]
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government officials and the chairman suggested that children employed as half-timers 
-  that is, those who worked six hours should have their shift divided into two parts. In 
the interval, mill owners should provide facilities so that factory children could devote 
time to study basic arithmetic, reading and writing.407 The committee found that 
‘education should be made compulsory for factory children’ as a provisional alternative 
to what they regarded as the ‘only complete and satisfactory solution of the problem, 
namely a scheme of free and compulsory education for all children’.
One objective when introducing compulsion into the education of factory children was 
that the children could be better supervised, and so consequently their migration 
between Bombay and the villages could come to a halt. The minority of the committee -  
three mill owners -  complained that this would increase the price on child labour, and 
that children weary of school and in need of money would look for work elsewhere 
during that interval. The Government of Bombay had long before the publication of the 
report made up its mind: the ‘very qualified support’ given by the committee would 
make it impossible for the Government to decide ‘in favour of a measure of so highly 
controversial a character’.408
Patel returned in late 1916 with a new Bill after some politicking on the part of the 
colonial administration.409 The Bill called for yearly grant-in-aid from the Government 
to the local authorities 410 However, it had been hammered out in private meetings 
between Patel and the Governor of the Presidency so, when putting it before the 
Council, Patel could argue for its progressive character with the knowledge that the 
Government would not oppose the Bill.
In the debate he pointed out what a transformative event the First World War had been, 
in terms of views of how education contributes to productivity and wider reforms. He 
would not believe ‘that the Government of India would adhere to their policy of pre-war 
times’. The Bill set out to experiment by introducing free and compulsory primary 
education only into the urban areas of the Presidency. It was left to local authorities to
407 MSA. G.B. E.D. Compilation 447 o f 1914. G.D. Resolution no. 8051 8 October 1914.
408 M.S.A. G.B. E.D. Compilation 447 o f 1916. Letter no. 7762-G.D. o f 1912. G.B. to G.I. 16 
November 1912.
409 M.S.A. G.B. E.D. Compilation 447 o f 1917. Extracts from the Bombay Government Gazette 
11 January 1917.
410 M.S.A. G.B. G.D. Compilation 447 o f 1918. Departmental note by secretaiy to G.B. French 
6 February 1917.
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deal with faulting parents who did not send their children to school. The measures 
would be to first warn parents, and then levy a fine of three rupees if they would not 
change their ways. The Bill was harsher on employers who employed children during 
school hours. An employer could be fined up to 25 rupees if they withheld children 
from schooling.411
This time there were very few principled remarks against the Bill in the Council. The 
most debated aspect when the Bill was read a second time was the part dealing with 
compulsion. H.S. Lawrence, the then Commissioner in Sind -  an area where local 
Muslim landed elites were highly sceptical of universal primary education as it would 
upset their agricultural economy -  argued that one should not be light-hearted in one’s 
support of the Patel Bill. Although he did not officially oppose it, Lawrence saw it as a 
major shift in the principles of government in the Presidency. Lawrence argued, 
‘[government in this country have hitherto refrained most scrupulously from 
interference in the domestic concerns of the people. This measure is intended to control 
the relations of parents and children, and will affect every home in the selected localities 
in a manner never yet dreamt of by the people’.412
Yet Lawrence’s were in a minority at this point. The War had illustrated the potential of 
Indian manufacturing capacity, but it had also pointed towards certain conceived 
weaknesses in the industrial system in Bombay. One such weakness, according to 
colonial officials, was the perpetuating instability of the labour force. It was now argued 
that primary education could help steady labour in the long term. The Indian Industrial 
Commission put it bluntly: ‘the children of workers are provided with education under 
tolerable conditions of life, a new generation of workers will grow up, who will learn to 
regard millwork as their fixed occupation5.413
It was now clear to many of the industrial capitalists in Bombay that an educated 
workforce would increase productivity in their enterprises. However, A.E. Mirams 
suggested in his social survey, laid before the Indian Industrial Commission in 1917, 
that ‘the trouble is that the employee is so crassly ignorant everyone seems afraid to
411 M.S.A. G.B. E.D. Compilation 447 o f 1917. Extracts from the Bombay Government Gazette 
4 July 1917.
412 M.S.A. Proceedings o f the Legislative Council o f the Governor o f Bombay 1917. Lawrence, 
H.S. Proceedings o f 25 July 1917, 38.
413 Government o f  India (1918) Report o f  the Indian Industrial Commission. Calcutta, 179.
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make a serious beginning with him’. And since the ‘current regulations’ stipulate that 
education must be voluntary, teaching must be made ‘intensely interesting’ for 
employees to attend. Society as a whole might reap the benefits of better education of 
industrial workers, argued Mirams. Through more stringent elementary education 
employees could be given a chance of becoming ‘more useful members of the 
community and more efficient citizens’ 414
Indian industrialists and sections of administrators now pushed for a rethinking on 
issues of education. The representative witness of the Bombay Millowner’s Association, 
C.N. Wadia, argued before the Indian Industrial Commission for immediate changes to 
primary education. He called for a system of centralised and compulsory education. Up 
until now, voluntary schools in mills had not been a success, he argued. Instead, he 
suggested that the Municipality should set up schools in every district and draw on the 
mill owners for funding.415 In fact, mill owners suggested, the want of primary 
education was one of the reasons India was ‘outstripped’ by Japan in the ‘race for 
industrial progress’.
The uneducated Indian workforce was not able to develop the new skills needed, the 
mill industry’s representatives asserted before the Commission. Moreover, they 
suggested, a ‘great impediment to... efficiency is the shifting habit of the operative, and 
to cure him of this he should be given better education, his surroundings inside and 
outside the mills should be made healthier and better’ 416
The Indian Merchant Chamber and Bureau put it in similar terms. For them, to improve 
the labourers’ efficiency and skill would have to imply a package of compulsory free 
education, sanitary housing, better wages and the redemption of debt.417 This rhetoric 
surrounding the introduction of free and compulsory education was linking social and 
political ends. And here the indigenous intelligentsia and colonial administrators came 
to a shared view: education was becoming political. Here was an ‘opportunity for 
Government to introduce compulsory education and satisfy the demands of the people
414 Ibid., 18-19.
415 Government o f India (1918) Report o f  the Indian Industrial Commission. Written and Oral 
Evidence. Witness no. 278 C.N. Wadia oral evidence 12November 1917, 643.
416 Ibid. Witness no. 280 N. B. Saklatvala written evidence, 667-668.
417 Ibid. Witness no. 303 Indian M erchants’ Chamber and Bureau written evidence, 805.
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and by doing so they will allay the unrest’ 418 Moreover, primary education could help 
alleviate illiteracy -  a major obstacle to progress, some officials argued. And primary 
education provided a chance for them to spread moral education much more effectively. 
The introduction of compulsory primary education would clearly benefit the population, 
they argued.419
By 1922 a consensus seemed to have emerged that the introduction of free and 
compulsory education was needed, and that the colonial state must take an active role. 
In fact, an official committee under Chairman Narayan G. Chandavarkar unanimously 
recommended that ‘universal compulsion’ in education for boys and girls must be the 
‘goal to be aimed at’. The report points out that the witnesses, with some few 
exceptions, favoured compulsion to such a degree that the opinion against compulsion 
‘need not be considered too seriously’. One colonial official stated in his evidence 
before the Compulsory Education Commission: ‘Education is one of the most important 
functions of the State and the State cannot afford to let it pass out of its cognisance or 
supervision’ 420
A voluntary system will not give enough progress in the matter of education, the report 
of the Compulsory Education Committee went on to argue, and especially not now 
when ‘the people themselves are said to realise the need for education’. The committee 
recommended that compulsion in education would henceforth be introduced cautiously 
into most areas of Bombay City and more selectively into other areas 421
In a little more than a decade, views on the role of the state in education had changed 
considerably. When compulsory education was introduced as an argument for raising 
productivity, as well as promoting efficiency in government, it turned out to be of great 
importance to the state. The colonial administration now found it important to expand
418 M.S.A. Government o f Bombay (1922) Report o f  the Committee Appointed by Government 
o f  Bombay to Consider and Report on the Question o f  the Introduction o f  Free and Compulsoiy 
Prim aiy Education into the Bombay Presidency, 1922. Written and Oral Evidence. Witness no. 
47 R.R. Kale oral evidence 21 January 1922.
419 M.S.A. G.B. E.D. Compilation 272 o f 1916. Departmental notes [n.d.].
420 M.S.A. Government o f Bombay (1922) Report o f  the Committee Appointed by Government 
o f  Bombay to Consider and Report on the Question o f  the Introduction o f  Free and Compulsory 
Primary Education into the Bombay Presidency, 1922. Written and Oral Evidence. Witness no. 
133 F.G. Pratt oral evidence 9 December 1921.
421 M.S.A. Government of Bombay (1922) Report o f  the Committee Appointed by Government 
o f  Bombay to Consider and Report on the Question o f  the Introduction o f  Free and Compulsory 
Prim aiy Education into the Bombay Presidency, 1922, 7.
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its bio-political scope and regulate education: as it prioritised increased production over 
character-formation, the limit of voluntarism in education became more easily defined.
5.4. The limit of laissez-faire: housing and town planning, city 
of Bombay 1915-1925
Records produced with reference to housing and town planning in Bombay are 
revealing when discussing growing social concerns, and the expanding bio-political 
scope of the colonial administration there. Housing records tell of administrative anxiety 
over the many pressures of life in emerging industrial society. They reflect an 
understanding that these acknowledged pressures might ultimately have an impact, not 
only on the function of markets, but ultimately on the effectiveness of colonial 
government itself.
In this section I will describe housing as central to emerging social concerns of the 
colonial administration. Housing, I will suggest, formed a junction through which 
various other questions within the social domain connected. The ways in which the 
colonial administration attempted to get a grip of issues of housing and town planning 
reflect, in a particluar way, its efforts to redefine the responsibility of government in 
relation to market and society; when it came to deteriorating urban housing conditions 
the colonial state saw the limit of laissez-faire, and expanded its own bio-political 
scope.
As we shall see below, in the case of housing in Bombay, colonial administrators 
structured government action around relatively far-reaching regulations. Records 
concerning housing in Bombay reflect how social imperialism connected contemporary 
discourses on social intervention in the metropole to similar interventions in the colony. 
However, one will also encounter the adaptability of those discourses when actually 
applied to a colonial reality. The application of social imperialism in Bombay was 
always formed by local historical conditions of the Presidency.
The local government sensed, and recognised, strong public opinion forming around the 
question of urban housing in Bombay City. They acknowledged how sections of the
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press, as well as business, increasingly attached to the state a responsibility to extend its 
reach into the social domain and to address the issue of housing comprehensively. 
Before, newspapers had found that employers but also communities must take full 
responsibility for housing their workers. Now, calls for a reorientation of the 
administrations housing policy began to emerge. As one newspaper pointed out in a 
discussion on housing:
In almost every country in the world, the State has a 
recognised function in respect of social and moral 
progress. Such progress should, no doubt, proceed 
largely from non-official effort, but there are some
matters where State aid is essential and in all matters 
the moral support of the State is of the greatest value.
In British India, the reformer not only received no 
countenance from the State, but oftentimes, he finds
422the State ranged on the side of obstruction.
I discussed this already in chapter three, but also in the colonial context of Bombay the 
belief in charity as a comparatively superior force in attending to housing lost ground. 
Colonial officials found that a charity based approach failed to remove the root causes 
of the problems society faced. A.E. Mirams, discussed earlier, put it quite forthrightly 
when he argued with reference to housing that he had:
...no faith in charity as a remedy...By all means let 
philanthropy do its proper part in the amelioration of bad 
housing conditions but it is useless relying on eleemosynary 
efforts for the solution of the problem.423
Instead, regulatory interventions executed by the state in collaboration with efforts by
local capital would initiate ‘social welfare work’, Mirams argued; at least until a ‘civic
sense has become more fully developed’, as the Indian Industrial Commission later had 
it 424 Realities of urban life in Bombay as described earlier in this thesis, clearly lent
422 M.S.A. Government of Bombay (1909) Confidential Weekly Report on Newspapers 
Published in the Bombay Presidency. Extract from the Indian Social Reformer 23 May 1909.
423 Mirams, 1916, 7.
424 Government o f India (1918) Report o f  the Indian Industrial Commission. Calcutta, 192.
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issues of urban housing a sense of urgency. By the time of the outbreak of the First 
World War, housing, as I will discuss below, embodied aspects well beyond narrow 
early twentieth-century notions of tearing down congested areas. Poor urban housing 
teased out wider and more general anxieties concerning modem industrial life among 
administrators and business elites. With the invention of the social domain, these 
anxieties came together within one realm, through which administrators found a new 
conceptual focus.
5.4.1. Urban housing: microcosm of modern industrial society
Poor urban housing seemed to embody what politicians, bureaucrats and thinkers 
within empire feared most about modem industrial society: instability of labour and 
other groupings, disease, crime, and radicalism. Yet for sections of administrators it 
also presented an easy and technical fix to wider ‘social’ problems: amend poor 
housing conditions, and populations might become more productive, harmonious and 
prosperous.
The housing question had stirred feelings in British industrial towns already in the 
1880s. New social surveys and sociological studies of the kind discussed in chapter 
four fed the press and bureaucrats with dystopian facts related to housing. Poor housing 
conditions had become an obvious reminder of urban poverty for politicians and 
reformers alike. Data on housing in Britain, as we saw in chapter three, translated into 
demands for state action: to social liberals and socialists there seemed to be clear limits 
to what employers, charity and housing societies could actually handle when housing 
developed into a problem.
But, as I have shown, there were also visionary components within discussions on 
housing and urban environmental conditions: social evolutionism and moral discourse 
flowed together and formed the prospects for moulding new and improved societies. 
This conflation created a more complex view of poverty and social ills, Alan Kidd 
argues. The poor, Kidd points out, were no longer perceived as a distinct class. 
‘Poverty’ suggests Kidd ‘was a condition or circumstance which might be analysed,
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and by implication might be alleviated or even eradicated’.425 Housing projects in 
Britain, Kidd suggests, manifested a growing inclination on behalf of the state to 
engage poverty.
Early housing policy in Bombay was modelled on nineteenth-century urban 
improvement schemes in Scotland and England. Town planning and city improvement 
in Bombay was initially oriented towards creating ‘sanitary order’, Prashant Kidambi 
argues. Housing improvement schemes in Bombay were, as will be mentioned below, 
initially carried out by the Bombay Improvement Trust 426 Kidambi correctly points out 
the many failures of the Trust, and he shows how sections of the Indian intelligentsia, 
as well as Indian property owners, openly challenged the work of the Trust.427 I will 
return to this below.
Yet the housing question, as I have framed it here, formed part of a much wider 
reconfiguration of state-society relations, structured by the ways in which social 
imperialism came to influence colonial administration and translate into local colonial 
governance. The housing question in Bombay must be seen in this light.
Housing was at the centre of emerging social concerns in Bombay. Colonial officials 
were influenced by how the question of urban housing was dealt with in Britain as key 
to the stability and progress of modem urban life; decisions to act upon poor housing 
conditions in Bombay also formed, as pressure mounted on the administration from 
several different directions. Prominent industrialists who were still reluctant to endorse 
nationalist positions found in the growing state involvement a way to pass on their 
costs for the housing of their employees to the public purse. Nationalists like the 
banister M.N. Nariman or the famous Bombay based newspaper editor Homiman, 
found in poor housing a failure of British policy. Trade unionists like M.N. Roy began 
to raise demands for housing on behalf of the working classes. Yet despite their diverse 
reasoning, they all invoked emerging European welfare states as models of a ‘civilised’ 
state.
By intervening into the social domain and addressing issues of housing, it was now 
argued, the state might be able to resolve a whole set of socially rooted problems. A.E.
425 Kidd, 1999, 61-62.
426 Kidmabi, 2007,71.
427 Ib id , 86.
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Mirams suggested before an audience in Karachi that housing and town planning had 
become ‘one of the latest of those great questions which are engaging the attention of 
social reformers’. While showing a lantern slide and lecturing about what the new 
Town Planning Act in Bombay could do for Karachi, Mirams argued that housing was 
in fact now considered ‘most pressing because it is concerned with the living 
conditions of the whole of the people’. It was only veiy recently, A.E. Mirams 
continued, ‘that there has been any idea that the regulation of these conditions for the 
benefit of the poor as well as for the richer classes is just as much a duty of 
Government as the provision of pure food and water’.
Housing reforms, he argued, were not only a question of creating shelter and planned 
physical spaces for the population. Rather, they helped articulate ways in which the 
state could relate to the intricacies of life of a modem industrial society. Were the state 
truly to embark on a series of interventions, Mirams continued, it would much better 
‘assist the growth of a healthy, happy and more contented people’.428
It was also suggested, for example, that better housing would help create a stable 
workforce. Around the outbreak of the First World War demands were made for 
reducing working hours in the textile cotton mills. But, mill-owners argued, if their 
housing was in a sorry state, workers would presumably rather turn to the streets than 
spend time at home during their increased spare time. And were workers to spend their 
spare time not at home, but on the streets, they would easily upset public order.
As one non-official member of the Indian Industrial Commission put it when discussing 
the issue with the representative from the Bombay Millowner’s Association, C.N. 
Wadia:
At present they [mill workers] loaf about and 
overcrowd the streets and find no place to go... If you 
give them more pay and less hours, do you not think 
they will loaf about the streets not knowing where to 
go and having nothing to do except drink or go away 
to their villages? Don’t you think that the 
municipality must provide big play-grounds, better
428 Mirams, A.E. (1916b) What the Bombay Town Planning Act Means to Karachi. Bombay.
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accommodation in chawls, and other facilities that 
will make them more steady?429
In short, to regulate living conditions would enhance stability and progress in the 
Presidency. Mirams argued when addressing the municipality of Poona that the new 
town planning regulations, referred to above, would prove to be most valuable to local 
authorities because ‘[w]ith improved environment the habits of the people and their 
outlook on life will undergo a transformation’.430
To remedy urban poverty through the construction of better housing was imperative in 
developing a colonial community in harmony. Coming back to Bombay after a study 
visit in Britain, Mirams wrote in his memorandum to the Indian Industrial Commission: 
‘Although I have observed a good deal of poverty in my walk through life and in many 
countries, and although I have read a great deal about poverty I confess I did not realise 
its poignancy and its utter wretchedness until I came to inspect the so-called homes of 
the poorer working classes of the town of Bombay’.431 Referencing Charles Dickens’s 
dystopian imagery of Victorian London, Mirams then gives a colourful description of 
the chawls, the tenement structures, in which the working classes of Bombay City lived:
Many of these chawls are huge houses of from 3 to 5 
floors with anything from 10 to 40 or more rooms.
Each floor has a vemadah running along its whole 
front or an interior corridor.. .The access to the upper 
floors is by means of a very narrow and steep 
staircase. Glancing into the rooms as one walks along 
the verandah...the visitor might be excused for 
thinking them sparsely inhabited, but a closer 
inspection may reveal, sitting on the floor, a mother 
and 2 or 3 children, the father and as often as not 
some of the family relations and a lodger. ..In such a 
room...where there is hardly space to move, whole
429 Government o f  India (1918) Report o f  the Indian Industrial Commission. Written and Oral 
Evidence. Witness No 278 C N Wadia oral evidence 12 November 1917, 655.
430 Mirams, A.E. (1916c) An Address to members o f  Municipality and Citizens o f  Poona on ‘The 
Bombay Town Planning Act o f  1915 Poona.
431 Mirams, 1916, 4.
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families sleep, breed, cook their food with the aid of 
pungent cow-dung cakes, and perform all the 
functions of family life...This is truly a distressing 
state of affairs...432
The idea of poor housing as a breeding ground for radicalism grew stronger during the 
period here under review. Poverty, ill health and deteriorating living conditions were 
increasingly seen as motivations for political mobilisation, and a reason why extremism 
gained a foothold, especially after the Bolshevik revolution in Russia.
The sociologist Patrick Geddes, discussed earlier, entertained similar ideas. Urban 
housing in Bombay manifested urban poverty in obscene ways, he thought; to find its 
remedy might help revert revolutionary tendencies in India. While administrators and 
public figures were marginalising his abstract form of sociology, Geddes took to satire 
in his critique of housing conditions in Bombay. His piece University o f  Bolshevism 
(established 1920) in Worli Bombay was an attempt to ironically describe the ways in 
which poor housing conditions in Bombay paved the way for Bolshevism, and how the 
Government of Bombay, through its own previous policies, promoted revolutionary 
activity as effectively as any agitator or conspiracy.
In his satire- Geddes describes how the ‘University of Bolshevism’ had been open for 
three years, in order to promote Bolshevism in India. The ‘university’ had so far been 
able to appeal to the ‘dissatisfied workers in the city’, but was set to recruit from almost 
all classes in the city of Bombay. The main work of the ‘university staff was to bring 
about dissatisfaction among those enrolled.
The university had accomplished its work better than similar institutions in Russia or 
Germany, Geddes wrote wryly. Overcrowded housing with small rooms with little light 
and air catered for its success. Added to this was high rent, insufficient lighting, no 
parks or playgrounds. Here, Geddes wrote, lay the success for radicalisation of the 
population in Bombay 433
" Mirams, 1916, 4-5.
433 Univ.S.A. T-GED 12/1/282. Geddes, P. ([n.d.]) ‘University o f Bolshevism (established in 
1920) Worli Bom bay’.
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Others took a moral and family-centred standpoint in their call for better housing in 
Bombay. Modem society brought a strain on family relations, it was argued, and 
through proper housing interventions government could help reform dysfunctional 
family relationships. This had been one of the themes of the Inter-allied Congress on 
Housing, held in London in June 1920, according to Dr K.E. Dadachanji. He brought 
this dimension of housing policy to the attention of the Bombay Legislative Council in 
the 1920s.434
The issue of housing in Bombay was even given an evolutionary slant. For Governor 
George Lloyd, anyone causing delays in coming to terms with the housing situation 
must ‘recognize clearly the responsibilities of breeding up an unhealthy, an unfit and 
squalid race of people. Unless we give them better air, better light, better cleanliness 
and better conditions, we shall not breed a race worthy of this city’ 435
Both within the colonial administration, and among public figures, much hope was 
pinned to the resolution of the urban housing problem. As these examples show, 
housing was depicted as central to a whole set of questions regarding the effect 
modernity might have on life in the city. Housing turned into a central junction of the 
newly invented social domain, and as such it was central to the expanding bio-political 
concerns of the colonial administration.
5.4.2 Engaging the ‘housing question’ through state action
It had not always been obvious that the colonial administration was under any form of 
obligation to address questions of housing in Bombay. Yet during the time here under 
review the notion of responsibility on the part of the administration to provide housing 
and public amenities for the population established itself in public and state discourse.
434 M.S.A. G.B. Public Works Department [P.W.D.] Development Department [D.D.] File 106 
(ii) o f 1921. Council Questions Dr. K.E. Dadachanji.
435 M.S.A. Bombay Legislative Council Proceedings. Lloyd, G. Proceedings o f 3 August 1920, 
563.
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The newly conceptualised field of the ‘social’, and the acknowledgment of its 
deterioration, made it possible to question the principle of laissez-faire: industrial 
capitalism seemed to bestow upon life certain negative effects that market mechanisms 
did not care to tend to, and charity could not end. Only through political power, it was 
argued, could these effects be reversed, and their various consequences controlled.
The question of who was responsible for housing and the provision of public amenities 
for the less-privileged sections of colonial Bombay became acute, as the Bombay 
Improvement Trust continued to falter. The Bombay industrialist Dinshaw Wacha 
asked the Government of India repeatedly in 1918-19 whether it recognised as a 
principle of a ‘civilised State’ its obligation to provide housing for the working 
classes.436 Or, he asked, was it still up to industrial enterprises to uphold the social 
welfare of their employees?
It had been argued in the press for some time that employers had failed to cany out the 
necessary schemes, and that it was now up to the Government and the Municipality to 
take charge. Housing was, newspapers argued, the issue above all others that the 
Government had to address.437
For a long time colonial officials had looked to the market for the resolution of the 
housing crises. They had argued that the market would ultimately regulate itself, that it 
was up to major employers of labour to house their own employees, and it was not for 
the state to intervene.438 However, after the massive plague epidemic, to which I 
referred earlier in this chapter, severely interrupted local trade and production, and the 
Government of Bombay had established the Bombay Improvement Trust in 1898 in 
order to ‘open up’ congested areas, the administration acknowledged that a 
continuation of a policy of non-intervention was difficult to justify, 439
Initially, the Government was indifferent to the fact that the Trust displaced more 
people than it actually re-housed. However, as it became obvious early in the career of
436 M.S.A. Proceedings o f  the Indian Legislative Council 1918. Wacha, D. Proceedings o f 4 
September 1918, 7.
437 M.S.A. Government of Bombay (1919) Confidential Weekly Report on Newspapers 
Published in the Bombay Presidency. Extracts from the Kaiser-i-Hind 23 August 1919.
438 Government o f India (1914) Report o f  the Bombay Development Committee.
439 See: Government o f Bombay Administration Reports. Reports o f  the City o f Bombay 
Improvement Trust 1899-1905.
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the Trust that it would not be able to cany reforms on such a large scale as deemed 
necessary, and that its projects were met by resentment among ever-widening sections 
in Bombay, a new approach had to be designed.440
Yet as late as 1914, the Bombay Development Committee had suggested that major 
employers bore the main responsibility of providing accommodation for their 
workers 441 The Municipal Corporation initially approved in principle, but observed 
‘that there is little indication of this being done at present under the voluntary 
conditions prevailing’.442
The view within business, however, was divided. Mill owners in Bombay agreed that 
they should house their own workpeople, and assured that no legislative measures were 
necessary in order for them to do so. Another large employer of labour, the BB&CI 
Railway Company, on the other hand, was doubtfiil whether the provision of housing 
was within the proper function of a railway company.443
In fact, major employers of labour had a veiy poor track record when it came to 
arrangements for housing their employees in the city of Bombay and close-by areas. 
The two Bombay based railway companies, the Port Trust, and the Municipality, had 
built only 2640 one-room tenements -  taken together -  during the period between 1901 
and 19 1 5.444 In response to this, E.S Montagu, then Liberal Secretaiy of State for India, 
drew on the British experience. He argued that was it to be found that cotton textile 
mill owners did not live up to their obligations, or that existing legislation was 
inadequate, it should now be considered whether the government or local authorities 
should be given greater powers, on the lines of the Housing Acts in England. ‘The 
experience of housing difficulties in this country’, Montagu asserted, ‘indicates that 
private enterprise cannot be relied on to provide the adequate remedy’. He invoked a 
limit to laissez-faire.
440 Kidambi, P. (2001) State, society and labour in colonial Bombay c. 1893-1918. Unpublished 
Ph.D. thesis. Oxford.
44! Government o f  India (1914) Report o f  the Bombay Development Committee.
442 M.S.A. G.B. G.D. Compilation 1524 (a) o f 1918. Private letter Sethna to secretary to G.B. 
G.D. 15 July 1915.
443 M.S.A. G.B. G.D. Compilation 1524 (a) o f 1918. Letter secretary Bombay Development 
Committee to secretary to G.B. G.D 25 May 1914.
444 M.S.A. G.B. G.D. Compilation 1142 o f 1918. Letter Thomas to secretaiy to G.I. 13 March
1918.
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According to his information, 800,000 people lived in one-room tenements in Bombay 
City, and he found the pace in the construction of new housing very slow. Montagu 
asserted that the housing situation in Bombay was 'highly unsatisfactory’, and that it 
demanded 'immediate and energetic action’ on behalf of government. He requested a 
report on conditions of housing in Bombay.445
Montagu’s request went out to local administrators through the Government of 
Bombay during the autumn of 1917. With the exception of a few rooms made available 
to employees by municipalities or other local authorities for low or no rent, and rooms 
rented out by bigger employers in larger industrial centres in the Bombay Presidency 
like Ahmedabad and Surat, no comprehensive official scheme of housing had been 
designed 446
The Government of Bombay, in turn, calculated that nearly 900,000 people lived in one- 
roomed tenements, and still there was a shortage of 64,000 such tenements. And to this 
end, the administration said, the provision of housing by the Bombay Improvement 
Trust and private enterprise was ‘utterly inadequate’. State intervention was perceived 
as a practical necessity.
The War had altered the situation considerably, the Government argued. High prices of 
material, land and labour held back construction. Simultaneously, there was a big influx 
of migrants into urban areas, especially directed towards Bombay City. The shortage of 
housing did not only affect mill workers, but ‘artisans and labourers of all sorts: and 
also for the lower and upper middle classes, whether Indian or European’.447
Subsequently the debate over how an intervention could be designed, where the 
government and local authorities would deliver newly constructed housing for the lower 
rungs of society, began to occupy the minds of local elites and colonial officials. It was 
clear to the administration that it could not carry out reforms by itself; moreover, it 
needed some public legitimacy in its programmes. Yet to improve housing conditions 
was too important for the economy and stability of the Bombay Presidency to be left to
445 O.I.O.C. Bombay Proceedings Development Department. Despatch from the Secretary o f 
State for India no. 85 Rev. 26 October 1917.
446 M.S.A. G.B. G.D. Compilation 1142 o f 1918. Letter no. 6992 o f 1917. Secretary to G.B. to 
Commissioner in Sindh and Commissioners o f Divisions 6 October 1917.
447 O.I.O.C. Bombay Proceedings Development Department. Letter G.B. to G.I. E.D. 30 Sept
1919.
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the market. New actors must come forward. As the chairman of the Bombay 
Improvement Trust, J.P. Orr, argued:
we shall certainly need the aid not only of legislators 
but also of social reformers: for in these democratic 
days legislation involving interference with vested 
interests cannot be put through without the support of 
the people...Social reform is needed to create such 
discontent with existing conditions as will lead to the 
formulation of definite public opinion in favour of the 
adoption of higher standards in two important 
matters; (1) a higher standard of comfort, especially 
for the poorer classes...(2) a higher standard in the 
sacrifice of private to public interests’.448
In order to resolve this issue, administrators began to look towards Britain for 
inspiration. As he would later give evidence before the Indian Industrial Commission, 
A.E. Mirams asked permission from the Indian Office to study housing in larger towns 
in England, as he was anxious to familiarise himself with ‘the latest thing in housing on 
the British Isles’.449
Measures taken by official bodies in England to empower local authorities to deal with 
housing impressed colonial officials in Bombay. Thomas H. Holland, who we met in 
the Preface, wondered while in Bombay for the Industrial Commission whether it would 
be ‘possible to go a step further towards these socialistic arrangements and allow the 
Municipality to build the chawls, charging the mills in proportion to the labour they 
employ?’ 450
J.P. On* sent home a report from London where he had studied how ‘the housing 
problem’ was ‘being tackled in England’. His report was put together in a leaflet and
448 Orr, J. (1917 8 October) 'Social Reform and Slum Reform: Bombay Past and P resent '. A 
lecture delivered to the Social Service League. Bombay.
449 M.S.A. G.B. G.D. Compilation 959 o f 1917. Letter Mirams to India Office 16 August 1917.
450 Government o f India (1918) Report o f  the Indian Industrial Commission. Written and Oral 
Evidence. Witness no. 298 J. A. Wadia oral evidence 12 November 1917 [question by chairman 
T. Holland].
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read at the meeting of the Bombay Co-Operative Housing Association in early August 
1919. The association comprised influential businessmen and public figures; on this 
evening justice N.G. Chandavarkar presided over the meeting. In his report Orr had 
found that the question of housing had been tackled wholeheartedly by all concerned in 
Britain, ‘from King to workman’.
Orr found measures such as the introduction of ‘drastic amendments’ to the Working 
Classes Act inspiring. Being present in the House of Commons and the London County 
Council when housing was debated, he took heart at the way that party differences were 
put aside to get to the root of the matter. He commented on the enormous amount of 
money being spent on housing in England, and the thorough ways in which several 
committees have been studying the matter.
The most important aspect of the whole question, however, was the forming of public 
opinion. Orr commented on how the:
workmen’s aspiration to higher standard of comfort was very 
evident, and what is more, very well received; and the writer 
could not help feeling that the problem of housing the 
working classes in Bombay would be far easier if there were 
more evidence of similar aspirations there, if there were more 
“divine discontent”, some agency like the Labour Party of 
England to champion the cause of the working classes.451
Initially, planning for the actual construction of new housing evolved around the 
existing structure of the Bombay Improvement Trust. However, as the new scheme 
would demand close co-ordination between various authorities, Governor George Lloyd 
suggested instigating a Development Board.452 The Government of India generally 
accepted the idea and scope of the suggested Development Board, but saw difficulties in 
its relation to other local authorities.453
451 M.S.A. G.B. G.D. Compilation 379 o f 1919. Orr, J.P. (1919) ‘The Housing Problem: How it 
is being tackled in England’. In The Bombay Co-operative Housing Association. Leaflet No. 33.
452 O.I.O.C. Bombay Proceedings Development Department o f 1919. Letter no. 387-P. Thomas 
to secretary to G.I. E.D. 30 September 1919.
453 O.I.O.C. Bombay Proceedings Development Department o f 1919. Letter no. 154 G.I. E.D. 12 
November 1919.
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Soon the scope of this board expanded considerably. Some months later, Lloyd and the 
Government of Bombay had changed their view with regards to who should actually 
cany out the housing scheme. They found that it was better if  the Improvement Trust 
concentrated its work on the schemes it had already undertaken but not yet 
implemented, partly due to the War. Instead, Lloyd proposed to establish a 
Development Department, which would deal with the ‘housing question’ in Bombay. It 
was to be designed in the fashion of the Munitions Boards -  that is, simultaneously a 
department of Government and an executive authority.
The Development Department in Bombay was the first of its kind in British India. And 
as such, it mapped out a distinct realm for its functioning. The department was to be 
organised in such a way, Lloyd argued, that it could by itself cany out schemes 
pertinent to housing in Bombay. For example, it would take over all questions regarding 
acquisition of land in Bombay City.454 Its director would be represented on the boards 
of several local authorities. The department, Lloyd suggested, was to be a specialised 
one -  yet still firmly placed within the local state structure.
The Development Department was fonned within the new governmental framework put 
in place by the 1919 Government of India Act. The Act established a governing system 
in which government departments were either transferred or reserved. Reserved 
departments answered to British authority. Transferred departments were placed under 
elected ministers, and as such they ensured limited local representation and influence. 
The Development Department was constructed as a reserved department of government, 
and as such, it was placed under the Governor.
Local elites were split in their immediate opinions over the announcement of the new 
department. During the debate in the Bombay Legislative Council following the 
publication of the new plans, nationalists rejected the idea of placing it directly under 
British authority and argued that the lack of public consultation beforehand showed the
454 O.I.O.C. Bombay Proceedings Development Department of 1920. Letter no. 1359. Monie to 
secretary G.I. E.D. 4 February 1920.
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arrogance of the administration.455 Industrialists argued for the need to involve local 
manufacturers. However, members of the council embraced the idea of something being 
done concerning the housing problem. Some newspapers called for non-official 
involvement; others found official agency necessary, yet debated whether it was up to 
the Municipality or the Government to carry out the schemes 456
More specifically, the Development Department was to deal with the construction of 
infrastructure and houses in and around Bombay City. Consequently, the newly 
established Industrial Housing Scheme was placed under this department. From here, 
plans emerged to construct 50,000 tenements in order to house 250,000 people in 
compartmentalised industrial-class areas of Bombay City.457 Apparently, George Lloyd 
had had to curtail his initial plan of providing housing for 320,000 people.458
After constructing these tenements the Government had no intention of actually 
managing them. It was thought that employers, as well as the municipality and co­
operative housing societies, should take over responsibility for collecting rent and 
keeping the constructed houses in shape. The Government also had a plan to let newly 
constructed houses to local civil society organisations such as the Social Service 
League, The Depressed Classes Mission, the Maratha Samaj and Christian 
organisations, so that these organisations ‘endeavour to inculcate habits of decency and 
cleanliness among the tenants’ 459 Soon, however, the administration took over the 
running of the houses it had constructed as well.
It was suggested that if rents in the newly built houses were to be set below market 
levels, people would freely migrate to newly built areas. However, this strategy would 
amount to a loss for the colonial administration. To resolve this deficit it created the 
Cotton Cess, a town duty of 1 rupee on every bale of raw cotton travelling through 
Bombay City and Port. Money generated by the tax would be diverted to cover the
455 See: M.S.A. Proceedings o f Bombay Legislative Council. Proceedings o f  3 August 1920.
456 M.S.A. Government of Bombay (1920) Confidential Weekly Report on Newspapers 
Published in the Bombay Presidency. Extract from the Indian Social Reformer, August 14; Sanj 
Vartaman 21 August; Bombay Chronicle 21 August.
457 O.I.O.C. Government o f Bombay Departmental Reports. Annual Report o f  the Development 
Department 1921.
458 O.I.O.C. Montagu Papers Mss Eur 524. Collection 24. Private letter Lloyd to Montagu 17 
August 1919.
459 O.I.O.C. Government o f  Bombay Departmental Reports. Annual Report o f  the Development 
Department 1924.
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losses on rent. The duty, as it turned out, was also a source of revenue for the nearly 
bankrupt Municipality: it was to keep 3/7th of the duty and 4/7th was channelled towards 
housing.460 India Office accepted this form of taxation, even though it had preferred one 
that would fall more directly on mill owners.461 The tax resulted in Bombay losing out 
on trade, which was being re-directed towards Karachi.
Taken together, one colonial official claimed, these schemes under the Development 
Department implied ‘the greatest transformation of any city in the world which has been 
undertaken since Napoleon III with the help of Haussmann recreated Paris’.462 But out 
of grand plans came little. In the end, only 16,000 tenements were actually constructed 
under this scheme. Soon, letters dripping frustration over superiors and fellow colonial 
officials poured out of the Governor’s House in Bombay. ‘The main source of trouble 
and difficulty I find in doing anything here’ writes George Lloyd to Montagu with 
regard to the proposed programmes of the Development Department,
lies in the relationship of the local Government to the Government 
of India. It meets one at every turn, it delays, baffles and nullifies 
all one’s energy and destroys all one’s hopes.463
The Development Department became a subject of strong public criticism.464 Costly 
attempts to reclaim land from the sea at the so-called Back Bay caused public outrage. 
The critique was only partly based on principle; often it stemmed from the fact that 
many of the early large orders for material and plants were placed in Britain, while local 
elites demanded them to be landed by Indian firms, in the context of a post-War 
depression for industries 465
460 O.I.O.C. Government o f Bombay Departmental Reports. Administrative Report o f  the 
Municipal Commissioner o f  Bombay City fo r  the year 1919-20.
461 O.I.O.C. Bombay Proceedings Development Department of 1920. Secretary o f State for 
India to Viceroy telegram 4 May 1920.
462 Government o f India (1916) Report o f  the Bombay Back Bay Inquiry Committee. Written and 
Oral Evidence, volume 1. Witness no. 48 Chitale oral evidence 16 August 1926, 216.
463 O.I.O.C. Montagu Papers Mss Eur 524. Collection 22. Private letter Lloyd to Montagu 18 
March 1919.
464 Subedar, M. (1926) Minority Report. In Government o f Bombay Report o f  Bombay 
Development Department Advisory Committee, 33.
465 M.S.A. G.B. P.W.D (D.D). File 120 o f 1921. Correspondence between Indian Merchant 
Chamber and Bureau and the Development Department November 1920-January 1921.
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The Government of India argued that from the perspective of the colonial government, 
the financing of the housing schemes was the main crux. There was little room for 
further taxation. And for the Bombay Government, reallocations in the budget were not 
yet an option that would cover the expenses. Instead, the Government of Bombay now 
desired to lend money through long-term premium bonds, to an extent sufficient to 
finance the work under the Development Department. The funds raised by the bonds 
would be held by Bombay Development Fund Trustees.
Lloyd suggested in 1920 that, within the coming five years, 30 crores of rupees would 
be required to finance the Development Department schemes and the loans of local 
bodies in Bombay. This proposal was not met with much enthusiasm in London, as the 
House of Commons had rejected long-term premium bonds as a way of financing public 
spending.466 Initially, the so-called Development Loan managed to raise a significant 
amount of money from the public, and it was hailed by the India Office as a success. 
For years to come, however, as the schemes under the Development Department began 
to fail spectacularly, the payment of interest and instalments on the loans pushed the 
Presidency very close to bankruptcy. Budgets for ‘nation building* departments of 
government, such as covering for education and health, were significantly cut in order 
to cover for the failures of the Development Department.
5.4.3. Bio-politics of housing
Were the colonial administration to engage housing, it was argued, it might better 
handle growing mobilisation and discontent in Bombay. This, the Government of India 
wrote to the then Under Secretary of State for India William Duke, was of high priority. 
The Government of India argued that while it was well aware of the difficulties in terms 
of financing the housing schemes in Bombay, it was ‘impressed with the industrial and 
political importance’ of coming forward with actual proposals with regards to housing 
in Bombay:
466 O.I.O.C. Bombay Proceedings Development Department o f 1920. Telegram No. A-202 
Viceroy to Secretary o f State for India 17 March 1920.
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[tjhere is abundant evidence to show that the very 
unsatisfactory conditions of housing are among the 
chief causes of the industrial unrest that manifests 
itself as periodical strikes, whilst reduction in factory 
hours and increase of wages merely add serious and 
cumulative taxes to local industries without, under 
the existing state of housing, corresponding 
advantages to the workers.467
Interventions to create better housing conditions could prove a successful measure to 
combat unrest. But to build houses might not be enough, officials in Bombay began to 
suggest. New social surveys directed their attention to the fact that an disproportionately 
high percentage of working- and middle-class wages went to the payment of rent, even 
in the newly built chawls.468 Rents were on the rise: between 1913 and 1915 the average 
rent of one-room tenements had risen by more than 70 per cent.469
The First World War made the general economic relationship between tenants and 
landlords a critical one. Production growth in certain industries led to migration into 
Bombay City. As prices on staple goods rose, already strained working-class and lower- 
middle-class household budgets were on the verge of collapse. According to the records, 
disturbances in the poor quarters of Bombay City tipped the Government of India in 
favour of regulating rent levels.
The administration in Bombay feared widespread instability, and sought new rent 
regulating measures. Provisions were made under the Defence of India Act of 1915.470 
Under this ruling a landlord could not extract rent exceeding 10 rupees a month, save an 
additional fixed percentage each year in order to compensate for increased costs in 
repairs. When made into provincial legislation, two Rent Acts were passed.471 They
467 O.I.O.C. Bombay Proceedings Development Department o f 1920. Letter no. 6 1920 Sharp to 
Duke 26 February 1920.
468 Government o f Bombay (1924) Report o f  the Special Advisory Committee on the Industrial 
Housing Scheme. Bombay.
469 Mirams, 1916, 24.
470 M.S.A. G.B. G.D. Compilation 1136 o f 1920. Letter G.B. to E.S. Montagu 8 February 1918.
471 Bombay Rent Act No I, Act No III o f  1918; Bombay Rent Act No II Act no. VII o f 1918.
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were installed ‘for the purpose of public safety’, and cleared for the control and 
regulation of housing of labourers and artisans and their families.472
One Act was created in order to restrict the increase of rent in general in Bombay, the 
other as a continuation of attempts to restrict rent costs for labourers and artisans. These 
Acts were, in scope and character, related to the Rent Acts put in place in Britain at the 
same time. One major difference was that in the Bombay context there was no fixed and 
guiding ‘standard of living’, and administrators had neither then nor later any intention 
of calculating one.473 The issue was debated within the legislative council. Indian 
members were split. Landlords felt that low rent levels went against their interest, while 
more reformist members called for even lower levels of rent. The issue, however, did 
not rouse any wider anti-colonial sentiments.
The establishment of new and concrete institutions enforced interventions into the social 
domain. Hence, a Rent Controller, a new function, was given significant powers under 
the Rent Act. The Rent Controller in Bombay City mapped Bombay into a grid covering 
all areas of the city. For inspection puiposes Bombay was divided into seven wards. 
Each ward was divided into 82 sections. A Superintendent supervised each ward, and a 
ward clerk, in turn, supervised each section.474 In fact, the Rent Controller had the 
powers of a civil court. He was to settle disputes between parties after hearing them out 
and could, in this process, demand the production of witnesses. There was no appeal 
against the Rent Controller’s decisions. On his word, for example, premises that he 
found to be withheld from occupation for ‘no good reason’ could be confiscated by 
Government and rented out. In the first reading of the Bill it was suggested that a refusal 
from the landlord should carry three months’ imprisonment. Geographically, the 
provisions under the Rent Act could be applied wherever the Government of Bombay 
deemed appropriate. In this way it came to constitute a means to confiscate property 
without liability 475
472 M.S.A. G.B. G.D. Compilation 1136 o f 1918. G.B. J.D. Memorandum 17 February 1918.
473 M.S.A. G.B. G.D. File no 1432 (iii) -  (a) of 1925. Letter Collector and Rent Controller 
Bombay Suburban District 19 February 1924.
474 M.S.A. G.B. G.D. Compilation 1136 of 1918. Municipal officer [n.s] to Controller o f Prices 
letter [n.d].
475 M.S.A. Proceedings o f the Bombay Legislative Council. Desai, P.A. Proceedings o f 30 July 
1918.
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The Acts were not initially debated among colonial officials. They were conceived as 
emergency measures, which would serve their purpose throughout the war. But as the 
war ended only a minority of colonial officials argued for the abolition of the Acts’; a 
majority wanted to see them kept. One of the main justifications for the Rent Acts was 
that they would serve as a non-coercive means to uphold stability in the city of Bombay. 
As former Municipal Commissioner Cadell put it, ‘I have heard from the highest police 
authority in Bombay that the Rent Act has had a very good effect and more especially a 
sedative or soothing effect’ 476 The Acts could serve to buy the consent of the majority 
of the population, who would otherwise have to pay more than half of their earnings in
477rent. Accordingly, administrators found that the Acts ‘were always political’.
For Cadell and others within governing circles in Bombay, the way politics now 
expanded its reach into the social domain was a novelty with beneficial results. By 
reaching into society through designed housing interventions, the administration hoped 
to forestall public discontent, but also channel capacities within society towards more 
productive ends. Bio-political interventions such as housing policy could bring better, 
and perhaps more sustainable results than forceful interventions through the police or 
the military. With a principle of lassaiz-faire, this opportunity would have been lost to 
the administration.
5.5. Local responses to social interventions
On a general level all three cases described above point toward the ways in which social 
imperialism translated into the actual work of the colonial administration in the Bombay 
Presidency. The three cases show how the expanding bio-political scope of the colonial 
state formed and was introduced into Bombay. Moreover, as I suggested in the 
introduction to this chapter, these cases also indicate the decentralised level on which 
colonial state power began to intervene into colonial society during the time here under 
review. Detail provided by these cases exemplifies how newly designed interventions 
asserted themselves on the everyday level through projects of housing and rent
476 M.S.A. Proceedings o f the Bombay Legislative Council. Cadell, R.R. Proceedings o f 4 
February 1918, 591.
477 M.S.A. G.B. G.D. File no 1432 (iii) -  (a) o f 1925. Letter Controller o f Rent Bombay 
Suburban Division 19 February 1925.
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regulations, through the introduction of education for children in factories, or through 
detailed planning of movements in plague infected areas.
However, the chalking out of a widened area of state action and the making of ‘the 
social’ into a political entity in Bombay did not happen without response from 
individuals, sections and groups within colonial society. As it was politicised, the social 
domain became a space for various struggles, and in this section I will briefly address 
some of them. How these struggles formed and were fought out is outside the scope of 
this thesis. However, although I concentrate on narrating the birth of social imperialism, 
and how it translated into practises of government, I think it important to acknowledge 
the various ways in which interventions into the newly conceptualised social domain 
were resisted, or responded to, in the colonial context.
In this section I will categorise two forms of responses to the social interventions 
discussed above: spontaneous and mobilised. Although structurally restricted, both 
forms of responses did form in the Bombay Presidency during the period under review. 
Responses of the first category rarely evolved into wider protest on the part of local 
communities; occasional eruptions did not challenge colonial authority in any 
substantial way. These were weak responses in the sense that they lacked an 
organisational and ideological base. Spontaneous responses could be characterised as
478decentralised everyday friction, in opposition to decentralised everyday interventions.
The second category formed as a broad amalgamation of various forms of mobilised 
discontent. These responses to social interventions were integrated into wider 
frameworks: both explicitly nationalist, as well as autonomous workers-politics. 
Mobilised responses also include instances of political action earned by single-issue- 
associations. This action crystallised around particular issues, rather than over wider 
areas of policy.
478 Haynes, D. and Prakash, G. (1991) ‘'Introduction: The Entanglement o f Power and 
Resistance’ in Haynes, D. and Prakash, G. (Eds.) Contesting Power: Resistance and Everyday 
Social Relations in South Asia,. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1-22; Scott, J. C. 
(1985) Weapons o f  the Weak: Everyday Forms o f  Peasant Resistance. Hew Haven: Yale 
University Press.
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5.5.1 Spontaneous responses to social intervention
An example of the first category of spontaneous responses, or everyday friction, is 
illustrated with regard to Karachi during the plague epidemic, discussed above. In order 
to implement new and harsh plague measures, plague authorities visited a Khada fishing 
village in the Lyari area outside of Karachi City. During the visit of the authorities, 
rioting erupted in the village. The fishing village was small, with about 4000 to 6000 
inhabitants. Although the area was infected by plague, the villagers would neither move 
into health camps nor go into local segregation.
I showed above how plague measures had been intrusive in Karachi, as well as in Poona 
and Bombay. Objections to the ways in which the administration earned out its 
programmes were made on several grounds, but a sense that the authorities were 
violating bodies, the domestic sphere, and religious sentiment, were central to Indian 
resentment. In Bombay, Hindu Brahmins refused to go into mixed hospitals where they 
feared pollution by lower-caste Hindus. Muslims as well as Hindus protested against the 
public examination of women by male doctors. Segregationist policies, based on the 
construction of almost inaccessible and separated health camps, encouraged families to 
hide infected relatives, rather than separate themselves from them for an unspecified 
duration of time. Outbursts of violence against plague measures were not infrequent.479
Yet in Karachi plague authorities saw local protests against plague interventions as 
ordinary law and order problems. When preparing to enter the Khada village in Lyari, 
the District Magistrate and President of the Plague Committee in Karachi, J. Sladen, 
foresaw trouble. ‘There is among them’, wrote Sladen, ‘a considerable number of bad 
characters known to the Police’. Every year they were ‘giving trouble’ to the plague 
authorities, Sladen complained.480
In late April of 1898 villagers openly defied one of the representatives of the plague 
authorities who had come to inspect the village and forcefully remove plague-infected 
inhabitants. The inspection had then been called off, but Sladen insisted in carrying out
Arnold, 1993,211-218.
480 S.A. R.C.S. G.D. (Plague). Box 5749, file 1, volume 2 o f 1899. Letter J.D. 1497 District 
M agistrate Karachi to Commissioner in Sind o f 1899 4 May 1899.
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inspections. On a later occasion he decided to call for assistance to the plague 
inspectors, for two hundred ‘rank and file’ of the Bombay Grenadiers. The soldiers were 
to have parts of the village cordoned off. In these parts of the village, Sladen argued, 
plague had been the worst, and here resided ‘the most troublesome clan of the village’.
About three hundred village men gathered to resist the measure. Sladen ordered officer 
Swann, who was commanding the Grenadiers that day, to use force in order to cany out 
the containment of the village. Swami earned out these orders. He later wrote to Gilles, 
the Collector of Karachi, how proud he was of his soldiers.481 Several villagers were 
severely injured by bayonets and rifle butts.
Representatives from the fishing village signed a petition to the Commissioner in Sind
complaining about the treatment they received by visiting plague superintendents. ‘We
neither entertained the least idea of intentionally disobeying any reasonable order or of
creating any disturbances or riot’, the petitioners wrote. Plague officers, accompanied
by ‘military power’, the petitioners ascertained, surrounded village houses, and
‘immediately afterwards they began to rush in our huts and drag our children and
females whoever came in their way’. Moreover, they used their bayonets ‘freely’,
stabbing several villagers. The representatives of the village now called for an impartial 
» * *enquiry into the incident. The Acting Commissioner urged the collector of Karachi to
send an officer to the village and convey the commissioner’s response personally.483 
The message was read to the villagers; in it the commissioner wholly approved of the 
intervention. The villagers ‘must obey the Sarkar’s [lit. headman — here used for the 
Collector] orders and the Sarkar only wishes them well, as does the Commissioner’, 
said the note.484 Yet the population of the fishing village continued to refuse migrating 
freely to the medical huts created by the administration.
Going through the records one finds several cases of spontaneous responses to social
interventions. Housing records tell of flight protests as petty landowners flee court
481 S.A. R.C.S. G.D. (Plague). Box 5749, file 1, volume 2 o f 1899. Private letter Swann to Gilles 
6 May 1899.
482 S.A. R.C.S. G.D. (Plague). Box 5749, file 1, volume 2 o f 1899. Petition Saleh Hussein et al.
4 May 1899.
483 S.A. R.C.S. G.D. (Plague). Box 5749, file 1, volume 2 o f 1899. Memo no. P-92 o f 1899 
Wingate 6 May 1899.
484 S.A. R.C.S. G.D. (Plague). Box 5749, file 1, volume 2 o f 1899. J.P.H [City Deputy 
Collector] to Saleh Hussein note [true translation] 6 May 1899.
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procedures, when their land is to be coercively acquired.485 The annual reports of 
government housing schemes show on a yearly basis the amount of money lost in the 
Revenue Department due to absconding tenants 486 These protests often articulate 
resentment of perceived injustice or harm, rather than anti-colonial sentiment. They did 
not crystallise into systematic or organised forms of protest; they occurred on an 
occasional basis. However, as I will exemplify in the next section, organised responses 
to social interventions existed as well.
5.5.2 Mobilised responses to social intervention
The journey from the first category of spontaneous response, to the second category of 
mobilised struggle centred on everyday social interventions is a long one. I can only 
indicate certain tendencies of mobilisation in this work. Rajnarajan Chandavarkar, 
however, argues that this decentralised level of everyday life was important for the 
formation of workers’ politics and political responses to British rule in Bombay. He has 
pronounced the ‘neighbourhood’ as a category for workers’ mobilisation.487 Access to 
formal political power in colonial Bombay was, of course, restricted to an exclusive 
sphere of colonial officials and local elites. This level saw few contributions from 
Indians before 1919, and it only gradually opened up for an indigenous elite 
contribution after the Government of India Act of 1919. Popular participation was in no 
way present.
Nonetheless, within actual unfolding interventions, mobilised responses did emerge. 
These responses took shape as elite ventures, or at least as elite mediated responses. As 
an example, I will refer to the formation of mobilised responses to housing and rent 
interventions in Bombay in the 1920s. The mobilisation included organised interests: 
chambers and associations for industrial and merchant interests; a Tenant Movement; a
485 O.I.O.C. Government o f Bombay Administration Reports. Annual Report o f  the Bombay 
Improvement Trust 1902, 14-15.
486 See: O.I.O.C. Government o f Bombay Administration Reports. Annual Reports o f  the 
Industrial Housing Scheme for the years 1929-30 and 1939-40.
487 Chandavarkar, R. (1991) 'Worker's Resistance and the Rationalization o f Work in Bombay 
between the W ars', in Haynes, D. and Prakash, G. (Eds.) Contesting Power: Resistance and  
Everyday Social Relations in South Asia. Berkeley: University o f California Press, 109-144
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Landlords’ Association. The arena for protest was the city itself, and the press, to a large 
extent.
At times, when considerations were made whether the Rent Acts should be abolished or 
extended, especially in 1919, 1924 and 1928, the tenant movement arranged public 
meetings in newly built chawls and elsewhere, passing resolutions and signing petitions. 
These meetings were often convened by social reform organisations such as Servants of 
India, or the Social Service League. Workers from various locations came together in 
these meetings. Unions did take part in the mobilisation in its early form. Occasionally 
unlikely parties connected through protests: In 1919 the Bombay branch of the 
European Association, and more than 3,500 clerks in the Clerks’ Union, found 
themselves on the same side arguing for the extension of the Rent Acts.489
Mill owners and merchants exercised more direct influence over the bureaucracy: high- 
placed administrators were always invited as guests at the Bombay Millowners 
Association’s annual meeting.490 Many prominent industrialists and landlords also acted 
inside political structures. They were members of the Legislative Council, they sat on 
committees and on -  for example — the Advisoiy Board advising on the construction of 
working class housing in Bombay. The working classes, on the other hand, gained 
representation on the Board only after explicit requests.491
5.6. Conclusion
In this chapter I have exemplified and detailed how social imperialism translated into 
actual colonial policy in the Bombay Presidency during the period 1895-1925. Laying 
out details allowed me to pursue an argument about how the colonial state on the 
decentralised level of actual intervention, when addressing mundane questions of 
housing, sanitation and education, began to chalk out a bio-political space of action. The
488 M.S.A. G.B. G.D. File no 5518 (i) 1924; MSA. G.B. G.D. File 5518 (iii) 1928.
489 M.S.A. G.B. G.D. Compilation 1135. Resolution by the Clerks Union, 16 August 1919; 
European Association Bombay Branch to G.B. letter 13 August 1919.
490 See: Bombay M illowners’ Association (1925) Report o f  the Bombay M illowners’ 
Association, 5.
491 M.S.A. G.B. P.W .D (D.D.). File 59 (i). Telegram K. Dwarkadas 12 May 1921.
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details described above shows the ways in which new limits to market- and society 
based action were drawn in colonial Bombay.
I exemplified this process by pointing out how action against a plague epidemic in 
Karachi City set a limit to societal self-care, how productivist arguments for compulsory 
education in the Bombay Presidency set the limit for voluntarism, and how housing 
projects in Bombay City marked the limit to laissez-faire. These three cases show in 
different ways how interventions into society were designed and implemented in order 
to address threats to stability, risks of disruption to polity and markets, and obstacles to 
general industrial progress.
The first case described the ways in which the colonial administration reacted to an 
outbreak of bubonic plague in the port city of Karachi, 1896-1900. I showed that while 
the epidemic ran its course, authorities began to question their own knowledge about 
social conditions in the city, and also their ability to actually reach into society. I then 
pointed out how, in the face of social crises, the colonial administration resorted to 
stringent and coercive interventions in order to allegedly secure the city, rehabilitate 
trade and contain the disease. Society, the administration argued, could not heal itself; 
rather, the state had to mark the limit to self-care by implementing far-reaching 
interventions.
In the second case I investigated the debate whether or not the colonial administration 
ought to introduce free and compulsory primary education into the Presidency, in 
parallel with the introduction of free and compulsory primary education in Europe. I 
revisited the debate concerning education in the years 1905-25. I showed how the 
colonial administration initially was actively working against free and compulsory 
education on the grounds of the ‘backwardness’ or the Tow level of development’ of 
Indians. According to colonial administrators in the Presidency it would mean an 
unnecessary political risk to introduce compulsion into primary education, as it might 
outrage those parents who would both lose out on their children’s earning, as well as be 
levied a fine for keeping their children from school. However, by the end of the period 
under review the administration changed opinion after productivist arguments in favour 
of compulsion in education began to surface. The opinion that production could be 
increased if the workforce was better educated caught the attention of influential 
sections of administrators and business elites.
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Finally, I investigated the conditions of housing in Bombay City between 1915 and 
1925. I discussed how the question of housing, and in particular that of the lower 
middle-classes and the working classes, developed into a question of the highest priority 
among colonial officials. Poor housing, it was argued, had effects on both polity and 
economy: it could also lead to a slowing down of industrial progress, as well as to urban 
instability. Local officials now found markets failing to tend to the social costs of 
industrial capitalism, and they took active steps to address the situation through the 
establishment of a new department of Government -  the Development Department. It 
designed plans to intervene into society in unprecedented ways, and it framed its 
projects with social language. The department had as its main objective to construct 
more than two hundred thousand new tenements. In the end, fewer than twenty 
thousand tenements were actually built.
The cases show how the administration began to further its reach into the social domain, 
and to act bio-politically through mundane questions of government. Yet, as I 
acknowledged in the final brief section of the chapter: the ways in which the social 
domain was turned political through the translation of social imperialism into colonial 
practice made it a space of struggles. I placed these forms of responses into two 
categories: spontaneous responses and mobilised responses.
The former, exemplified with unrest during the plague in Karachi, shows how villagers 
in the Lyari area resisted harsh plague measures through collective effort. Yet, I argued, 
this response was not based in ideology, and had no organisational base. It was not 
aimed at British rule per se .
I showed how the latter category of mobilised responses formed around the issue of 
housing in the city of Bombay. Public meetings were held where various sections of 
society were represented, various associations formed, and the responses took on an 
explicitly political character.
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6. Conclusion: putting bio-politics into empire
This study into the birth of social imperialism, how knowledge and political thought 
operated within it, and how the local colonial administration in the Bombay Presidency 
applied it, has connected areas of research that often are kept separate. Within the 
confines of an historical period -  1895-1925 -  I have discussed movements within 
British liberal political thought and within the history of British social science, and 
traced their influence over ideologies of the British Empire. I have studied the 
transforming of local realities in the Bombay Presidency, and how social imperialism 
translated into colonial social interventions. In conclusion I will now return to some of 
the main arguments of this work. I will then end by indicating some new angles of 
research that could follow from this study into the birth of social imperialism.
One has to tread cautiously with material from the archives. With hindsight, it is always 
tempting to read into the records too much of the present. I have made it clear 
throughout this work that I view colonial empire, imperialism, and local colonial 
practises as historical phenomena that should be studied as such. Decolonisation meant 
an end to empire, as we know it. Having said that, I think it important, on the basis of 
historical evidence, to expand discussions of the motivations, workings and features of 
empire and its underlying ideologies, not only for bringing new understanding to a 
particular period in the history of empire, but for shedding light on the many 
connections that do exist with what came after. As Mark Twain famously said, history 
does not repeat itself, but it rhymes.
By analysing the introduction of social concerns into imperialism, I have opened up for 
further probing the ways in which twentieth-century empire began to develop a bio­
political dimension alongside its already defined economic and military cum geo­
political motivations. From here, I will suggest, one could easily imagine further 
research into what motivations and features of socially sensitive empire, if any, found 
resonance within the new world of international organisations and domineering nation­
states that took shape during the period following decolonisation.
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The birth of twentieth-century social imperialism did not mark a definitive end to a 
particular era of British Empire, and the beginning of a new one. It should come as 110 
surprise that the British Raj, while under the influence of social imperialism, never 
converted itself from a military-fiscal state into a state that systematically tended to the 
welfare of its subjects. As always in the long and diverse intellectual and political 
history of the empire, shifts were never clear-cut. Actors, institutions, practices and 
ideologies of the British Empire mixed, moved, and resurfaced throughout its entire 
existence. Social imperialism, as I have identified it here, built on what came before, so 
that views and practices co-existed within the imperial machinery; new concerns for 
conditions of life would develop alongside lingering ideas of racism and British 
supremacy.
Nonetheless, at any one period of the British Empire, certain tendencies of the shifting 
ideology that underpined empire stood out and found particular resonance within local 
colonial administrations, and thus came to shape the language and policy of those 
administrations. What I have analysed here -  the introduction of social concerns into 
imperialism -  make up one such instance in the history of empire.
It was, as we have seen, not new for the British to intervene into life on the 
Subcontinent and to elaborate interventions within a reformist intellectual framework. I 
have shown how liberalism enjoyed a privileged place in the history of reformist 
ideology within empire, and especially under the British Raj. Social imperialism thus 
formed part of a longer imperial reformist engagement in India, and it borrowed some 
of its internal components from that engagement.
Whether early British interventionism and reformist ideology had any actual affect on 
everyday realities on the Subcontinent is, however, a matter of dispute among 
historians, I have pointed out. In this work I have presented historical evidence of local 
ramifications of social imperialism, yet I have refrained from claiming that such 
interventions produced sustainable social change on the Subcontinent.
In chapter two I suggested that there are patterns to be categorised in how interventions 
were conceived and designed. I suggested that interventions under early British rule -  
that is, until the Indian Mutiny of 1857 — could best be characterised as aiming at moral 
reform, designed to transform the moral character of Indians. Yet as I pointed out,
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although educational policy was elaborated, and campaigns against particular customs 
such as ‘suttee’ were implemented, they seem to have had only a marginal impact on the 
lives of Indians. Yet these interventions clearly reflected more than a fleeting colonial 
whim: they represented a mentality, and formed part of an early liberal reformist 
ideology brought to India by evangelical as well as utilitarian servants of the East India 
Company.
This phase, I argued, receded after the Indian Mutiny. It was replaced by what I have 
called revenue-enhancing interventions that were designed to increase the income of the 
consolidating colonial state. This shift could be explained by more than one factor, I 
argued. On the one hand, the British sensed that previous reformist interventions into 
Indian ways of life had caused resentment and discontent. Official rhetoric of that time 
indicated that fear of further unrest strengthened the British reluctance to continue moral 
reform interventions.
On the other hand, the shift towards revenue-enhancing interventions occurred at a time 
of intensified imperial competition among European powers. European chauvinism and 
racism fuelled ideas about a European right to govern over discrete places and peoples. 
The American Civil War caused disruptions within several agricultural markets, 
showing the weak spots in the structure of the world economy; simultaneously, 
technical innovations brought new intensity to industrial production. What Eric 
Hobsbawm has called the ‘Age of Empire’ was beginning to be felt in Asia and Africa.
However, I argued, by the early 1880s, British officials began to notice certain 
converging trends. Renewed resentment towards British rale was being channelled 
through modem forms of association. The Indian National Congress was perhaps the 
most elaborate platform from which critique of British policy was voiced. However, I 
pointed out, there were other forms of locally erupting unrest too. The mobilisation of 
nationalist and anti-British sentiment linked to a series of famines, outbreaks of 
epidemic diseases, and increased hardship among Indian urban populations.
A combination of calamities -  natural and man-made -  and new and productive ways to 
channel deep-felt dissatisfactions within colonial society built towards a real crisis in 
legitimacy for the colonial state. For the British, these experiences, I argued, ushered in 
a renewed interventionist rhetoric that allegedly aimed to preserve the lives of colonised
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subjects. The new interventionist phase, I suggested, was a preamble to social 
imperialism. However, interventions forming within that period were not defined as 
'social’ by imperialists and local colonial administrators. They were designed to meet 
particular crises, rather than as attempts to create an approach to manage society in a 
holistic manner. It would take a couple more decades for local colonial administrators to 
begin to describe the measures they adopted to reach into society, through a language of 
social reform.
The rise of social imperialism during the first quarter of the twentieth century would 
prove innovative within sections of the doctrine of imperial thought, as well as within 
local colonial practice. What was distinctly new with the birth of social imperialism was 
the conceptualisation of the domain intervened into. I will return to this below, but the 
very notion of the social as a political entity formed during the period here under 
review.
Moreover, arguments and language used when framing interventions into the social 
domain were new. Social imperialism carried with it a re-coding of interventionist 
language that would reflect hopes of elaborating a rational, scientific, and secular 
approach towards the management of society. Operators within the imperial machinery 
thought that to invoke ‘the social’ in debates over why imperial rule was necessary in 
India would help provide legitimacy to the continuation of the imperial enterprise. Yet, 
as I have pointed out, the process of re-framing interventions as social, rather than 
moral, did not exclude moral motivations in imperialism and local colonial policy. 
Neither in Britain, nor in India, did the social turn in government imply a de­
moralisation of society — as, for example, historian Gertrude Himmelfarb would have it. 
Religious sentiments, for example, would still inform how colonial administrators 
would motivate their work in India.
I discussed how this new interventionist ideology centred the state as a vehicle for 
reformist action. From both within and outside the imperial machinery, there were new 
demands for state action. As I have suggested, a wide range of previous assumptions 
regarding state-society relations were being reworked. Local colonial administrators 
found that the social turn implied a greater emphasis on the state, and on colonial 
administration, in carrying out interventions at the cost of society- or market-based
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action. For them, innovations in social interventions could promote stability while being 
framed by a progressive language.
Social imperialism as an ideology that would inform British imperialists, as well as 
local colonial administrators, formed within a particular context; the turn of the 
twentieth century was a time of great intellectual and material change in Britain, as well 
as in India. For imperialists, it was a time riddled with contradictions difficult to wish 
away. Great pressures were felt on everyday livelihoods all over an expanding British 
Empire, while technical advance and political doctrine underpinned visions of a less 
unequal society. Radical intellectual movements in Britain and social movements in 
India called for new ways of conceptualising state-society relations, and although 
evoked within very different political contexts, these movements challenged the 
credibility of the ways in which imperial and domestic authorities met and dealt with the 
needs of transforming societies.
I have shown that London by the turn of the twentieth century was at the centre of a 
radical reformulation of ideas concerning the obligation of the state to tend to the side 
effects of industrial capitalism, while still catering for the future progress of modem 
society. In chapters three and four I discussed how two developing movements 
converged at this point: that of a newly formulated social liberalism and that of 
consolidating British sociology. I showed how these two movements had a lot in 
common, and that they came to reinforce each other. People and ideas moved freely 
between social liberal and sociological camps. The universal aspirations of these two 
moments helped create a perception among sections of British thinkers, politicians and 
colonial administrators that there existed a shared experience within emerging modem 
industrial societies of the British Empire. This, in return, speeded up the movement of 
new political and sociological ideas between Britain and industrialising India.
I devoted parts of chapters three and four to show how during the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries it seemed evident to liberals — of whom many actively engaged 
in debates in sociology — and also to other British radicals such as the Fabians and 
certain strands of socialists, that a reformulated approach of government was needed in 
order to further the orderly development of industrial society. British radicals began to 
elaborate an intellectual framework where the state and political power were given 
central roles in the management of society. Through their labours they came up with a
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new object of government, and this was the most radical shift emanating from that 
eclectic intellectual London-milieu I suggested: the conceptualisation and politicisation 
of a new terrain of human existence called ‘the social’.
In order to better understand and analyse the intensified scientific and political interest 
in the social, I placed it in a wider analytical framework provided by Michel Foucault. 
As chapter one makes clear, my writing on the growing social concern in turn of the 
twentieth-century radical liberal thought and its impact on imperialism and local 
colonial government in Bombay has been influenced by his work on bio-politics. In my 
first chapter I described Foucault’s approach to the ways in which tending to conditions 
of life and the welfare of populations was linked to the rise of liberalism and liberal 
forms of government.
According to Foucault, for early liberals, utmost economy in statecraft -  that is, the 
most balanced utilisation of coercion in government -  was imperative. The most 
economic mode of government for liberals, argued Foucault, would thus be people 
governing themselves. Yet a self-governing people had to be morally and materially fit 
in order to successfully exercise their sovereignty, according to contemporary liberals. 
Subsequently, liberals came to rely 011 interventions into the social domain and 
conditions of life, ‘bio-politics’ in Foucault’s vocabulary, in order to develop the 
capacity of the governed. That is, the ability to tend to the moral and material condition 
of peoples emerged as a feature of good government in liberalism.
For Foucault, bio-politics was not necessarily monopolised by the state, but his 
assertions resonate well with the framing of new liberal ideas regarding the social 
obligation of the state that emerged around the turn of the twentieth century. I have 
pointed out that for early twentieth-century liberals, there were limits to the 
effectiveness with which societies and markets could avert the side effects of industrial 
society, and guide it towards future progress. For social liberals, charity or laissez-faire- 
based approaches were not only unable to cope with the many contradictions emerging 
within modem societies, they sometimes helped to produce them. Social liberals now 
looked in the direction of the state for more comprehensive action, and for moral and 
financial support -  yet not for total or complete policy.
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Chapters three and five make clear that the demands on the state, and the state’s 
response to those demands, were obviously differently framed in colonial Bombay, 
compared with how they were framed in Britain. In Bombay, administrators argued that 
colonial society lacked the capacity to tend to itself by means of charity, initially urging 
employers of larger labour forces to take their responsibility by looking after the welfare 
of their employees. But as I have shown, new demands on social interventions were 
increasingly placed at the level of the state during the period I have been revisiting. 
These new demands were voiced by imperialists within the imperial machinery, as well 
as by an array of local interests in Bombay -  industrialists, unionists and others.
In order to argue for more comprehensive state action within ‘the social’, however, I 
pointed out, liberals needed to come up with ideas of what the social domain in fact 
was. The social, I have suggested, was described as a dimensions of life that was 
somehow separate, yet contingent of, the economy and polity. In political terms, these 
aspects of life often proved to be technical and related to the eveiyday: they raised 
issues of housing, leisure, of education, of sanitation and health. Science, philosophy, 
and the arts invited much broader understandings of the social.
Debates referencing this social domain thus ranged from abstract views on the future 
evolution of industrial society, to exact estimations of various indicators of 
overcrowding, nutrition and household budgets for various sections of society. 
Previously detached aspects of life, I have argued, were now being linked and placed 
under the regulatory powers of the state. There seemed to exist, though, I suggested, a 
common notion of the capacity of these aspects of life to mobilise forces, causing great 
upheaval, as well as steady progress for society, economy and polity.
Clearly, the social domain was linked to the aspirations and consequences of modem 
life. The social was, however, not always evoked as being explicitly modem in itself — 
many sociologists studied the evolution of ‘social’ issues, problems and facts over time, 
yet the modem -  or the contemporary -  was always kept in the picture for comparison, 
as if what was actually studied were not the social problems or facts in themselves, but 
their dormant capacity to turn themselves into modem forms.
Modem society was thus always present as the final stage to any social development 
trajectory; it embodied the present stage of evolution, and, as such, it was
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conceptualised as being universally applicable; to twentieth-century liberals and other 
radicals, the spread of modem industrial society did not end at the shores of Britain. As 
such the emergence of the modem industrial society outside of Britain created for social 
liberals a sense of we-ness, of a shared experience that connected metropolitan and 
colonial society. Yet since the British had already lived that experience for decades, 
they thought of themselves as well-equipped to guide India through its perils.
I have shown that to social liberal imperialists, what carried the modern industrial 
society around the world was not really clear. The British Empire might be a vector, or, 
argued some within the broad liberal movement, an instigator that would by the touch of 
British industriousness and civilisation set free progressive forces internal to every 
society and civilisation. For others, it was capitalism that expanded outward from its 
British core; still, some put their faith in Christianity as a transforming force in society.
Nonetheless, I have argued, it seemed evident to early twentieth-century liberals that a 
reformulated approach of government was needed in order to avoid further strains on 
modern industrial society, wherever it would emerge. These liberals began to elaborate 
an intellectual framework where the state and political power was given a much more 
central role in the management of society. Those who argued for a more pronounced 
social concern of the state shared a conviction that individualistically oriented political 
thought proved unable to deal with the many new problems thrown up by industrial 
society. As the social became politicised, the role of state action within society was 
reassessed and reformulated in wide liberal circles, to the extent that early twentieth- 
century liberals -  contrary to their liberal tradition -  saw a need to regulate the social, 
and reduce the influence of laissez-faire.
I have shown how the reformulated political language that framed these new liberal 
demands for state action inspired liberal imperialists to include a social component in 
their ideas about the role of projected imperial power in industrialising India. Liberal 
imperialists like H.L. Samuel now suggested that it was similar concerns making them 
social reformers domestically that led them to argue for the continuation of empire 
abroad.
Yet in order to advance social concerns of domestic politics and colonial administration 
the social domain had to be made known, to be studied for its internal dynamics and
220
unknown features. Sociology emerged at this time as a “science of society”. I pointed 
out how sociology seemed attractive to domestic British politicians and local colonial 
officials alike as they thought it would help them — within different contexts — to decode 
the social through reasoned inquiiy.
Already from the outset, as I showed in chapter four, there was a rift among sociologists 
in Britain over whether their discipline was primarily to help advance concrete political 
and administrative solutions to social problems, or whether it should produce more 
abstract discussions on social evolution and related topics. 1 used debates within the 
newly formed Sociological Society in London to show the scope of those debates.
Now, for those within the sociologist community that suggested sociology as a means 
for advancing political arguments of social reform, sociology was a mere tool, an 
application of a method through which the many problems in society could be 
indentified and revealed. For those sociologists, the freedom of social science lay not in 
its independence from governmental interference, but in the truth it spoke. In the 
colonial context, I pointed out, science, and in extension social science, had always been 
measured by its administrative utility.
For social imperialists, sociology provided several advantages when linked to political 
power: it helped bring legitimacy to state action, and it brought to politics promises of 
certainty in dealings with society and life. For colonial administrators this was a 
welcomed development. While social scientists asked questions concerning what 
characterised life in industrial towns and how these new realities could be studied, 
predicted and compared, domestic bureaucrats and colonial officials asked questions 
concerning what were the effects on market and polity of the perceived deterioration in 
modem industrial society.
I have shown the extent to which sociology influenced colonial administrators in the 
Bombay Presidency. Detailed social surveys by Charles Booth, or Seebohm Rowntree 
were held up as examples also in colonial Bombay; I showed how their work influenced 
Flarold Hart Mann, who would later move to Bombay for work in the colonial 
administration. The sociological influence on colonial government, however, could best 
be understood by the ways in which the colonial administration of the Presidency 
attempted to officially introduce sociology as a research subject in colonial Bombay.
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By way of a detailed discussion on the establishment of a School of Economics and 
Sociology at the University of Bombay, 1 highlighted the growing demand for the 
discipline of sociology among colonial officials. I showed how colonial administrators 
were highly active in planning for the new research School. They hoped that a new 
research facility would bring new light to the circumstances that they found themselves 
in the middle of — the implications of which they could not clearly make out.
However, while the University of Bombay finally recruited the well-known Professor 
Patrick Geddes, who I showed had been an active voice in the forming of sociology in 
Britain, his sociology did not fit the colonial boot. Colonial administrators and local 
business elites looked for a practical and applied sociology that could generate data of 
contemporary social conditions. Geddes was marginalised and criticised for his abstract 
sociology. Nonetheless, I showed that sociology -  in its applied form -  clearly 
influenced the administration in colonial Bombay. Social surveys helped delineate and 
explore the social domain. I argued that sociology influenced local colonial 
administrators in a very specific way: it developed as a technology of government, 
which revealed the social in its double role as a resource to develop and a source of 
discontent.
While chapters three and four discussed political thought and knowledge in social 
imperialism, and how they related to the Bombay Presidency, in chapter five I detailed 
exactly how social imperialism translated into actual colonial social interventions in the 
Bombay Presidency during the period 1895-1925. Providing details enabled me to 
narrate how the colonial state on the decentralised level of actual intervention -  when 
addressing mundane questions of housing, sanitation and education -  began to chalk out 
a bio-political space of action. Thus, f described the ways in which new limits to 
market- and society based action were drawn in colonial Bombay. The cases I discussed 
concerned how action against a plague epidemic in Karachi City set a limit to societal 
self-care, how productivist arguments for compulsory education in the Bombay 
Presidency set the limit for voluntarism, and how housing projects in Bombay City 
showed the limitations of laissez-faire.
The cases show in concrete ways how the administration began to further its reach into 
the social domain. They show details of how the social formed as a space of
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legitimating colonial policy, as well as a space of contestation of local interventions. I 
showed how local colonial officials engaged certain calculations concerning benefits 
and drawbacks when furthering the reach of the state into the social domain. Yet, to 
expand the bio-political scope of the local colonial administration was a slow process 
covering decades. While the stability of the working-classes and middle-classes werer 
important factors in colonial housing policy, in the case of education for example, it was 
product!vist motives that furthered the social agenda. The rise of Japan, and the First 
World War proved to lcoal business and colonial officials the importance of having a 
basically educated labour force. Consequently, the idea of free and compulsory 
education became anchored within the colonial administration.
However, in chapter three I argued, that there were also more refined arguments to 
expand the bio-political scope in imperialism: in the radicalised political climate in 
India, tending to social conditions of the subject population could serve as a more 
sustainable mode of government for local colonial administrations than the use of force. 
For a liberal like E.S. Montagu, a bio-political approach brought more legitimacy, as 
well as efficiency, to the ways in which the colonial state dealt with Indian populations. 
For him, and twentieth-century liberals like him, to repress unrest would only produce a 
fiercer backlash. He attached legitimacy to the claims but not to the methods of Indian 
revolutionaries when suggesting that the effort of the British administration must be to 
win the extremists over by becoming a better social reformer than the revolutionaries set 
themselves up to be.
Yet, as I acknowledged in the final brief section of chapter five, the ways in which the 
social domain was turned political through the translation of social imperialism into 
colonial practice made it a space of struggles and responses. I placed these forms of 
responses into two categories: spontaneous responses and mobilised responses. While 
the former category shows local populations’ suspicion towards British official intent, it 
was not further based in ideology. The latter form of response, however, was political in 
a traditional way: it relied on organisation and political consciousness. The colonial 
administration was anxious of both forms of response, and it was especially anxious that 
they would conflate.
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6.1. Further implications of the study
Although the topic of this study has led me to discuss what at a first glance might seem 
disparate areas of research, I have tried to keep the work concise. Consequently, there 
are questions that I acknowledge as important in relation to the birth of social 
imperialism, but have had to leave out for the sake of consistency. Below, I intend to 
outline a discussion with three interlinked components that build on the groundwork 
laid in this thesis but which I did not pursue in this work. I hope the discussion might 
provide ideas for future research into the motivations, effects, and legacies of social 
imperialism.
In this study I have pointed out that social concerns were introduced into imperialism at 
a time when the British Raj was in question. Assertive Indian nationalism broadened its 
base by penetrating new layers of colonial society, and other forms of discontent 
continued to find an outlet through a wide range of protests and eruptive unrest. 
Moreover, as I have pointed out, critique of previous policies of the Raj was voiced 
from within the imperial machinery too. New ideas concerning how the colonial 
administration would govern India more effectively were, as I have shown, developing 
with an acknowledgment of past administrations’ inactivity. Yet those new approaches 
formulated within the colonial state did not suppose the end of the British Raj; rather, 
they built on the calculation of the indefinite perpetuation of British rule over India. 
Consequently, I think it important to further study historically what extent social 
imperialism formed as a self-reproductive force of empire.
I have shown how imperialists in Britain and local colonial administrators in Bombay, 
nourished hopes that social imperialism, when translated into local policy, would break 
with previous policy and produce the stability and legitimacy needed for empire to carry 
on during the twentieth century. Imperialists hoped that addressing areas of everyday 
concern of Indians would reduce general discontent, make basic presumptions of 
nationalist and extremist mobilisation superfluous and, at the same time, strengthen the 
legitimacy of the colonial state. Similar strategies seem to have been elaborated 
elsewhere at a later point -  for example in Calcutta, and also in urban Kenya in the early 
1940s, where A.E. Mirams carried out work.
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Intriguingly, however, although those people advancing social concerns in imperial 
thought and practice might never have intended to reduce the embeddedness of imperial 
power within the everyday lives of Indians they seem implicitly to have played into the 
long game of decolonisation. Clearly, the ways in which the social domain was included 
into politics during the first quarter of the twentieth century opened up new prospects 
for a variety of local interests to articulate themselves politically.
Indeed, the new, complex, and often deteriorating everyday realities of industrial areas 
in British India did not only force local colonial officials or British liberal imperialists 
to re-frame policies of colonial intervention into society, they fed into a wide range of 
indigenous political aspirations. Social experiences of modem industrial society 
translated into political mobilisation in India and elsewhere in unprecedented ways. The 
idea that discontent over social realities and conditions of life could crystallise into 
political consciousness was partly a product of the very invention of the social as a 
political entity.
In Bombay, as I have mentioned, workers’ politics formed around everyday issues of 
housing and sanitation, as did various other political expressions, including nationalist 
ones. This is an intriguing aspect of the rise of the social as a political entity not only in 
Europe, but in the colonial context; a politicised social domain emerged as an unequal 
discursive space shared by imperialists and those opposing empire. Colonial 
administrations in industrialising India and their discontents often shared the same 
social language -  they utilised the same forms of classification of social entities, they 
studied the social through the same sociological methods, and they viewed everyday 
social issues as symbolic sites of political mobilisation. Curiously, then, the social 
formed a core in a critique of empire, as well as in attempts to prolong imperial rule 
over discreet peoples.
Fredrick Cooper has discussed this contradictory development in interesting ways with 
reference to labour questions in post-Second World War French West Africa. He 
suggests that French authorities felt an urgent need to elaborate new colonial approaches 
of government in the face of increased political mobilisation among urban workers.492 
For Cooper neither the newly organised labour forces in West African cities or French 
colonial officials intended for everyday social discontent to become a negotiation over
•>y2 Cooper, 2005, 206.
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colonial rule -  which, in fact, was how the situation would later turn out. For Cooper it 
is the ways in which organised labour and colonial officials interplayed within the 
‘labour question’ that would, unintended one might add, help establish the conditions 
for decolonisation.
Indeed, (yet at an earlier point and in the context of British India) it seems likely that 
many of those engaged in criticising the past policy of the Raj and who helped turn 
social conditions political almost three decades before the events described by Cooper, 
simply saw it as putting legitimate demands before the state, rather than demanding an 
end to British occupation. Nonetheless, the politicisation of the social served as a 
strategy of government simultaneously as it empowered people everywhere in the 
industrialising world and brought new arguments to anti-colonial struggles.
Further studies into the ways in which the social emerged as a shared discursive space, 
and how it was appropriated by different and opposing interests, would help elucidate 
the historical centrality of early social politics, not only in Europe, but also elsewhere in 
empire in the beginning of the twentieth century. It would be a multifaceted topic that 
embodies questions concerning the ways in which imperial policy and the colonial state, 
never a monolith, carried the seeds of their own undoing. Studies of this kind would tell 
of how new social-political frameworks that were elaborated by thinkers and high 
placed officials, were appropriated by local protest leaders within colonial society, and 
adapted by lower rung colonial administrations across various contexts, creating a new 
situation where new forms of politics seemed plausible. Yet that would be a story best 
told within narrow historical periodisation.
Further studies into the globalisation of social politics under empire could, however, 
also advance discussions on a conceptual level that would be fruitful for the 
understanding of the present. On the basis of what has been discussed in this thesis, and 
in addition to what was mentioned above, it seems like social conditions of life, at this 
time, emerged as a defining space for questions of sovereignty of discrete peoples 
outside metropolitan countries. In other words, conditions of life — levels of poverty, ill 
health and so forth — reflected claims to, and the denying of, self-government.
For nineteenth- and early twentieth-century imperialists, as I have shown, political 
freedom was always qualified. During the nineteenth century moral and civilisational
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advance made up the qualification mark. It was, allegedly, the moral character and 
customs of people encountered by the British through military conquest, trade and 
occupation, which made up the defining aspect of sovereignty. Correspondingly, the 
difference of indigenous ways of life legitimised the British denial of local capacity for 
self-government. Barbarians, nineteenth-century imperialists argued, could be educated 
into civilised ways, and would then graduate for full independence.
It looks a likely hypothesis, however, that the social — as it was evoked within liberal 
imperial thought by the turn of the twentieth century — began to overtake moral 
character as the litmus test for perceived capacity for independence. In other words, 
arguments for denying sovereignty of discrete peoples would be framed in social, rather 
than moral terms. I have argued that influential sections of twentieth-century 
imperialists suggested that by injecting into colonial society a modem industrialism that 
would enable welfare on unprecedented levels, imperial power might sculpture colonial 
people capable of self-government. Yet the sense of we-ness that began to emerge as 
modern industrial society actually did expand would always come with the disclaimer 
that colonial administration must continue, if only to guide India through new forms of 
social hardship it had only just begun to experience.
Moreover, according to twentieth-century liberal imperialists like E.S. Montagu, social 
welfare was a prerequisite for political independence. Political freedom would never 
take root in disease-ridden neighbourhoods among the illiterate and poor, who lived 
their lives as pendants to machines, they argued. If claims to political freedom were 
anyhow articulated under such circumstances, there would be no one to exercise it in 
responsible ways: people living under poor conditions were not disposed to take full 
advantage of their independence.
This was obviously one of Foucault’s presumptions when discussing liberal forms of 
government: for liberals of both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, bio-political 
interventions were understood as necessary as long as particular populations were 
morally or materially unqualified to govern themselves. For liberal imperialists during 
the period here under review, the ‘benevolent despotism’ of the British Empire would 
temporarily see colonised populations through to welfare; empire would see them 
through to true sovereignty. Yet, in the case of twentieth-century liberal writings on the 
British Empire as we have seen, the tail end of that developmental journey towards
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sovereignty was still as it had been during the nineteenth century -  always unspecified 
and deferred for an undefined future. For twentieth-century liberal imperialists there 
existed, as it were, a continuing need for imperial intervention into everyday realities 
within the realm of the empire.
Foucault’s writing is unclear on how nineteenth-century liberal thinkers would 
conceptualise the ways in which people would be assessed for se lf  government. In the 
context of empire, the subjugation of discrete peoples under the ‘benevolent despotism’ 
of empire relied on a set of fluid qualifying assumptions. However, during the early 
twentieth century, as this study illustrates, the imperial test of whether a discrete people 
would qualify as sovereign, was cloaked in the language of rationalism and underpinned 
by a methodology of social sciences. Only to a lesser degree did it refer to the cultural 
coding of nineteenth-century philosophy, history and literature.493
By the turn of the twentieth century colonial administrators could simply seize upon 
urban neighbourhoods to collect sociological and economic data of household budgets, 
overcrowding, literacy levels, child mortality, and so forth, and from that compiled data 
they would read out their justification, and perhaps motivation, for continuing colonial 
intervention.
A further analysis of the turn towards social in imperialism as a basis for denying 
sovereignty and legitimise external bio-political interventions might prove useful as it 
provides a more tangible basis for comparison between past and present forms of 
interventionism. The shift discussed in this thesis might prove helpful to scholars who 
probe today’s world for the legacies of the British Empire.
Mark Duffleld, for example, has looked into how imperial techniques were absorbed 
and reworked by new forms of internationalised development and security regimes, and 
by the expansive national interests of domineering nation-states. Although the moment 
of decolonisation produced a world of formally equal nation-states, suggests Duffield, 
populations inhabiting this world were simultaneously split into those perceived as 
developed with full capability of self-government, and those perceived as 
underdeveloped thus producing ineffective states. For external powers to aid 
underdeveloped populations and their states would initially be framed in terms of
493 Said, E. W. (1993) Culture and Imperialism, New York: Knopf.
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solidarity, Duffield writes. Now however, underdeveloped populations in ineffective 
states are viewed as risks: they might erupt violently, turn radical, or migrate. To fix 
conditions of life through continuing external bio-political interventions becomes 
necessary in order to discourage any such tendencies. On a global level, Duffield 
argues, ‘territorial sovereignty remains, sovereignty over life within ineffective states is 
now internationalized’.494
Duffield effectively shows the connection between imperial and post-imperial 
justifications for breaching sovereignty over life. In order to analytically capture this 
continuing process of how external powers define and deny sovereignty, and justify bio­
political interventions, Duffield evokes the notion of a shifting and ‘negotiated 
sovereign frontier’. The sovereign frontier, consequently, is not simply drawn as a 
boundary between nation-states; rather, it is drawn between peoples, who are either 
perceived as capable or incapable of self-government. Over various epochs writes 
Duffield, the sovereign frontier has been consolidated, negotiated, and reconsolidated 
among and within discrete peoples and places so that ‘[cjolonization, decolonization, 
and today renewed interventionism can be interpreted as the expansion, contradiction, 
and re-expansion of the West’s external sovereign frontier’.495
Duffield’s account is convincing and arresting, yet, it has a weak spot. In order to 
establish the location of the sovereign frontier over time, he relies on how the binary 
opposition of barbarity/civilisation has been framed within liberal discourses within an 
unspecified West. This makes it difficult to compare liberal interventionism on either 
side of decolonisation because the rhetoric surrounding external bio-political 
intervention has changed dramatically over the last two hundred years. In order to 
follow these shifts Duffield traces how cultural representations reflected in liberal 
thought as structuring oppositional categories change over time. This leads him to 
suggest that where John Stuart Mill would have talked about the imperial responsibility 
to, as it were, educate the savage, today’s liberals talk about educating failing or fragile 
states. For Duffield, such a change in rhetoric figures signify the continuing update of 
discourse on the basis of evolving cultural representations, rather than a full-blown 
discursive disjuncture.
494 Duffield, 2007, 225.
495 Ib id , 232.
229
But it is not entirely clear why nineteenth-century liberal views on the moral and 
civilisational character of a particular people would now simply correspond to 
twentieth-century liberal views of the states that govern them. So, although he initially 
successfully detaches the qualification for sovereignty from its territorial and geo­
political moorings, and places it amongst people, Duffield still falls back on the state as 
the carrier of sovereignty. It is the sovereignty of states, although not in a territorial 
sense, but over life, that is continuously infringed upon in Duffield’s account. However, 
it is not evident, I believe, that ideologies of liberal interventionism have shed their 
social component in order to become an exclusively political doctrine. Externalised 
interventionism is still interested in fixing up people.
A much more tangible approach in detecting the current location of the external 
sovereign frontier and how it connects back to empire, would be to look at how social 
conditions of people were framed as the privileged space defining their sovereignty on 
either side of decolonisation. Clearly, poor social conditions have motivated external 
bio-political intervention into everyday life under empire, as 1 have shown here, and 
surely it has continued to do so in the world that came after. At various locations in the 
world previously covered by the British Empire, sectors like those discussed here -  
education, housing, and sanitation -  remain practically sustained by non-indigenous 
actors. They are likely to remain so until a time when local populations are perceived 
capable of looking after their own affairs. The language of justification might be very 
different, and the aim, and techniques might differ, but the idea that the social domain is 
key to progress and stability still remains.
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